diff options
author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2006-09-21 13:04:43 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2006-09-21 13:04:43 +0000 |
commit | 926c41bd293461df485e1ccde391ef471abf86c1 (patch) | |
tree | 38fb7da2421faf174a9cb9cdd055c8dabfa2739d /engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c | |
parent | 1182301ca725de1b01371d0fb9b27ae2414c21c2 (diff) |
Updated version of gost engine.
Diffstat (limited to 'engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c')
-rw-r--r-- | engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c | 230 |
1 files changed, 125 insertions, 105 deletions
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c b/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c index 120ec69d3c..7b81c23f92 100644 --- a/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c +++ b/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c @@ -13,49 +13,48 @@ #include <openssl/objects.h> #include "gost89.h" #include "gosthash.h" -#include "gost_asn1.h" #include "e_gost_err.h" -#include "keywrap.h" -#include "crypt.h" -#include "sign.h" -#include "pmeth.h" -#include "tools.h" -#include "gostkeyx.h" +#include "gost_keywrap.h" +#include "gost_lcl.h" /* Transform ECDH shared key into little endian as required by Cryptocom * key exchange */ -static void *make_key_le(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen) { +static void *make_key_le(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen) + { const char* inbuf= in; char* outbuf= out; int i; - if (*outlen < inlen) { - return NULL; - } - for (i=0;i<inlen;i++) { + if (*outlen < inlen) + { + return NULL; + } + for (i=0;i<inlen;i++) + { outbuf[inlen-1-i]=inbuf[i]; - } + } *outlen = inlen; return out; -} + } /* Create gost 2001 ephemeral key with same parameters as peer key */ -static EC_KEY *make_ec_ephemeral_key(EC_KEY *peer_key,BIGNUM *seckey) { +static EC_KEY *make_ec_ephemeral_key(EC_KEY *peer_key,BIGNUM *seckey) + { EC_KEY *out = EC_KEY_new(); EC_KEY_copy(out,peer_key); EC_KEY_set_private_key(out,seckey); gost2001_compute_public(out); return out; -} + } /* Packs GOST elliptic curve key into EVP_PKEY setting same parameters * as in passed pubkey */ static EVP_PKEY *ec_ephemeral_key_to_EVP(EVP_PKEY *pubk,int type,EC_KEY *ephemeral) -{ + { EVP_PKEY *newkey; newkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); EVP_PKEY_assign(newkey,type,ephemeral); return newkey; -} + } /* * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback encrypt @@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ec_ephemeral_key_to_EVP(EVP_PKEY *pubk,int type,EC_KEY *ephemer int pkey_GOST01cc_encrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *key,size_t key_len) -{ + { EVP_PKEY *pubk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(pctx); GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL; @@ -73,66 +72,68 @@ int pkey_GOST01cc_encrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,unsigned char *out, EC_KEY *ephemeral=NULL; const EC_POINT *pub_key_point=NULL; unsigned char shared_key[32],encrypted_key[32],hmac[4], - iv[8]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; + iv[8]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; ephemeral = make_ec_ephemeral_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk), gost_get_priv_key(data->eph_seckey)); if (!ephemeral) goto err; /* compute shared key */ pub_key_point=EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk)); if (!ECDH_compute_key(shared_key,32,pub_key_point,ephemeral,make_key_le)) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY); goto err; - } + } /* encrypt session key */ gost_init(&ctx, &GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet); gost_key(&ctx,shared_key); encrypt_cryptocom_key(key,key_len,encrypted_key,&ctx); /* compute hmac of session key */ if (!gost_mac(&ctx,32,key,32,hmac)) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_MAC); return -1; - } + } gkt = GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_new(); if (!gkt) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_NO_MEMORY); return -1; - } + } /* Store IV which is always zero in our case */ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv,iv,8)) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_STORING_IV); goto err; - } + } if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,hmac,4)) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_STORING_MAC); goto err; - } + } if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,encrypted_key,32)) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_STORING_ENCRYPTED_KEY); goto err; - } + } - if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,data->eph_seckey)) { + if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,data->eph_seckey)) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_CANNOT_PACK_EPHEMERAL_KEY); goto err; - } + } ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher); gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc); if ((*out_len = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt,&out))>0) ret = 1; ; -err: + err: if (gkt) GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); return ret; -} + } /* * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback decrypt * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptocom variation */ -int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) { +int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) + { /* Form DH params from compute shared key */ EVP_PKEY *priv=EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL; @@ -145,17 +146,19 @@ int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_l const EC_POINT *pub_key_point; EVP_PKEY *eph_key; - if (!key) { + if (!key) + { *key_len = 32; return 1; - } + } /* Parse passed octet string and find out public key, iv and HMAC*/ gkt = d2i_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(NULL,(const unsigned char **)&p, - in_len); - if (!gkt) { + in_len); + if (!gkt) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_PARSING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO); return 0; - } + } eph_key = X509_PUBKEY_get(gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key); /* Initialization vector is really ignored here */ OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8); @@ -168,37 +171,40 @@ int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_l i=ECDH_compute_key(shared_key,32,pub_key_point,EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),make_key_le); EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key); if (!i) - { + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY); GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); return 0; - } + } /* Decrypt session key */ gost_init(&ctx, &GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet); gost_key(&ctx,shared_key); if (!decrypt_cryptocom_key(key,*key_len,gkt->key_info->encrypted_key->data, gkt->key_info->encrypted_key->length, &ctx)) - { + { GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); return 0; - } + } GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); /* check HMAC of session key*/ - if (!gost_mac(&ctx,32,key,32,hmac_comp)) { + if (!gost_mac(&ctx,32,key,32,hmac_comp)) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_MAC); return 0; - } - /* HMAC of session key is not correct */ - if (memcmp(hmac,hmac_comp,4)!=0) { + } + /* HMAC of session key is not correct */ + if (memcmp(hmac,hmac_comp,4)!=0) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_SESSION_KEY_MAC_DOES_NOT_MATCH); return 0; - } + } return 1; -} + } /* Implementation of CryptoPro VKO 34.10-2001 algorithm */ -static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,const EC_POINT *pub_key,EC_KEY *priv_key,const unsigned char *ukm) { +static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,const EC_POINT *pub_key,EC_KEY *priv_key,const unsigned char *ukm) + { unsigned char ukm_be[8],databuf[64],hashbuf[64]; BIGNUM *UKM=NULL,*p=NULL,*order=NULL,*X=NULL,*Y=NULL; const BIGNUM* key=EC_KEY_get0_private_key(priv_key); @@ -207,9 +213,10 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons gost_hash_ctx hash_ctx; BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - for (i=0;i<8;i++) { + for (i=0;i<8;i++) + { ukm_be[7-i]=ukm[i]; - } + } BN_CTX_start(ctx); UKM=getbnfrombuf(ukm_be,8); p=BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -220,15 +227,16 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons BN_mod_mul(p,key,UKM,order,ctx); EC_POINT_mul(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key),pnt,NULL,pub_key,p,ctx); EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key), - pnt,X,Y,ctx); + pnt,X,Y,ctx); /*Serialize elliptic curve point same way as we do it when saving * key */ store_bignum(Y,databuf,32); store_bignum(X,databuf+32,32); /* And reverse byte order of whole buffer */ - for (i=0;i<64;i++) { + for (i=0;i<64;i++) + { hashbuf[63-i]=databuf[i]; - } + } init_gost_hash_ctx(&hash_ctx,&GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet); start_hash(&hash_ctx); hash_block(&hash_ctx,hashbuf,64); @@ -239,7 +247,7 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(pnt); return 32; -} + } /* Generates ephemeral key based on pubk algorithm * computes shared key using VKO and returns filled up @@ -247,9 +255,9 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons */ /* Public, because it would be needed in SSL implementation */ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(EVP_PKEY *pubk,BIGNUM *eph_key, - const unsigned char *key,size_t keylen, unsigned char *ukm, - size_t ukm_len) -{ + const unsigned char *key,size_t keylen, unsigned char *ukm, + size_t ukm_len) + { const struct gost_cipher_info *param=get_encryption_params(NULL); EC_KEY *ephemeral = NULL; @@ -260,43 +268,49 @@ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(EVP_PKEY *pubk,BIGNUM *eph_ke EVP_PKEY *newkey=NULL; /* Do not use vizir cipher parameters with cryptopro */ - if (!getenv("CRYPT_PARAMS") && param == gost_cipher_list) { + if (!get_gost_engine_param(GOST_PARAM_CRYPT_PARAMS) && param == gost_cipher_list) + { param= gost_cipher_list+1; - } + } ephemeral = make_ec_ephemeral_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk),eph_key); VKO_compute_key(shared_key,32,pub_key_point,ephemeral,ukm); gost_init(&ctx,param->sblock); keyWrapCryptoPro(&ctx,shared_key,ukm,key,crypted_key); gkt = GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_new(); - if (!gkt) { + if (!gkt) + { goto memerr; - } + } if(!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv, - ukm,8)) { + ukm,8)) + { goto memerr; - } - if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,crypted_key+40,4)) { + } + if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,crypted_key+40,4)) + { goto memerr; - } - if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,crypted_key+8,32)) { + } + if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,crypted_key+8,32)) + { goto memerr; - } + } newkey = ec_ephemeral_key_to_EVP(pubk,NID_id_GostR3410_2001,ephemeral); - if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,newkey)) { + if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,newkey)) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_MAKE_RFC4490_KEYTRANSPORT_2001,GOST_R_CANNOT_PACK_EPHEMERAL_KEY); goto err; - } + } ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher); gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(param->nid); EVP_PKEY_free(newkey); return gkt; -memerr: - GOSTerr(GOST_F_MAKE_RFC4490_KEYTRANSPORT_2001, - GOST_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -err: - GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); - return NULL; -} + memerr: + GOSTerr(GOST_F_MAKE_RFC4490_KEYTRANSPORT_2001, + GOST_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + err: + GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); + return NULL; + } /* * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback encrypt @@ -304,32 +318,34 @@ err: */ int pkey_GOST01cp_encrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *key,size_t key_len) -{ + { GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt=NULL; EVP_PKEY *pubk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(pctx); unsigned char ukm[8]; int ret=0; - if (RAND_bytes(ukm,8)<=0) { + if (RAND_bytes(ukm,8)<=0) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_ENCRYPT, GOST_R_RANDOM_GENERATOR_FAILURE); return 0; - } + } - if (!(gkt=make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(pubk,gost_get_priv_key(data->eph_seckey),key, key_len,ukm,8))) { + if (!(gkt=make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(pubk,gost_get_priv_key(data->eph_seckey),key, key_len,ukm,8))) + { goto err; - } + } if ((*out_len = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt,&out))>0) ret =1; GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); return ret; -err: - GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); - return -1; -} + err: + GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); + return -1; + } /* Public, because it would be needed in SSL implementation */ int decrypt_rfc4490_shared_key_2001(EVP_PKEY *priv,GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt, - unsigned char *key_buf,int key_buf_len) -{ + unsigned char *key_buf,int key_buf_len) + { unsigned char wrappedKey[44]; unsigned char sharedKey[32]; gost_ctx ctx; @@ -346,40 +362,44 @@ int decrypt_rfc4490_shared_key_2001(EVP_PKEY *priv,GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt, OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_info->imit->length==4); memcpy(wrappedKey+40,gkt->key_info->imit->data,4); VKO_compute_key(sharedKey,32,EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(eph_key)), - EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),wrappedKey); - if (!keyUnwrapCryptoPro(&ctx,sharedKey,wrappedKey,key_buf)) { + EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),wrappedKey); + if (!keyUnwrapCryptoPro(&ctx,sharedKey,wrappedKey,key_buf)) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKCS7_GOST94CP_KEY_TRANSPORT_DECRYPT, - GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY); + GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY); goto err; - } + } EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key); return 32; -err: + err: EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key); return -1; -} + } /* * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback decrypt * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptopo variation */ -int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) { +int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) + { const unsigned char *p = in; EVP_PKEY *priv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL; int ret=0; - if (!key) { + if (!key) + { *key_len = 32; return 1; - } + } gkt = d2i_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(NULL,(const unsigned char **)&p, - in_len); - if (!gkt) { + in_len); + if (!gkt) + { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKCS7_GOST94CP_KEY_TRANSPORT_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_PARSING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO); return -1; - } + } ret = decrypt_rfc4490_shared_key_2001(priv,gkt,key,*key_len); GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt); return ret; -} + } |