diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'apps')
| -rw-r--r-- | apps/s_apps.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | apps/s_cb.c | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | apps/s_client.c | 16 |
3 files changed, 79 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/apps/s_apps.h b/apps/s_apps.h index e9b6f40288..8e12c2146c 100644 --- a/apps/s_apps.h +++ b/apps/s_apps.h @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc); void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc); int args_excert(int option, SSL_EXCERT **pexc); int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc); +void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio); void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s); #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c index 096471a86f..30c9147d5c 100644 --- a/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/apps/s_cb.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (verify_depth >= depth) { if (!verify_return_error) ok = 1; - verify_error = X509_V_OK; + verify_error = err; } else { ok = 0; verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; @@ -1086,6 +1086,80 @@ static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s) BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } +/* + * Hex encoder for TLSA RRdata, not ':' delimited. + */ +static char *hexencode(const unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; + char *out; + char *cp; + size_t outlen = 2 * len + 1; + int ilen = (int) outlen; + + if (outlen < len || ilen < 0 || outlen != (size_t)ilen) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %" PRIu64 "-byte buffer too large to hexencode\n", + opt_getprog(), (uint64_t)len); + exit(1); + } + cp = out = app_malloc(ilen, "TLSA hex data buffer"); + + while (ilen-- > 0) { + *cp++ = hex[(*data >> 4) & 0x0f]; + *cp++ = hex[*data++ & 0x0f]; + } + *cp = '\0'; + return out; +} + +void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio) +{ + int mdpth; + EVP_PKEY *mspki; + long verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(s); + + if (verify_err == X509_V_OK) { + const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(s); + + BIO_printf(bio, "Verification: OK\n"); + if (peername != NULL) + BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername); + } else { + const char *reason = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err); + + BIO_printf(bio, "Verification error: %s\n", reason); + } + + if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) { + uint8_t usage, selector, mtype; + const unsigned char *data = NULL; + size_t dlen = 0; + char *hexdata; + + mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, &data, &dlen); + + /* + * The TLSA data field can be quite long when it is a certificate, + * public key or even a SHA2-512 digest. Because the initial octets of + * ASN.1 certificates and public keys contain mostly boilerplate OIDs + * and lengths, we show the last 12 bytes of the data instead, as these + * are more likely to distinguish distinct TLSA records. + */ +#define TLSA_TAIL_SIZE 12 + if (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) + hexdata = hexencode(data + dlen - TLSA_TAIL_SIZE, TLSA_TAIL_SIZE); + else + hexdata = hexencode(data, dlen); + BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s%s %s at depth %d\n", + usage, selector, mtype, + (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) ? "..." : "", hexdata, + (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the certificate" : + mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate", + mdpth); + OPENSSL_free(hexdata); + } +} + void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; @@ -1100,12 +1174,14 @@ void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s) peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer) { int nid; + BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: "); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); + print_verify_detail(s, bio_err); } else BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n"); X509_free(peer); diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index 39e3e48288..8fe16121a9 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -2461,9 +2461,6 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) const SSL_CIPHER *c; X509_NAME *xn; int i; - int mdpth; - EVP_PKEY *mspki; - const char *peername; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion; #endif @@ -2525,18 +2522,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)), BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s))); } - if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) { - uint8_t usage, selector, mtype; - mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, NULL, NULL); - BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s at depth %d\n", - usage, selector, mtype, - (mspki != NULL) ? "TA public key verified certificate" : - mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate", - mdpth); - } - if (SSL_get_verify_result(s) == X509_V_OK && - (peername = SSL_get0_peername(s)) != NULL) - BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername); + print_verify_detail(s, bio); BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_session_reused(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, ")); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n", |