The EVP_MAC functions have been renamed for consistency. The EVP_MAC_CTX_*

functions are now EVP_MAC functions, usually with ctx in their names.

Before 3.0 is released, the names are mutable and this prevents more
inconsistencies being introduced.

There are no functional or code changes.
Just the renaming and a little reformatting.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11997)

1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
index 84d712afc5..1b47247cbb 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
 {
     TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
 
-    EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_hash);
-    EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
+    EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_hash);
+    EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_sha1);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
                                                       NULL, SN_sha1, libctx))
                 return 0;
         } else {
-            EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
+            EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_sha1);
             if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
                                                    OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
                                                    NULL, NULL, libctx))
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
     *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
                                              (void *)sec, sec_len);
     *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-    if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
+    if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx_init, params))
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
         goto err;
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
     if (chunk == 0)
         goto err;
     /* A(0) = seed */
-    ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
+    ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
     if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
         goto err;
     if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
@@ -298,18 +298,18 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
         /* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
         if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
             goto err;
-        EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
+        EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx_Ai);
         ctx_Ai = NULL;
 
         /* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
-        ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
+        ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
         if (ctx == NULL)
             goto err;
         if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
             goto err;
         /* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
         if (olen > chunk) {
-            ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
+            ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx);
             if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
                 goto err;
         }
@@ -324,15 +324,15 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
         }
         if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, olen))
             goto err;
-        EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+        EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
         ctx = NULL;
         out += chunk;
         olen -= chunk;
     }
     ret = 1;
  err:
-    EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
-    EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
+    EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
+    EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx_Ai);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai));
     return ret;
 }