Add ossl_rand symbols

Partial fix for #12964

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14473)

6 files changed, 55 insertions, 55 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/init.c b/crypto/init.c
index 09be58ea12..4bef667199 100644
--- a/crypto/init.c
+++ b/crypto/init.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void)
 
     /*
      * Note that cleanup order is important:
-     * - rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so
+     * - ossl_rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so
      * must be called before engine_cleanup_int()
      * - ENGINEs use CRYPTO_EX_DATA and therefore, must be cleaned up
      * before the ex data handlers are wiped during default ossl_lib_ctx deinit.
@@ -411,8 +411,8 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void)
      * - ENGINEs and additional EVP algorithms might use added OIDs names so
      * obj_cleanup_int() must be called last
      */
-    OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: rand_cleanup_int()\n");
-    rand_cleanup_int();
+    OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: ossl_rand_cleanup_int()\n");
+    ossl_rand_cleanup_int();
 
     OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: conf_modules_free_int()\n");
     conf_modules_free_int();
diff --git a/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c b/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
index f79955180a..d4677c34f5 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
     size_t entropy_available;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 
-    pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
     entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
 
     if (entropy_available > 0) {
-        ret   = rand_pool_length(pool);
-        *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+        ret   = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
+        *pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
     }
 
-    rand_pool_free(pool);
+    ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
     size_t ret = 0;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 
-    pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
+    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
@@ -60,12 +60,12 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
     if (!ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool))
         goto err;
 
-    if (salt != NULL && !rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0))
+    if (salt != NULL && !ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0))
         goto err;
-    ret   = rand_pool_length(pool);
-    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+    ret   = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
+    *pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
  err:
-    rand_pool_free(pool);
+    ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
     return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 3cd34198c1..318540cff0 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
         goto err;
 # endif
 
-    if (!rand_pool_init())
+    if (!ossl_rand_pool_init())
         goto err;
 
     rand_inited = 1;
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
     return 0;
 }
 
-void rand_cleanup_int(void)
+void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void)
 {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
         meth->cleanup();
     RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
 # endif
-    rand_pool_cleanup();
+    ossl_rand_pool_cleanup();
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
     rand_engine_lock = NULL;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
 void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
 {
     if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
-        rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
+        ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
 
     if (!ret) {
         /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
-        RAND_POOL *pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
-                                        (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
-                                        RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
+        RAND_POOL *pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
+                                             (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
+                                             RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
 
         if (pool == NULL)
             return 0;
@@ -139,14 +139,14 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
             goto err;
 
         if (meth->add == NULL
-            || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
-                         rand_pool_length(pool),
-                         (rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
+            || meth->add(ossl_rand_pool_buffer(pool),
+                         ossl_rand_pool_length(pool),
+                         (ossl_rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
             goto err;
 
         ret = 1;
      err:
-        rand_pool_free(pool);
+        ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
     }
     return ret;
 # else
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
             default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
         } else {
             ENGINE_finish(e);
-            default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
+            default_RAND_meth = &ossl_rand_meth;
         }
 #  else
-        default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
+        default_RAND_meth = &ossl_rand_meth;
 #  endif
     }
     tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
index d1c9bd7fec..bea8149bad 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
@@ -26,6 +26,6 @@
 # define SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL          (7 * 60)  /* 7 minutes */
 
 /* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
-extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
+extern RAND_METHOD ossl_rand_meth;
 
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c b/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c
index e9237a4cd9..0f2809412a 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
     return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg, out, count, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
+RAND_METHOD ossl_rand_meth = {
     drbg_seed,
     drbg_bytes,
     NULL,
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
 RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
 {
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-    return &rand_meth;
+    return &ossl_rand_meth;
 #else
     return NULL;
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c b/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c
index ebb9078ce6..94bb1eab7c 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
 /*
  * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
  */
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
-                         size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
+                              size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
 {
     RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
     size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ err:
  * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data
  * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG.
  */
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
-                            size_t entropy)
+RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
+                                 size_t entropy)
 {
     RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
 
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
 /*
  * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
  */
-void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
+void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     if (pool == NULL)
         return;
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
     /*
      * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint,
      * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed
-     * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
-     * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
+     * to ossl_rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
+     * (see corresponding comment in ossl_rand_pool_attach()).
      */
     if (!pool->attached) {
         if (pool->secure)
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
 /*
  * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
  */
-const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
+const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     return pool->buffer;
 }
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
 /*
  * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
  */
-size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     return pool->entropy;
 }
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
 /*
  * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
  */
-size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     return pool->len;
 }
@@ -140,9 +140,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
  * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
  * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
  * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it
- * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach().
+ * again to the pool using ossl_rand_pool_reattach().
  */
-unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
+unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
     pool->buffer = NULL;
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
  * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass
  * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool.
  */
-void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
+void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
 {
     pool->buffer = buffer;
     OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len);
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
  *  |entropy|  if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
  *      0      otherwise
  */
-size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
         return 0;
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
  * the random pool.
  */
 
-size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
         return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy;
@@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
  * In case of an error, 0 is returned.
  */
 
-size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
+size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
 {
     size_t bytes_needed;
-    size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
+    size_t entropy_needed = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
 
     if (entropy_factor < 1) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
     /*
      * Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount
      * of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where
-     * rand_pool_add_begin, rand_pool_add_end or rand_pool_add
+     * ossl_rand_pool_add_begin, ossl_rand_pool_add_end or ossl_rand_pool_add
      * are used to collect entropy data without any error handling
      * whatsoever, continue to be valid.
      * Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
 }
 
 /* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
-size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
 {
     return pool->max_len - pool->len;
 }
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
  *
  * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
  */
-int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
+int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
                   const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 {
     if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
     if (len > 0) {
         /*
          * This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer
-         * returned from rand_pool_add_begin.
+         * returned from ossl_rand_pool_add_begin.
          * The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the
          * address of the end of the allocated memory to something
          * different, since that comparison would have an
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
          * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
          * additional data.
          * For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within
-         * the limits given by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
+         * the limits given by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
          * below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
          */
         if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
@@ -354,10 +354,10 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
  * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
  * is returned without producing an error message.
  *
- * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
+ * After updating the buffer, ossl_rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
  * to finish the update operation (see next comment).
  */
-unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
+unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
 {
     if (len == 0)
         return NULL;
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
 
     /*
      * As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given
-     * by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
+     * by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
      * to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
      * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
      * additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here,
@@ -391,12 +391,12 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
  * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
  *
  * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
- * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
+ * ossl_rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
  * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
  * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
  * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
  */
-int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 {
     if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);