diff options
| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2014-04-06 00:51:06 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2014-04-07 19:25:34 +0100 |
| commit | 7e840163c06c7692b796a93e3fa85a93136adbb2 (patch) | |
| tree | 67eeb65e9cae0d16b0b12be1d54d01d4c8a32780 /ssl/t1_lib.c | |
| parent | a4896327e3e8c692438f0a85306f207b84b767f0 (diff) | |
Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index c4f23c1022..80397b9c07 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -3801,16 +3801,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - /* Read type and payload length first */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - pl = p; - if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + /* Read type and payload length first */ + if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) + return 0; /* silently discard */ + hbtype = *p++; + n2s(p, payload); + if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + pl = p; + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; |