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authordjm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>2020-10-18 11:32:01 +0000
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2020-10-18 23:46:29 +1100
commit816036f142ecd284c12bb3685ae316a68d2ef190 (patch)
treeb964deff7f92305df67c23cc359859101798d629 /monitor.c
parent9e2c4f64224f68fb84c49b5182e449f94b0dc985 (diff)
upstream: use the new variant log macros instead of prepending
__func__ and appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f14b80bcfa85414b2a1a6ff714fb5362687ace8
Diffstat (limited to 'monitor.c')
-rw-r--r--monitor.c295
1 files changed, 141 insertions, 154 deletions
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index c4e07ba4..10f84624 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.216 2020/10/18 11:21:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.217 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -309,8 +309,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
- debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
- auth_method);
+ debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
@@ -318,8 +317,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
- fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
- __func__, ent->type);
+ fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
+ ent->type);
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
authenticated = 0;
@@ -352,12 +351,11 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
}
if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
- fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
+ fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
- debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
- __func__, authctxt->user);
+ debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
@@ -426,38 +424,38 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
int r;
if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
/* Read length */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
+ debug_f("child log fd closed");
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
return -1;
}
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
- fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
+ fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
/* Read severity, message */
sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &file, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &func, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &line)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
/* Log it */
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
@@ -490,7 +488,7 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
- fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (pfd[1].revents) {
/*
@@ -505,13 +503,13 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
- debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type)
@@ -521,15 +519,13 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
if (ent->f != NULL) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
- fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
- type);
+ fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
- debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
- type);
+ debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
}
@@ -539,7 +535,7 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
return ret;
}
- fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
/* NOTREACHED */
return (-1);
@@ -584,21 +580,19 @@ mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
+ debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
- fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
+ fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
sshbuf_reset(m);
dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
if (dh == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
@@ -606,7 +600,7 @@ mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
DH_free(dh);
}
@@ -628,15 +622,15 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
u_int keyid, compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
- debug3("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (keyid > INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
+ fatal_f("invalid key ID");
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
@@ -655,21 +649,20 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
- fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
+ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
- "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
- __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
+ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
+ datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
@@ -684,24 +677,21 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sign");
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
- p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
} else
- fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
- debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
- is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen);
+ debug3_f("%s signature %p(%zu)", is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX",
+ signature, siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
free(alg);
free(p);
@@ -725,13 +715,13 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r, allowed = 0;
u_int i;
- debug3("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
- fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
+ fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
@@ -743,7 +733,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (pwent == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
goto out;
}
@@ -765,26 +755,23 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (options.x != NULL) { \
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
- } \
+ if (options.x != NULL && \
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
@@ -799,10 +786,10 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
* authentication to succeed.
*/
- debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+ debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
}
- debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+ debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
@@ -825,7 +812,7 @@ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
free(banner);
@@ -841,9 +828,8 @@ mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
free(authctxt->style);
@@ -891,9 +877,9 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
size_t plen;
if (!options.password_authentication)
- fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(ssh, passwd);
@@ -901,13 +887,14 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM");
#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
@@ -930,19 +917,19 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
- fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (success) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
}
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
@@ -962,23 +949,23 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r, authok;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
- fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
- debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
+ debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
free(response);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
@@ -1161,21 +1148,21 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
+ debug3_f("key_from_blob: %p", key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
- fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
+ fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key");
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
@@ -1206,13 +1193,13 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
cuser, chost);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unknown key type %d", type);
break;
}
}
- debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
- auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+ debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
+ pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
(key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
@@ -1224,7 +1211,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
key_blobtype = type;
key_opts = opts;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
@@ -1239,9 +1226,9 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (!allowed)
@@ -1261,7 +1248,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
int r, fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
@@ -1271,21 +1258,21 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
@@ -1298,17 +1285,17 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
if (type == 0)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -1327,9 +1314,9 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
u_char type;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
@@ -1337,11 +1324,11 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
@@ -1354,17 +1341,17 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
cp[len - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
@@ -1373,7 +1360,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
/* verify client user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
@@ -1399,11 +1386,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
if (*sigalg == '\0') {
@@ -1413,7 +1400,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
@@ -1430,15 +1417,15 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
- fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ fatal_f("bad signature data blob");
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
- debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key,
+ debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key,
(ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
(ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
@@ -1482,11 +1469,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (sig_details != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
}
sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
@@ -1526,9 +1513,9 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
static void
mm_session_close(Session *s)
{
- debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
session_unused(s->self);
@@ -1541,7 +1528,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
Session *s;
int r, res, fd0;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
sshbuf_reset(m);
s = session_new();
@@ -1557,11 +1544,11 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
- fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
+ fatal_f("dup2");
mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
@@ -1570,20 +1557,20 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
/* send messages generated by record_login */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("send fds failed");
/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (fd0 != 0)
- error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
+ error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
/* slave side of pty is not needed */
close(s->ttyfd);
@@ -1591,7 +1578,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
return (0);
@@ -1599,7 +1586,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
@@ -1611,10 +1598,10 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
char *tty;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
sshbuf_reset(m);
@@ -1628,7 +1615,7 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
- debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
+ debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
/* The child is terminating */
session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
@@ -1710,9 +1697,9 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
struct kex *kex;
int r;
- debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
+ debug3_f("packet_set_state");
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
@@ -1744,13 +1731,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
void
mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+ debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
child_state);
- debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
+ debug3_f("GOT new keys");
}
@@ -1770,7 +1757,7 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
#endif
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
@@ -1784,7 +1771,7 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
if (do_logfds) {
if (pipe(pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
@@ -1823,10 +1810,10 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
goid.elements = p;
goid.length = len;
@@ -1836,7 +1823,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
@@ -1856,10 +1843,10 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
@@ -1867,7 +1854,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
@@ -1888,11 +1875,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
@@ -1901,7 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
@@ -1918,15 +1905,15 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
const char *displayname;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";