diff options
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 83 |
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index 01088af312..7195379401 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -1302,19 +1302,52 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return ret; } -static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, int *al) +static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + PACKET psk_identity_hint; -#else + /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in + * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of + * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK + * identity. + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, + &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + return 1; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; #endif } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; - int al; + int al = -1; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PACKET save_param_start, signature; @@ -1337,48 +1370,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { - PACKET psk_identity_hint; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in - * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of - * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK - * identity. - */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; - } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, - &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } + if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; } /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - } else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ - /* - * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_* - * options - */ - if (0) { } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { @@ -1678,8 +1676,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + if (al == -1) + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; err: + if (al != -1) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |