diff options
| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2011-05-12 17:44:59 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2011-05-12 17:44:59 +0000 |
| commit | 376838a6064c07e53806a025a82f5ade4a8edca3 (patch) | |
| tree | ca5bb9a534d994aaa6c19454190de152924af11e /ssl/s3_clnt.c | |
| parent | d768a816aaf15b7809f56677b748719a43725d4f (diff) | |
Process signature algorithms during TLS v1.2 client authentication.
Make sure message is long enough for signature algorithms.
(backport from HEAD).
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_clnt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_clnt.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index b8e2b89df4..75f0a8e052 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -1775,7 +1775,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { int ok,ret=0; unsigned long n,nc,l; - unsigned int llen,sigalglen, ctype_num,i; + unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i; X509_NAME *xn=NULL; const unsigned char *p,*q; unsigned char *d; @@ -1834,14 +1834,24 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) /* HACK! For now just skip over signatature algorithms */ if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - n2s(p, sigalglen); - p += sigalglen; - sigalglen += 2; + n2s(p, llen); + /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and + * following length value. + */ + if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + goto err; + } + p += llen; } - else - sigalglen = 0; - - /* get the CA RDNs */ n2s(p,llen); @@ -1854,7 +1864,7 @@ fclose(out); } #endif - if ((llen+ctype_num+sigalglen+2+1) != n) + if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |