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authorShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>2020-08-29 12:37:46 +1000
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2020-09-18 14:20:38 +0100
commite43b44824174fb35309b32db9c1cca5d6fdca74a (patch)
tree7bd85be4efb43b7e2fbe57269f56ad9f99d2a406 /providers
parent3f699197ac0ccf7e3dda6ff3cddaa33803285299 (diff)
Add fips checks for dsa signatures
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12745)
Diffstat (limited to 'providers')
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/signature/build.info3
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c150
2 files changed, 104 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/build.info b/providers/implementations/signature/build.info
index 5a813083b2..9d682b81da 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/build.info
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/build.info
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ $DSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$EC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
IF[{- !$disabled{dsa} -}]
- SOURCE[$DSA_GOAL]=dsa.c
+ SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=dsa.c
+ SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=dsa.c
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}]
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
index f18f90ec63..7d2496aae8 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
@@ -30,18 +30,19 @@
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/provider_util.h"
#include "crypto/dsa.h"
#include "prov/der_dsa.h"
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn dsa_newctx;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_signature_init;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn dsa_sign;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn dsa_verify;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_sign_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn dsa_digest_sign_final;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn dsa_digest_verify_final;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn dsa_freectx;
@@ -85,8 +86,50 @@ typedef struct {
EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
size_t mdsize;
+ int operation;
+
} PROV_DSA_CTX;
+/*
+ * Check for valid key sizes if fips mode. Refer to
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
+ * "Table 2"
+ */
+static int dsa_check_key_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ size_t L, N;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *q;
+ DSA *dsa = ctx->dsa;
+
+ if (dsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = DSA_get0_p(dsa);
+ q = DSA_get0_q(dsa);
+ if (p == NULL || q == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ L = BN_num_bits(p);
+ N = BN_num_bits(q);
+
+ /*
+ * Valid sizes or verification - Note this could be a fips186-2 type
+ * key - so we allow 512 also. When this is no longer suppported the
+ * lower bound should be increased to 1024.
+ */
+ if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)
+ return (L >= 512 && N >= 160);
+
+ /* Valid sizes for both sign and verify */
+ if (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256))
+ return 1;
+ return (L == 3072 && N == 256);
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
static size_t dsa_get_md_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx)
{
if (pdsactx->md != NULL)
@@ -94,42 +137,11 @@ static size_t dsa_get_md_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx)
return 0;
}
-static int dsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
+static int dsa_get_md_nid(const PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
- /*
- * Because the DSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
- * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
- * map.
- */
- static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
- { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
- { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
- { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
- { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
- { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
- { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
- { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
- { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
- { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
- };
- size_t i;
- int mdnid = NID_undef;
-
- if (md == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
- if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
- mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (mdnid == NID_undef)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
- end:
- return mdnid;
+ return ossl_prov_digest_get_approved_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
}
static void *dsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
@@ -160,11 +172,21 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
mdprops = ctx->propq;
if (mdname != NULL) {
- EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
- int md_nid = dsa_get_md_nid(md);
WPACKET pkt;
+ EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+ int md_nid = dsa_get_md_nid(ctx, md);
+ size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL || md_nid == NID_undef) {
+ if (md == NULL)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+ if (md_nid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
+ if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
@@ -196,7 +218,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
return 1;
}
-static int dsa_signature_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
+static int dsa_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, int operation)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
@@ -207,9 +229,24 @@ static int dsa_signature_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
return 0;
DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa);
pdsactx->dsa = vdsa;
+ pdsactx->operation = operation;
+ if (!dsa_check_key_size(pdsactx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
+static int dsa_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+}
+
+static int dsa_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+}
+
static int dsa_sign(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
@@ -254,7 +291,7 @@ static int dsa_verify(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
}
static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
- void *vdsa)
+ void *vdsa, int operation)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
@@ -262,7 +299,7 @@ static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
return 0;
pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!dsa_signature_init(vpdsactx, vdsa))
+ if (!dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, operation))
return 0;
if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, NULL))
@@ -285,6 +322,17 @@ static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
return 0;
}
+static int dsa_digest_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
+ void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+}
+
+static int dsa_digest_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname, void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+}
+
int dsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
@@ -428,7 +476,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
@@ -477,6 +525,12 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
* params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
* case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
* digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
+ * NOTE: Ideally we would check pdsactx->flag_allow_md, but this is
+ * problematic because there is no nice way of passing the
+ * PROV_DSA_CTX down to this function...
+ * Because we have API's that dont know about their parent..
+ * e.g: EVP_SIGNATURE_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_SIGNATURE *sig).
+ * We could pass NULL for that case (but then how useful is the check?).
*/
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
@@ -523,18 +577,18 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx)
const OSSL_DISPATCH dsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_newctx },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,