diff options
| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2014-05-13 18:48:31 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2014-06-05 13:23:05 +0100 |
| commit | 410e444b71bca5af929fe82162cbe37e31c82083 (patch) | |
| tree | 186ef4e41241fb825e5e96a14a7731f83a190b7c /ssl/d1_both.c | |
| parent | a91be10833e61bcdc9002de28489405101c52650 (diff) | |
Fix for CVE-2014-0195
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 1632ef744872edc2aa2a53d487d3e79c965a4ad3)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/d1_both.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 820c8f08fa..228af21462 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -632,7 +632,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; } else + { frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; + if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) + { + item = NULL; + frag = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a * retransmit and can be dropped. |