Allow for higher granularity of entropy estimates by using 'double'

instead of 'unsigned' counters.
Seed PRNG in MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp.

Partially submitted by Yoram Meroz <yoram@mail.idrive.com>.

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
index 10be71a894..927c59d4c3 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_screen - Add entropy to the PRNG
 
  void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 
- void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
 
  void RAND_screen(void);
 
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output
 less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
 key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
 B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much
-randomness is contained in B<buf>. Details about sources of randomness
-and how to estimate their entropy can be found in the literature,
-e.g. RFC 1750.
+randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about
+sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found
+in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.
 
 RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
 passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.