Fix external symbols related to provider related security checks for

keys and digests.

Partial fix for #12964

This adds ossl_ names for the following symbols:

digest_get_approved_nid, digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1
digest_is_allowed, digest_md_to_nid, digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid,
securitycheck_enabled,
dh_check_key, dsa_check_key, ec_check_key,

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14211)

5 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c
index df412ccf73..32ce2ee0ed 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int dh_init(void *vpdhctx, void *vdh)
     DH_free(pdhctx->dh);
     pdhctx->dh = vdh;
     pdhctx->kdf_type = PROV_DH_KDF_NONE;
-    return dh_check_key(vdh);
+    return ossl_dh_check_key(vdh);
 }
 
 static int dh_set_peer(void *vpdhctx, void *vdh)
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int dh_set_ctx_params(void *vpdhctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 
         EVP_MD_free(pdhctx->kdf_md);
         pdhctx->kdf_md = EVP_MD_fetch(pdhctx->libctx, name, mdprops);
-        if (!digest_is_allowed(pdhctx->kdf_md)) {
+        if (!ossl_digest_is_allowed(pdhctx->kdf_md)) {
             EVP_MD_free(pdhctx->kdf_md);
             pdhctx->kdf_md = NULL;
         }
diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
index a1b17443ba..8d3f748f9b 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int ecdh_init(void *vpecdhctx, void *vecdh)
     pecdhctx->k = vecdh;
     pecdhctx->cofactor_mode = -1;
     pecdhctx->kdf_type = PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
-    return ec_check_key(vecdh, 1);
+    return ossl_ec_check_key(vecdh, 1);
 }
 
 static
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int ecdh_set_peer(void *vpecdhctx, void *vecdh)
         return 0;
     EC_KEY_free(pecdhctx->peerk);
     pecdhctx->peerk = vecdh;
-    return ec_check_key(vecdh, 1);
+    return ossl_ec_check_key(vecdh, 1);
 }
 
 static
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int ecdh_set_ctx_params(void *vpecdhctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 
         EVP_MD_free(pectx->kdf_md);
         pectx->kdf_md = EVP_MD_fetch(pectx->libctx, name, mdprops);
-        if (!digest_is_allowed(pectx->kdf_md)) {
+        if (!ossl_digest_is_allowed(pectx->kdf_md)) {
             EVP_MD_free(pectx->kdf_md);
             pectx->kdf_md = NULL;
         }
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
index be1a8fca3f..e6dd538708 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
         int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
         WPACKET pkt;
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
-        int md_nid = digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(md, sha1_allowed);
+        int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(md, sha1_allowed);
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 
         if (md == NULL || md_nid == NID_undef) {
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int dsa_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, int operation)
     DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa);
     pdsactx->dsa = vdsa;
     pdsactx->operation = operation;
-    if (!dsa_check_key(vdsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
+    if (!ossl_dsa_check_key(vdsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
         return 0;
     }
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c
index ed21ac79c3..aff3724435 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int ecdsa_signverify_init(void *vctx, void *ec, int operation)
     EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec);
     ctx->ec = ec;
     ctx->operation = operation;
-    return ec_check_key(ec, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+    return ossl_ec_check_key(ec, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 }
 
 static int ecdsa_sign_init(void *vctx, void *ec)
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
         return 0;
     }
     sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-    md_nid = digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(md, sha1_allowed);
+    md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(md, sha1_allowed);
     if (md_nid == NID_undef) {
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
                        "digest=%s", mdname);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
index 4cdd90a5c6..a69981a36a 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
     if (mdname != NULL) {
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
         int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-        int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
+        int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 
         if (md == NULL
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
         return 0;
     }
     /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
-    if ((mdnid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1)) == NID_undef
+    if ((mdnid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1)) == NID_undef
         || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, NULL, mdname, mdnid)) {
         if (mdnid == NID_undef)
             ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,