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authorNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>2019-12-15 00:20:53 +0200
committerNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>2020-02-18 19:11:10 +0200
commit4fe54d674f14e7964f982285d1aeb86698a33c3c (patch)
tree22b2e7ef133ef38ba551719538d68422f2d0b500 /providers/implementations/exchange
parentcf6404b14198b96a882affe917bb337e2626136c (diff)
[PROV][KMGMT][KEXCH][EC] Implement EC keymgtm and ECDH
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
Diffstat (limited to 'providers/implementations/exchange')
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/exchange/build.info2
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c533
2 files changed, 535 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/build.info b/providers/implementations/exchange/build.info
index 51d32fc090..82b688def3 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/build.info
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/build.info
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
$DH_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$ECX_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$ECDH_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
IF[{- !$disabled{dh} -}]
SOURCE[$DH_GOAL]=dh_exch.c
@@ -21,4 +22,5 @@ ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}]
SOURCE[$ECX_GOAL]=ecx_exch.c
DEFINE[$ECX_GOAL]=$ECDEF
+ SOURCE[$ECDH_GOAL]=ecdh_exch.c
ENDIF
diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf353fa175
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * ECDH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "crypto/ec.h" /* ecdh_KDF_X9_63() */
+
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_newctx_fn ecdh_newctx;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_init_fn ecdh_init;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_set_peer_fn ecdh_set_peer;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_derive_fn ecdh_derive;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_freectx_fn ecdh_freectx;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_dupctx_fn ecdh_dupctx;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_set_ctx_params_fn ecdh_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_settable_ctx_params_fn ecdh_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_get_ctx_params_fn ecdh_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_keyexch_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdh_gettable_ctx_params;
+
+enum kdf_type {
+ PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE = 0,
+ PROV_ECDH_KDF_X9_63
+};
+
+/*
+ * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
+ * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes EC_KEY structures, so
+ * we use that here too.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+
+ EC_KEY *k;
+ EC_KEY *peerk;
+
+ /*
+ * ECDH cofactor mode:
+ *
+ * . 0 disabled
+ * . 1 enabled
+ * . -1 use cofactor mode set for k
+ */
+ int cofactor_mode;
+
+ /************
+ * ECDH KDF *
+ ************/
+ /* KDF (if any) to use for ECDH */
+ enum kdf_type kdf_type;
+ /* Message digest to use for key derivation */
+ EVP_MD *kdf_md;
+ /* User key material */
+ unsigned char *kdf_ukm;
+ size_t kdf_ukmlen;
+ /* KDF output length */
+ size_t kdf_outlen;
+} PROV_ECDH_CTX;
+
+static
+void *ecdh_newctx(void *provctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pectx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pectx));
+
+ if (pectx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pectx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
+ pectx->cofactor_mode = -1;
+ pectx->kdf_type = PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
+
+ return (void *)pectx;
+}
+
+static
+int ecdh_init(void *vpecdhctx, void *vecdh)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pecdhctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+
+ if (pecdhctx == NULL || vecdh == NULL || !EC_KEY_up_ref(vecdh))
+ return 0;
+ EC_KEY_free(pecdhctx->k);
+ pecdhctx->k = vecdh;
+ pecdhctx->cofactor_mode = -1;
+ pecdhctx->kdf_type = PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static
+int ecdh_set_peer(void *vpecdhctx, void *vecdh)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pecdhctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+
+ if (pecdhctx == NULL || vecdh == NULL || !EC_KEY_up_ref(vecdh))
+ return 0;
+ EC_KEY_free(pecdhctx->peerk);
+ pecdhctx->peerk = vecdh;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static
+void ecdh_freectx(void *vpecdhctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pecdhctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+
+ EC_KEY_free(pecdhctx->k);
+ EC_KEY_free(pecdhctx->peerk);
+
+ EVP_MD_free(pecdhctx->kdf_md);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pecdhctx->kdf_ukm, pecdhctx->kdf_ukmlen);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(pecdhctx);
+}
+
+static
+void *ecdh_dupctx(void *vpecdhctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *dstctx;
+
+ dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
+ if (dstctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *dstctx = *srcctx;
+
+ /* clear all pointers */
+
+ dstctx->k= NULL;
+ dstctx->peerk = NULL;
+ dstctx->kdf_md = NULL;
+ dstctx->kdf_ukm = NULL;
+
+ /* up-ref all ref-counted objects referenced in dstctx */
+
+ if (srcctx->k != NULL && !EC_KEY_up_ref(srcctx->k))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ dstctx->k = srcctx->k;
+
+ if (srcctx->peerk != NULL && !EC_KEY_up_ref(srcctx->peerk))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ dstctx->peerk = srcctx->peerk;
