diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2020-08-07 16:40:25 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com> | 2020-08-29 17:39:37 +1000 |
commit | e538294f8f9b522279e523ebf6804ed4cb721b80 (patch) | |
tree | 4338aa6523f15f187c33d6ce994f7ae6cb08e1e5 /providers/implementations/keymgmt | |
parent | bddfea0271d0596961a43283b36ff49923329a92 (diff) |
Implement key management for the EVP_PKEY MAC to EVP_MAC provider bridge
Some MAC implementations were available before the current EVP_MAC API. They
were used via EVP_DigestSign*. There exists a bridge between the old API and
the EVP_MAC API however this bridge itself uses a legacy EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
This commit implements the key management for provider side bridge without
having to useany legacy code.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
Diffstat (limited to 'providers/implementations/keymgmt')
-rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/keymgmt/build.info | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c | 381 |
2 files changed, 384 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/build.info b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/build.info index 53c84ac3d4..a8ad5ae4f9 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/build.info +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/build.info @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ $DSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a $EC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a $ECX_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a $KDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a +$MAC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a IF[{- !$disabled{dh} -}] SOURCE[$DH_GOAL]=dh_kmgmt.c @@ -36,3 +37,5 @@ SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=rsa_kmgmt.c SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=rsa_kmgmt.c SOURCE[$KDF_GOAL]=kdf_legacy_kmgmt.c + +SOURCE[$MAC_GOAL]=mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..246a6bc890 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include "openssl/param_build.h" +#include "internal/param_build_set.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "prov/macsignature.h" + + +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_new_fn mac_new; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_free_fn mac_free; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_init_fn mac_gen_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_fn mac_gen; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_cleanup_fn mac_gen_cleanup; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_get_params_fn mac_get_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gettable_params_fn mac_gettable_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_set_params_fn mac_set_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_settable_params_fn mac_settable_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn mac_has; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_match_fn mac_match; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_fn mac_import; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn mac_imexport_types; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_fn mac_export; +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn mac_imexport_types; + +struct mac_gen_ctx { + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; + int selection; + unsigned char *priv_key; + size_t priv_key_len; +}; + +MAC_KEY *mac_key_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) +{ + MAC_KEY *mackey = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*mackey)); + + if (mackey == NULL) + return NULL; + + mackey->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (mackey->lock == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(mackey); + return NULL; + } + mackey->libctx = libctx; + mackey->refcnt = 1; + + return mackey; +} + +void mac_key_free(MAC_KEY *mackey) +{ + int ref = 0; + + if (mackey == NULL) + return; + + CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&mackey->refcnt, &ref, mackey->lock); + if (ref > 0) + return; + + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(mackey->priv_key, mackey->priv_key_len); + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(mackey->lock); + OPENSSL_free(mackey); +} + +int mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey) +{ + int ref = 0; + + CRYPTO_UP_REF(&mackey->refcnt, &ref, mackey->lock); + return 1; +} + +static void *mac_new(void *provctx) +{ + return mac_key_new(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx)); +} + +static void mac_free(void *mackey) +{ + mac_key_free(mackey); +} + +static int mac_has(void *keydata, int selection) +{ + MAC_KEY *key = keydata; + int ok = 0; + + if (key != NULL) { + /* + * MAC keys always have all the parameters they need (i.e. none). + * Therefore we always return with 1, if asked about parameters. + * Similarly for public keys. + */ + ok = 1; + + if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) + ok = key->priv_key != NULL; + } + return ok; +} + +static int mac_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection) +{ + const MAC_KEY *key1 = keydata1; + const MAC_KEY *key2 = keydata2; + int ok = 1; + + if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) { + if ((key1->priv_key == NULL && key2->priv_key != NULL) + || (key1->priv_key != NULL && key2->priv_key == NULL) + || key1->priv_key_len != key2->priv_key_len) + ok = 0; + else + ok = ok && (key1->priv_key == NULL /* implies key2->privkey == NULL */ + || CRYPTO_memcmp(key1->priv_key, key2->priv_key, + key1->priv_key_len) == 0); + } + return ok; +} + +static int mac_key_fromdata(MAC_KEY *key, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY); + if (p != NULL) { + if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + return 0; + } + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(key->priv_key, key->priv_key_len); + key->priv_key = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(p->data_size); + if (key->priv_key == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(key->priv_key, p->data, p->data_size); + key->priv_key_len = p->data_size; + + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int mac_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + MAC_KEY *key = keydata; + + if (key == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) == 0) + return 0; + + return mac_key_fromdata(key, params); +} + +static int key_to_params(MAC_KEY *key, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl, + OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + if (key == NULL) + return 0; + + if (key->priv_key != NULL + && !ossl_param_build_set_octet_string(tmpl, params, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, + key->priv_key, key->priv_key_len)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static int mac_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb, + void *cbarg) +{ + MAC_KEY *key = keydata; + OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl; + OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (key == NULL) + return 0; + + tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new(); + if (tmpl == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0 + && !key_to_params(key, tmpl, NULL)) + goto err; + + params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl); + if (params == NULL) + goto err; + + ret = param_cb(params, cbarg); + OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params); +err: + OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl); + return ret; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM mac_key_types[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; +static const OSSL_PARAM *mac_imexport_types(int selection) +{ + if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) + return mac_key_types; + return NULL; +} + +static int mac_get_params(void *key, OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return key_to_params(key, NULL, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *mac_gettable_params(void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM gettable_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return gettable_params; +} + +static int mac_set_params(void *keydata, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + MAC_KEY *key = keydata; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (key == NULL) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY); + if (p != NULL) + return mac_key_fromdata(key, params); + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *mac_settable_params(void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM settable_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return settable_params; +} + +static void *mac_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection) +{ + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); + struct mac_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL; + + if ((gctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gctx))) != NULL) { + gctx->libctx = libctx; + gctx->selection = selection; + } + return gctx; +} + + +static int mac_gen_set_params(void *genctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + struct mac_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (gctx == NULL) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY); + if (p != NULL) { + if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + return 0; + } + gctx->priv_key = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(p->data_size); + if (gctx->priv_key == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(gctx->priv_key, p->data, p->data_size); + gctx->priv_key_len = p->data_size; + } + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *mac_gen_settable_params(void *provctx) +{ + static OSSL_PARAM settable[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return settable; +} + +static void *mac_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg) +{ + struct mac_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx; + MAC_KEY *key; + + if (gctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + if ((key = mac_key_new(gctx->libctx)) == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + /* If we're doing parameter generation then we just return a blank key */ + if ((gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) == 0) + return key; + + if (gctx->priv_key == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY); + mac_key_free(key); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * This is horrible but required for backwards compatibility. We don't + * actually do real key generation at all. We simply copy the key that was + * previously set in the gctx. Hopefully at some point in the future all + * of this can be removed and we will only support the EVP_KDF APIs. + */ + key->priv_key = gctx->priv_key; + key->priv_key_len = gctx->priv_key_len; + gctx->priv_key_len = 0; + gctx->priv_key = NULL; + + return key; +} + +static void mac_gen_cleanup(void *genctx) +{ + struct mac_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx; + + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(gctx->priv_key, gctx->priv_key_len); + OPENSSL_free(gctx); +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH mac_keymgmt_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_NEW, (void (*)(void))mac_new }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_FREE, (void (*)(void))mac_free }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GET_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))mac_get_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))mac_gettable_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_SET_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))mac_set_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_SETTABLE_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))mac_settable_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_HAS, (void (*)(void))mac_has }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_MATCH, (void (*)(void))mac_match }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT, (void (*)(void))mac_import }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT_TYPES, (void (*)(void))mac_imexport_types }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT, (void (*)(void))mac_export }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT_TYPES, (void (*)(void))mac_imexport_types }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_INIT, (void (*)(void))mac_gen_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_SET_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))mac_gen_set_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_SETTABLE_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))mac_gen_settable_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN, (void (*)(void))mac_gen }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_CLEANUP, (void (*)(void))mac_gen_cleanup }, + { 0, NULL } +}; |