diff options
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/openssl/ssl.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/openssl/tls1.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/packet_locl.h | 63 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_enc.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_enc.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 513 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/packettest.c | 95 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/recipes/80-test_ssl.t | 11 |
9 files changed, 415 insertions, 279 deletions
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) If the server has ALPN configured, but supports no protocols that the + client advertises, send a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. + This behaviour is SHALL in RFC 7301, though it isn't universally + implemented by other servers. + [Emilia Käsper] + *) Add X25519 support. Integrate support for X25519 into EC library. This includes support for public and private key encoding using the format documented in diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h b/include/openssl/ssl.h index c9119e345e..6e223960a9 100644 --- a/include/openssl/ssl.h +++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h @@ -1109,6 +1109,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK +# define SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL # define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 # define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 diff --git a/include/openssl/tls1.h b/include/openssl/tls1.h index 0f0d4a3713..c2fe36430b 100644 --- a/include/openssl/tls1.h +++ b/include/openssl/tls1.h @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ extern "C" { # define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113 # define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114 # define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115/* fatal */ +# define TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* fatal */ /* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0 diff --git a/ssl/packet_locl.h b/ssl/packet_locl.h index 48767b6728..fd1f9f4ecf 100644 --- a/ssl/packet_locl.h +++ b/ssl/packet_locl.h @@ -93,6 +93,16 @@ static ossl_inline size_t PACKET_remaining(const PACKET *pkt) } /* + * Returns a pointer to the first byte after the packet data. + * Useful for integrating with non-PACKET parsing code. + * Specifically, we use PACKET_end() to verify that a d2i_... call + * has consumed the entire packet contents. + */ +static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_end(const PACKET *pkt) +{ + return pkt->curr + pkt->remaining; +} +/* * Returns a pointer to the PACKET's current position. * For use in non-PACKETized APIs. */ @@ -452,6 +462,12 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_strndup(const PACKET *pkt, char **data) return (*data != NULL); } +/* Returns 1 if |pkt| contains at least one 0-byte, 0 otherwise. */ +static ossl_inline int PACKET_contains_zero_byte(const PACKET *pkt) +{ + return memchr(pkt->curr, 0, pkt->remaining) != NULL; +} + /* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len) { @@ -489,6 +505,28 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, } /* + * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1, but additionally, fails when there are + * leftover bytes in |pkt|. + */ +__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) +{ + unsigned int length; + const unsigned char *data; + PACKET tmp = *pkt; + if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) || + !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || + PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + *pkt = tmp; + subpkt->curr = data; + subpkt->remaining = length; + + return 1; +} + +/* * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a two-byte length, and stores * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|. * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with @@ -501,6 +539,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int length; const unsigned char *data; PACKET tmp = *pkt; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) { return 0; @@ -514,6 +553,30 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, } /* + * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2, but additionally, fails when there are + * leftover bytes in |pkt|. + */ +__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, + PACKET *subpkt) +{ + unsigned int length; + const unsigned char *data; + PACKET tmp = *pkt; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) || + !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || + PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + *pkt = tmp; + subpkt->curr = data; + subpkt->remaining = length; + + return 1; +} + +/* * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a three-byte length, and stores * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|. * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c index d4d64d0e5e..1c493e2807 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -667,6 +667,8 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code) return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: + return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); default: return (-1); } diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index 1b2820bff9..21eb3283da 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -792,6 +792,8 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code) return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: + return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); default: return (-1); } diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index f02317e09f..3aa01db7e5 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1732,63 +1732,62 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } /* - * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a - * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type - * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the - * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on - * success. + * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. + * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. + * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. + * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - unsigned int data_len; - unsigned int proto_len; const unsigned char *selected; - const unsigned char *data; unsigned char selected_len; int r; + PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; - if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) - return 0; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - /* - * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, - * length-prefixed strings. - */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len - || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len)) - goto parse_error; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { + return 0; + } + save_protocol_list = protocol_list; do { - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len) - || proto_len == 0 - || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len)) - goto parse_error; - } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)); + /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); - r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len, + if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) + return 1; + + r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + PACKET_data(&save_protocol_list), + PACKET_remaining(&save_protocol_list), s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return -1; + return 0; } memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; + } else { + *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; + return 0; } - return 0; - parse_error: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return -1; + return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /*- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X - * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. + * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, * elliptic_curves @@ -1801,9 +1800,9 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int type, size; - const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2; - PACKET tmppkt; + unsigned int type; + PACKET sni, tmppkt; + size_t ext_len; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ @@ -1817,10 +1816,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - }; - - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { + /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ @@ -1831,51 +1827,46 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; + /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ + static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; + tmppkt = *pkt; if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size) - || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size)) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { return; + } if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2) - || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt)) - return; - if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; - if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) - return; - } else { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len) - || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt)) - return; - if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; - } + ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? + sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; - s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; + s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, + ext_len); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +/* + * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of + * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions. + * + * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no + * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise + * ignored. + * + * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. + * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert. + */ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int type; - unsigned int size; - unsigned int len; - const