+
+ if (srcctx->kdf_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->kdf_md))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ dstctx->kdf_md = srcctx->kdf_md;
+
+ /* Duplicate UKM data if present */
+ if (srcctx->kdf_ukm != NULL && srcctx->kdf_ukmlen > 0) {
+ dstctx->kdf_ukm = OPENSSL_memdup(srcctx->kdf_ukm,
+ srcctx->kdf_ukmlen);
+ if (dstctx->kdf_ukm == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return dstctx;
+
+ err:
+ ecdh_freectx(dstctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static
+int ecdh_set_ctx_params(void *vpecdhctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ char name[80] = { '\0' }; /* should be big enough */
+ char *str = NULL;
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pectx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (pectx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int mode;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &mode))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (mode < -1 || mode > 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ pectx->cofactor_mode = mode;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_TYPE);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ str = name;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &str, sizeof(name)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (name[0] == '\0')
+ pectx->kdf_type = PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
+ else if (strcmp(name, OSSL_KDF_NAME_X963KDF) == 0)
+ pectx->kdf_type = PROV_ECDH_KDF_X9_63;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char mdprops[80] = { '\0' }; /* should be big enough */
+
+ str = name;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &str, sizeof(name)))
+ return 0;
+
+ str = mdprops;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST_PROPS);
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &str, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_free(pectx->kdf_md);
+ pectx->kdf_md = EVP_MD_fetch(pectx->libctx, name, mdprops);
+
+ if (pectx->kdf_md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_OUTLEN);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ size_t outlen;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &outlen))
+ return 0;
+ pectx->kdf_outlen = outlen;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ void *tmp_ukm = NULL;
+ size_t tmp_ukmlen;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &tmp_ukm, 0, &tmp_ukmlen))
+ return 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(pectx->kdf_ukm);
+ pectx->kdf_ukm = tmp_ukm;
+ pectx->kdf_ukmlen = tmp_ukmlen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST_PROPS, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_OUTLEN, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static
+const OSSL_PARAM *ecdh_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static
+int ecdh_get_ctx_params(void *vpecdhctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pectx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (pectx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int mode = pectx->cofactor_mode;
+
+ if (mode == -1) {
+ /* check what is the default for pecdhctx->k */
+ mode = EC_KEY_get_flags(pectx->k) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, mode))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_TYPE);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ const char *kdf_type = NULL;
+
+ switch (pectx->kdf_type) {
+ case PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE:
+ kdf_type = "";
+ break;
+ case PROV_ECDH_KDF_X9_63:
+ kdf_type = OSSL_KDF_NAME_X963KDF;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, kdf_type))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, pectx->kdf_md == NULL
+ ? ""
+ : EVP_MD_name(pectx->kdf_md))){
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_OUTLEN);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, pectx->kdf_outlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr(p, pectx->kdf_ukm, 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM_LEN);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, pectx->kdf_ukmlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_OUTLEN, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR,
+ NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM_LEN, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static
+const OSSL_PARAM *ecdh_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline
+size_t ecdh_size(const EC_KEY *k)
+{
+ size_t degree = 0;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ if (k == NULL
+ || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+
+ return (degree + 7) / 8;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline
+int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
+ size_t *psecretlen, size_t outlen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pecdhctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+ int retlen, ret = 0;
+ size_t ecdhsize, size;
+ const EC_POINT *ppubkey = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *privk = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *cofactor;
+ int key_cofactor_mode;
+
+ if (pecdhctx->k == NULL || pecdhctx->peerk == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ecdhsize = ecdh_size(pecdhctx->k);
+ if (secret == NULL) {
+ *psecretlen = ecdhsize;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pecdhctx->k)) == NULL
+ || (cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group)) == NULL )
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if outlen is less than maximum size this is not
+ * an error, the result is truncated.
