diff options
author | Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> | 2014-09-04 13:04:42 +0200 |
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committer | Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> | 2014-09-24 15:52:41 +0200 |
commit | 8d507aee7c2d91aaa9b9142530d46d82f1a0139b (patch) | |
tree | 882e8e3e3c3f966ad8fa4f30448f781dbc754a54 /ssl/s3_srvr.c | |
parent | 133145686e054a28f78b94e8a996ef7ae13d30b7 (diff) |
RT3067: simplify patch
(Original commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 72 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 127185a7dd..c23d987080 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" +#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> @@ -2168,8 +2169,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask; - unsigned char version_good; + int decrypt_len; + unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) @@ -2233,18 +2234,18 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) ERR_clear_error(); /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. - * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */ - decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ + decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct - * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa - * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. + * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks * are done in constant time and are treated like any other * decryption error. */ - version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8); - version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff); + version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); + version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks @@ -2255,55 +2256,22 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { - unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good; - unsigned char workaround; - - /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is - * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise - * it'll be 0x00. */ - workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4; - workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2; - workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1; - workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1); - - workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8); - workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff); - - /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version - * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over - * version_good. */ - version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) | - (version_good & ~workaround_mask); - } - - /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision - * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be - * used. */ - decrypt_good_mask |= version_good; - - /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len == - * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We - * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB - * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll - * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */ - decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16; - decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8; - decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4; - decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2; - decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1; - /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len == - * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then - * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all - * zeros. */ - decrypt_good_mask &= 1; - decrypt_good_mask--; + unsigned char workaround_good; + workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); + workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); + version_good |= workaround_good; + } + + /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good + * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ + decrypt_good &= version_good; /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using * decrypt_good_mask. */ for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++) { - p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) | - (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask); + p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i], + rand_premaster_secret[i]); } s->session->master_key_length= |