diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c | 85 |
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c index 49da1a690f..d74da436a2 100644 --- a/providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c +++ b/providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c @@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ typedef struct { void *provctx; - EVP_MAC *mac; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */ - PROV_DIGEST digest; + EVP_MAC_CTX *macctx; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */ + PROV_DIGEST digest; /* H(x) = hash(x) */ unsigned char *secret; size_t secret_len; unsigned char *info; @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom, * H(x) = HMAC-hash(salt, x) OR * H(x) = KMAC#(salt, x, outbits, CustomString='KDF') */ -static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md, +static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init, const unsigned char *kmac_custom, size_t kmac_custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, @@ -220,30 +220,18 @@ static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md, unsigned char c[4]; unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *out = derived_key; - EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; + EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned char *mac = mac_buf, *kmac_buffer = NULL; - OSSL_PARAM params[3]; - size_t params_n = 0; + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || derived_key_len == 0) return 0; - ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(kdf_mac); - if (ctx_init == NULL) - goto end; - - if (hmac_md != NULL) { - const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(hmac_md); - params[params_n++] = - OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, - (char *)mdname, 0); - } - params[params_n++] = - OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, (void *)salt, - salt_len); - params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, + (void *)salt, salt_len); + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params)) goto end; @@ -298,7 +286,6 @@ end: OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf)); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); - EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init); return ret; } @@ -316,8 +303,8 @@ static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx) { KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx; + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->macctx); ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest); - EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len); @@ -365,33 +352,34 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) return 0; } - if (ctx->mac != NULL) { + if (ctx->macctx != NULL) { /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */ int ret; const unsigned char *custom = NULL; size_t custom_len = 0; int default_salt_len; + EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->macctx); /* * TODO(3.0) investigate the necessity to have all these controls. * Why does KMAC require a salt length that's shorter than the MD * block size? */ - if (EVP_MAC_is_a(ctx->mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) { + if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) { /* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */ if (md == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); return 0; } - default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(md); + default_salt_len = EVP_MD_size(md); if (default_salt_len <= 0) return 0; - } else if (EVP_MAC_is_a(ctx->mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128) - || EVP_MAC_is_a(ctx->mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) { + } else if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128) + || EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) { /* H(x) = KMACzzz(x, salt, custom) */ custom = kmac_custom_str; custom_len = sizeof(kmac_custom_str); - if (EVP_MAC_is_a(ctx->mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128)) + if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128)) default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE; else default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE; @@ -408,7 +396,7 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) } ctx->salt_len = default_salt_len; } - ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->mac, md, + ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->macctx, custom, custom_len, ctx->out_len, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len, @@ -435,43 +423,34 @@ static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) return 0; } - if (ctx->mac != NULL) { + if (ctx->macctx != NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; - } else { - /* H(x) = hash */ - if (md == NULL) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len, - ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen); } + + /* H(x) = hash */ + if (md == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); + return 0; + } + + return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len, + ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen); } static int sskdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) { const OSSL_PARAM *p; KDF_SSKDF *ctx = vctx; - OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx); - EVP_MAC *mac; + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx); size_t sz; - const char *properties = NULL; - if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx)) + if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx)) return 0; - if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC)) != NULL) { - EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac); - ctx->mac = NULL; - - mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx), p->data, - properties); - if (mac == NULL) - return 0; - EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac); - ctx->mac = mac; - } + if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->macctx, params, + NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx)) + return 0; if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) |