+ */
+ size = outlen < ecdhsize ? outlen : ecdhsize;
+
+ /*
+ * The ctx->cofactor_mode flag has precedence over the
+ * cofactor_mode flag set on ctx->k.
+ *
+ * - if ctx->cofactor_mode == -1, use ctx->k directly
+ * - if ctx->cofactor_mode == key_cofactor_mode, use ctx->k directly
+ * - if ctx->cofactor_mode != key_cofactor_mode:
+ * - if ctx->k->cofactor == 1, the cofactor_mode flag is irrelevant, use
+ * ctx->k directly
+ * - if ctx->k->cofactor != 1, use a duplicate of ctx->k with the flag
+ * set to ctx->cofactor_mode
+ */
+ key_cofactor_mode =
+ (EC_KEY_get_flags(pecdhctx->k) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) ? 1 : 0;
+ if (pecdhctx->cofactor_mode != -1
+ && pecdhctx->cofactor_mode != key_cofactor_mode
+ && !BN_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ if ((privk = EC_KEY_dup(pecdhctx->k)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pecdhctx->cofactor_mode == 1)
+ EC_KEY_set_flags(privk, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+ else
+ EC_KEY_clear_flags(privk, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+ } else {
+ privk = pecdhctx->k;
+ }
+
+ ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
+
+ retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
+
+ if (retlen <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ *psecretlen = retlen;
+ ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+ if (privk != pecdhctx->k)
+ EC_KEY_free(privk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline
+int ecdh_X9_63_kdf_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
+ size_t *psecretlen, size_t outlen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pecdhctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+ unsigned char *stmp = NULL;
+ size_t stmplen;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (secret == NULL) {
+ *psecretlen = pecdhctx->kdf_outlen;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (pecdhctx->kdf_outlen > outlen)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ecdh_plain_derive(vpecdhctx, NULL, &stmplen, 0))
+ return 0;
+ if ((stmp = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(stmplen)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ecdh_plain_derive(vpecdhctx, stmp, &stmplen, stmplen))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Do KDF stuff */
+ if (!ecdh_KDF_X9_63(secret, pecdhctx->kdf_outlen,
+ stmp, stmplen,
+ pecdhctx->kdf_ukm,
+ pecdhctx->kdf_ukmlen,
+ pecdhctx->kdf_md))
+ goto err;
+ *psecretlen = pecdhctx->kdf_outlen;
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(stmp, stmplen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static
+int ecdh_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
+ size_t *psecretlen, size_t outlen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDH_CTX *pecdhctx = (PROV_ECDH_CTX *)vpecdhctx;
+
+ switch (pecdhctx->kdf_type) {
+ case PROV_ECDH_KDF_NONE:
+ return ecdh_plain_derive(vpecdhctx, secret, psecretlen, outlen);
+ case PROV_ECDH_KDF_X9_63:
+ return ecdh_X9_63_kdf_derive(vpecdhctx, secret, psecretlen, outlen);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ecdh_keyexch_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdh_newctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdh_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DERIVE, (void (*)(void))ecdh_derive },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SET_PEER, (void (*)(void))ecdh_set_peer },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))ecdh_freectx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdh_dupctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdh_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdh_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdh_get_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdh_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};