diff options
author | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2024-04-11 13:10:09 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2024-05-02 09:23:01 +0200 |
commit | 86ce09a10d01834a82f696b221a01d9e2ca21a18 (patch) | |
tree | 0a366e071d775f25a64ea22c9b2a7ca8e0752268 /crypto | |
parent | 85a97087a3beb9d4b9f7fbe14d96034d5d9dcee4 (diff) |
Make BN_generate_dsa_nonce() constant time and non-biased
Co-authored-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24265)
(cherry picked from commit d7d1bdcb6aa3d5000bf7f5ebc5518be5c91fd5a5)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_lib.c | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_local.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_rand.c | 78 |
3 files changed, 77 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c index 9070647b35..85698885ed 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c @@ -708,14 +708,29 @@ int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) int i; BN_ULONG t1, t2, *ap, *bp; + ap = a->d; + bp = b->d; + + if (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) + && a->top == b->top) { + int res = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < b->top; i++) { + res = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt_bn(ap[i], bp[i]), + -1, res); + res = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt_bn(bp[i], ap[i]), + 1, res); + } + return res; + } + bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); i = a->top - b->top; if (i != 0) return i; - ap = a->d; - bp = b->d; + for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = ap[i]; t2 = bp[i]; @@ -827,11 +842,10 @@ int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n) return (int)(((a->d[i]) >> j) & ((BN_ULONG)1)); } -int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) +int ossl_bn_mask_bits_fixed_top(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int b, w; - bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; @@ -845,10 +859,20 @@ int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) a->top = w + 1; a->d[w] &= ~(BN_MASK2 << b); } - bn_correct_top(a); return 1; } +int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) +{ + int ret; + + bn_check_top(a); + ret = ossl_bn_mask_bits_fixed_top(a, n); + if (ret) + bn_correct_top(a); + return ret; +} + void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int b) { if (b && !BN_is_zero(a)) diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h index b5be37ba97..8dbf773c73 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h @@ -679,5 +679,6 @@ static ossl_inline BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits) int ossl_bn_check_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb); +int ossl_bn_mask_bits_fixed_top(BIGNUM *a, int n); #endif diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c index a94dfcecdf..f0bac810b4 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c @@ -258,20 +258,22 @@ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, unsigned char random_bytes[64]; unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned done, todo; - /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */ - const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8; + /* We generate |range|+1 bytes of random output. */ + const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 1; unsigned char private_bytes[96]; unsigned char *k_bytes = NULL; + const int max_n = 64; /* Pr(failure to generate) < 2^max_n */ + int n; int ret = 0; EVP_MD *md = NULL; OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_bn_get_libctx(ctx); if (mdctx == NULL) - goto err; + goto end; k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes); if (k_bytes == NULL) - goto err; + goto end; /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */ if (BN_bn2binpad(priv, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)) < 0) { @@ -281,41 +283,55 @@ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, * length of the private key. */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); - goto err; + goto end; } md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA512", NULL); if (md == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST); - goto err; - } - for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) { - if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes), 0) <= 0) - goto err; - - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, &done, sizeof(done)) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, private_bytes, - sizeof(private_bytes)) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, message, message_len) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) - || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, digest, NULL)) - goto err; - - todo = num_k_bytes - done; - if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) - todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; - memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo); - done += todo; + goto end; } + for (n = 0; n < max_n; n++) { + for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) { + if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes), + 0) <= 0) + goto end; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, &done, sizeof(done)) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, private_bytes, + sizeof(private_bytes)) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, message, message_len) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, random_bytes, + sizeof(random_bytes)) + || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, digest, NULL)) + goto end; + + todo = num_k_bytes - done; + if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) + todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; + memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo); + done += todo; + } - if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out)) - goto err; - if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1) - goto err; - ret = 1; + /* Ensure top byte is set to avoid non-constant time in bin2bn */ + k_bytes[0] = 0x80; + if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out)) + goto end; - err: + /* Clear out the top bits and rejection filter into range */ + BN_set_flags(out, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP); + ossl_bn_mask_bits_fixed_top(out, BN_num_bits(range)); + + if (BN_ucmp(out, range) < 0) { + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + } + /* Failed to generate anything */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + end: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); EVP_MD_free(md); OPENSSL_clear_free(k_bytes, num_k_bytes); |