From 816036f142ecd284c12bb3685ae316a68d2ef190 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2020 11:32:01 +0000 Subject: upstream: use the new variant log macros instead of prepending __func__ and appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f14b80bcfa85414b2a1a6ff714fb5362687ace8 --- monitor.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 141 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) (limited to 'monitor.c') diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index c4e07ba4..10f84624 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.216 2020/10/18 11:21:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.217 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl @@ -309,8 +309,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) if (authenticated && !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod)) { - debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__, - auth_method); + debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method); authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } @@ -318,8 +317,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) - fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", - __func__, ent->type); + fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d", + ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method)) authenticated = 0; @@ -352,12 +351,11 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) } if (!authctxt->valid) - fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); + fatal_f("authenticated invalid user"); if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) - fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__); + fatal_f("authentication method name unknown"); - debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", - __func__, authctxt->user); + debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user); ssh->authctxt = NULL; ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); @@ -426,38 +424,38 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) int r; if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); /* Read length */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0) - fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "reserve len"); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE) { sshbuf_free(logmsg); - debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__); + debug_f("child log fd closed"); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; return -1; } - fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse len"); if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) - fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); + fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len); /* Read severity, message */ sshbuf_reset(logmsg); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0) - fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg"); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len) - fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &file, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &func, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &line)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); /* Log it */ if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) @@ -490,7 +488,7 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; - fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); } if (pfd[1].revents) { /* @@ -505,13 +503,13 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, } if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0) - fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); - debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); + debug3_f("checking request %d", type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) @@ -521,15 +519,13 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) - fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, - type); + fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type); ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); sshbuf_free(m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { - debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, - type); + debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } @@ -539,7 +535,7 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, return ret; } - fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); + fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); @@ -584,21 +580,19 @@ mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); - debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", - __func__, min, want, max); + debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) - fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", - __func__, min, want, max); + fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max); sshbuf_reset(m); dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); if (dh == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty"); return (0); } else { /* Send first bignum */ @@ -606,7 +600,7 @@ mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); DH_free(dh); } @@ -628,15 +622,15 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) u_int keyid, compat; const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; - debug3("%s", __func__); + debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (keyid > INT_MAX) - fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__); + fatal_f("invalid key ID"); /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), @@ -655,21 +649,20 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) * the client sent us. */ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ - fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen); + fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen); if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid); + fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid); if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) - fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key " - "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof"); if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) - fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", - __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); + fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", + datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); is_proof = 1; } @@ -684,24 +677,21 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) - fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "sign"); } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && auth_sock > 0) { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, - p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) { - fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } + p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "agent sign"); } else - fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); + fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid); - debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__, - is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen); + debug3_f("%s signature %p(%zu)", is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", + signature, siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); free(alg); free(p); @@ -725,13 +715,13 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r, allowed = 0; u_int i; - debug3("%s", __func__); + debug3_f("entering"); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) - fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); + fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username); @@ -743,7 +733,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if (pwent == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw"); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); goto out; } @@ -765,26 +755,23 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) #endif (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw"); out: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble options"); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ - if (options.x != NULL) { \ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \ - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ - __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ - } \ + if (options.x != NULL && \ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \ + fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \ - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ - __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \ } \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ @@ -799,10 +786,10 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any * authentication to succeed. */ - debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__); + debug_f("no valid authentication method lists"); } - debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); + debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ @@ -825,7 +812,7 @@ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) sshbuf_reset(m); banner = auth2_read_banner(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); free(banner); @@ -841,9 +828,8 @@ mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", - __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); + debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { free(authctxt->style); @@ -891,9 +877,9 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) size_t plen; if (!options.password_authentication) - fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("password authentication not enabled"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ authenticated = options.password_authentication && auth_password(ssh, passwd); @@ -901,13 +887,14 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); #ifdef USE_PAM if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM"); #endif debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); + debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; @@ -930,19 +917,19 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r; if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) - fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled"); success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (success) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt"); } - debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); + debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (success) { @@ -962,23 +949,23 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r, authok; if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) - fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled"); if (authctxt->as == NULL) - fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); + fatal_f("no bsd auth session"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; - debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); + debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok); free(response); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); - debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); + debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; @@ -1161,21 +1148,21 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r, allowed = 0; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; - debug3("%s entering", __func__); + debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); - debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); + debug3_f("key_from_blob: %p", key); if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { /* These should not make it past the privsep child */ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) - fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__); + fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key"); switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: @@ -1206,13 +1193,13 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) cuser, chost); break; default: - fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); + fatal_f("unknown key type %d", type); break; } } - debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__, - auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test", + debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method, + pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test", (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key), allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); @@ -1224,7 +1211,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if (allowed) { /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob"); key_blobtype = type; key_opts = opts; hostbased_cuser = cuser; @@ -1239,9 +1226,9 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0) - fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if (!allowed) @@ -1261,7 +1248,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen) int r, fail = 0; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_from"); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { p = sshbuf_ptr(b); @@ -1271,21 +1258,21 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen) (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "consume"); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid"); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); @@ -1298,17 +1285,17 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen) free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse method"); if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) fail++; free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype"); if (type == 0) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse pk"); if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); @@ -1327,9 +1314,9 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, u_char type; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid"); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || @@ -1337,11 +1324,11 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); @@ -1354,17 +1341,17 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse method"); if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0) fail++; free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse pk"); /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse host"); if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.') cp[len - 1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0) @@ -1373,7 +1360,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, /* verify client user */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser"); if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0) fail++; free(cp); @@ -1399,11 +1386,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); + fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed"); /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ if (*sigalg == '\0') { @@ -1413,7 +1400,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0) - fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse key"); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: @@ -1430,15 +1417,15 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) break; } if (!valid_data) - fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); + fatal_f("bad signature data blob"); if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); - debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key, + debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key, (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified", (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : ""); @@ -1482,11 +1469,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) encoded_ret = (ret != 0); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (sig_details != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk"); } sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); @@ -1526,9 +1513,9 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw) static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { - debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); + debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); + debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } session_unused(s->self); @@ -1541,7 +1528,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) Session *s; int r, res, fd0; - debug3("%s entering", __func__); + debug3_f("entering"); sshbuf_reset(m); s = session_new(); @@ -1557,11 +1544,11 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) - fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); + fatal_f("dup2"); mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw); @@ -1570,20 +1557,20 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) /* send messages generated by record_login */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) - fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg"); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) - fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); + fatal_f("send fds failed"); /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) - fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) - error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); + error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0); /* slave side of pty is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); @@ -1591,7 +1578,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); + debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); @@ -1599,7 +1586,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if (s != NULL) mm_session_close(s); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); return (0); } @@ -1611,10 +1598,10 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) char *tty; int r; - debug3("%s entering", __func__); + debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse tty"); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) mm_session_close(s); sshbuf_reset(m); @@ -1628,7 +1615,7 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req) extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; - debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); + debug3_f("tearing down sessions"); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close); @@ -1710,9 +1697,9 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) struct kex *kex; int r; - debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__); + debug3_f("packet_set_state"); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0) - fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state"); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; @@ -1744,13 +1731,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { - debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); + debug3_f("Waiting for new keys"); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); - debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); + debug3_f("GOT new keys"); } @@ -1770,7 +1757,7 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) #endif if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) - fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -1784,7 +1771,7 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) if (do_logfds) { if (pipe(pair) == -1) - fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; @@ -1823,10 +1810,10 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); goid.elements = p; goid.length = len; @@ -1836,7 +1823,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); @@ -1856,10 +1843,10 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); @@ -1867,7 +1854,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); @@ -1888,11 +1875,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); @@ -1901,7 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); @@ -1918,15 +1905,15 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) const char *displayname; if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); - debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); + debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; -- cgit v1.2.3