diff options
author | Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org> | 2023-10-26 21:29:32 +0200 |
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committer | Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org> | 2023-10-26 21:29:32 +0200 |
commit | 9198c1f2b1ddecde22af918541e0de2a32f0f45a (patch) | |
tree | 2af602f979b00fea18542cd679191c320009f9b2 /src/cmdhist.c | |
parent | 5f5131d775bf9966976e39aa38b070036cbfe969 (diff) |
patch 9.0.2068: [security] overflow in :historyv9.0.2068
Problem: [security] overflow in :history
Solution: Check that value fits into int
The get_list_range() function, used to parse numbers for the :history
and :clist command internally uses long variables to store the numbers.
However function arguments are integer pointers, which can then
overflow.
Check that the return value from the vim_str2nr() function is not larger
than INT_MAX and if yes, bail out with an error. I guess nobody uses a
cmdline/clist history that needs so many entries... (famous last words).
It is only a moderate vulnerability, so impact should be low.
Github Advisory:
https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-q22m-h7m2-9mgm
Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cmdhist.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/cmdhist.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/cmdhist.c b/src/cmdhist.c index d398ca7a68..96a9b3e95b 100644 --- a/src/cmdhist.c +++ b/src/cmdhist.c @@ -742,7 +742,10 @@ ex_history(exarg_T *eap) end = arg; if (!get_list_range(&end, &hisidx1, &hisidx2) || *end != NUL) { - semsg(_(e_trailing_characters_str), end); + if (*end != NUL) + semsg(_(e_trailing_characters_str), end); + else + semsg(_(e_val_too_large), arg); return; } |