unsigned char *data; int renegotiate_seen = 0; + PACKET extensions; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -1911,29 +1902,29 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) goto ri_check; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) - goto err; - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) - goto err; - - if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) - goto err; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) + return 0; - while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { - PACKET subpkt; + if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) + return 0; - if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size)) - goto err; + /* + * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but, + * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon + * resumption. + */ + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) { + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) + return 0; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size)) - goto err; + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), + s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al)) + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -1964,219 +1955,185 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - const unsigned char *sdata; unsigned int servname_type; - unsigned int dsize; - PACKET ssubpkt; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize)) - goto err; - - while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len) - goto err; - - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) - goto err; - - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = - OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt, - (unsigned char *)s->session - ->tlsext_hostname, - len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } else { - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, - (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } + PACKET sni, hostname; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni) + /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ + || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { + return 0; } - /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0) - goto err; + /* + * Although the server_name extension was intended to be + * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the + * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as + * such. + * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types + * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other + * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. + * + * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, + * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) + || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name + || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit) { + if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->servername_done = 1; + } else { + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST + * fall back to a full handshake. + */ + s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname + && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, + strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len) - || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - goto err; - - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) - return -1; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login, - len)) - goto err; - s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; - - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) - goto err; + PACKET srp_I; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I)) + return 0; + + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) + return 0; + + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user + * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. + */ + if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; + PACKET ec_point_format_list; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) - || ecpointformatlist_length == 0) - goto err; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, + &ec_point_format_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { + return 0; + } if (!s->hit) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, + &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ecpointformatlist_length; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ecpointformatlist_length)) - goto err; - } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) { - goto err; - } - /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { - unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length; + PACKET elliptic_curve_list; - /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length) - || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0 - || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0) - goto err; + /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, + &elliptic_curve_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 + || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { + return 0; + } if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) - goto err; - - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = - ellipticcurvelist_length; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - ellipticcurvelist_length)) - goto err; - } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) { - goto err; - } - /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { - goto err; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size) - || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) { + if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && + !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { - unsigned int dsize; - - if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || (dsize & 1) != 0 - || (dsize == 0) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize) - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0 - || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { - goto err; + PACKET supported_sig_algs; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs) + || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit) { + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), + PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { + return 0; + } } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - PACKET ssubpkt; + const unsigned char *ext_data; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, - (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) - goto err; + if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, + (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { + return 0; + } if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - const unsigned char *sdata; - unsigned int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize)) - goto err; - - while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) { + PACKET responder_id_list, exts; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) + return 0; + + while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; - unsigned int idsize; + PACKET responder_id; + const unsigned char *id_data; - if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4 - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) { - goto err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, + &responder_id) + || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { + return 0; } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) - goto err; - if (data != sdata) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - goto err; + + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL + && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = + sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { + + id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); + id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, + PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); + if (id == NULL) + return 0; + + if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2185,33 +2142,34 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize) - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { - goto err; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) { + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts)) + return 0; + + if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { + ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) - goto err; + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, + PACKET_remaining(&exts)); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL + || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { + return 0; + } } - } /* * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. */ - else + } else { s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { unsigned int hbtype; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype) - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) + || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2255,8 +2213,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0) + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { + if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al)) return 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ @@ -2268,7 +2226,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al)) + if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; } #endif @@ -2289,14 +2247,17 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * ServerHello may be later returned. */ else if (!s->hit) { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0) + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0) return 0; } } - /* Spurious data on the end */ - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) - goto err; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } ri_check: @@ -2310,10 +2271,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } + /* + * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly. + * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early. + * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must + * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers. + */ return 1; -err: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; } int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) @@ -2324,7 +2288,6 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } - |