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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2015-09-11 11:23:20 +0100
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2015-10-30 08:38:18 +0000
commit61ae935a9831d2b132e50508ccc37f879c17a5c4 (patch)
treeb3d5ff4e6c4055b365199cf7dd0e4b6df668e101 /ssl/statem
parent8ba708e5166b02ab61f2762d36b3e7b7455e9c06 (diff)
More state machine reorg
Move some function definitions around within the state machine to make sure they are in the correct files. Also create a statem_locl.h header for stuff entirely local to the state machine code and move various definitions into it. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/statem')
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem.c1376
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem.h8
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c623
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c1
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_lib.c1
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_locl.h181
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c721
7 files changed, 1530 insertions, 1381 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c
index 7e4f524ddc..f0b3260829 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
/*
* This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines.
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@
* | Message flow state machine | | |
* | | | |
* | -------------------- -------------------- | Transition | Handshake state |
- * | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine |
+ * | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine |
* | | sub-state | | sub-state | |----------->| |
* | | machine for | | machine for | | | |
* | | reading messages | | writing messages | | | |
@@ -108,27 +109,6 @@ static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s);
static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s);
static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s);
static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s);
-static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
-static inline int key_exchange_skip_allowed(SSL *s);
-static int client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
-static enum WRITE_TRAN client_write_transition(SSL *s);
-static enum WORK_STATE client_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static int client_construct_message(SSL *s);
-static unsigned long client_max_message_size(SSL *s);
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
-static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s);
-static enum WORK_STATE server_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static enum WORK_STATE server_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static int server_construct_message(SSL *s);
-static unsigned long server_max_message_size(SSL *s);
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-static enum WORK_STATE server_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-
enum HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
{
@@ -818,7 +798,7 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
/*
* Flush the write BIO
*/
-static int statem_flush(SSL *s)
+int statem_flush(SSL *s)
{
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
@@ -867,7 +847,6 @@ int statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
return 0;
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Set flag used by SCTP to determine whether we are in the read sock state
@@ -890,1352 +869,3 @@ int statem_in_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s)
return s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock;
}
#endif
-
-/*
- * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
-{
- /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Are we allowed to skip the ServerKeyExchange message?
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int key_exchange_skip_allowed(SSL *s)
-{
- long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
- * ciphersuite.
- */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
- * state transitions when the client is reading messages from the server. The
- * message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
- * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Success (transition allowed)
- * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
- */
-static int client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- return 1;
- } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
- & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
- && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* No valid transition found */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
- * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
- */
-static enum WRITE_TRAN client_write_transition(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* Renegotiation - fall through */
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- /*
- * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
- * we will be sent
- */
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- /*
- * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
- * sent, but no verify packet is sent
- */
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
- * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
- * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
- * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
-#else
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
-#endif
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- }
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
- * the client to the server.
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE client_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
- * messages unless we need to.
- */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
- return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
-#endif
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
-
- default:
- /* No pre work to be done */
- break;
- }
-
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
- * client to the server.
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
-#endif
- /*
- * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
- */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- }
-#endif
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
- s->first_packet = 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
- return WORK_ERROR;
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
-#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
- else
- s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
- return WORK_ERROR;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
- return WORK_ERROR;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_B;
-
- if (s->hit && tls_finish_handshake(s, WORK_MORE_A) != 1)
- return WORK_ERROR;
- break;
-
- default:
- /* No post work to be done */
- break;
- }
-
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success
- * 0: Error
- */
-static int client_construct_message(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
- return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
- else
- return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
- return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
-#endif
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- return tls_construct_finished(s,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */
-#define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258
-#define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 20000
-#define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 102400
-#define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH 0
-#define CCS_MAX_LENGTH 1
-/* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */
-#define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH 64
-
-/*
- * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
- * reading. Excludes the message header.
- */
-static unsigned long client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- return s->max_cert_list;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
- */
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
-
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
- * from the server
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
- if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- }
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- if (!s->hit)
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
- else
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WORK_ERROR;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
- * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
- * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
- * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success (transition allowed)
- * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
- */
-static int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- /*
- * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
- * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
- * OR
- * 2) If we did request one then
- * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
- * AND
- * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
- * list if we requested a certificate)
- */
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
- && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
- || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- /*
- * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
- * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
- * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
- * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
- * the case of static DH). In that case |s->no_cert_verify| should be
- * set.
- */
- if (s->session->peer == NULL || s->no_cert_verify) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /*
- * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
- * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
- * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
- * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
- */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
-#endif
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- }
-#endif
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* No valid transition found */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH, fortezza or RSA but we have a
- * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
- * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
- * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
- * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
- * key exchange.
- */
- if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
- || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
- [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
- 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- )
- )
- )
- /*
- * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
- * provided
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
- || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
- && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
- /* For other PSK always send SKE */
- || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-#endif
- ) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-{
- if (
- /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
- /*
- * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
- */
- && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
- /*
- * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
- * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
- * RFC 2246):
- */
- && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
- /*
- * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
- * are omitted
- */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
- * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
- */
-static enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- } else {
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
- (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
- } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
- } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
- }
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
- if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-