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authorDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>2014-05-13 18:48:31 +0100
committerDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>2014-06-05 09:04:27 +0100
commit1632ef744872edc2aa2a53d487d3e79c965a4ad3 (patch)
treef270b635ac06b1f4689d8634d064b200b0025560 /ssl/d1_both.c
parentf1f4fbde2ad48bd6cd61c2d054c4efcd9dcc73e6 (diff)
Fix for CVE-2014-0195
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/d1_both.c')
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_both.c9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 1bb2e4d1a1..7de9ae4b5f 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
+ {
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ {
+ item = NULL;
+ frag = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.