diff options
author | Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> | 2008-12-29 16:11:58 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> | 2008-12-29 16:11:58 +0000 |
commit | 0eab41fb78cf4d7c76e563fd677ab6c32fc28bb0 (patch) | |
tree | da848c7424ced86fc60823f4948b0fc79e52a381 /crypto | |
parent | 8aa02e97a782a4229936d5df6da42db3efe4acd1 (diff) |
If we're going to return errors (no matter how stupid), then we should
test for them!
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/evp.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/evp_err.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/evp_lib.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c | 5 |
15 files changed, 70 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h index 985ff2f5a9..df54409f10 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp.h +++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h @@ -1183,6 +1183,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 128 #define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX 127 #define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 110 +#define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE 162 #define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT 102 #define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD 115 #define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE 160 @@ -1262,6 +1263,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION 148 #define EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE 102 #define EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE 120 +#define EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL 159 #define EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED 144 #define EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 103 #define EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET 131 diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c index 25a8ad7cdc..04485f0162 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* crypto/evp/evp_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"}, +{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_SIZE"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD), "EVP_PBE_alg_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE), "EVP_PBE_alg_add_type"}, @@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION) ,"invalid operation"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE) ,"iv too large"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE) ,"keygen failure"}, +{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL),"message digest is null"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED) ,"method not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS) ,"missing parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET) ,"no cipher set"}, diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c index daccb66820..d815bc6d6f 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c @@ -256,7 +256,10 @@ int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md) int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md) { if (!md) + { + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL); return -1; + } return md->md_size; } diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c index c6d257fc08..d98455eaad 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c +++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c @@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 1); } - int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen) { int sctx, r = 0; @@ -159,13 +158,15 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen) { if (sctx) { - if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, - sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0) + if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0) + return 0; + } + else + { + int s = EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest); + if (s < 0 || EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL, s) <= 0) return 0; } - else if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL, - EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest)) <= 0) - return 0; } return 1; } @@ -177,6 +178,8 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) int r; unsigned int mdlen; int vctx; + + /* FIXME: surely this should test verifyctx? (Ben 29/12/08) */ if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx) vctx = 1; else diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c index 9c6e07b706..7ecfa8dad9 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c +++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen, int saltlen, iter; unsigned char *salt; const unsigned char *pbuf; + int mdsize; /* Extract useful info from parameter */ if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || @@ -109,9 +110,12 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, saltlen); PBEPARAM_free(pbe); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_tmp, NULL); + mdsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + if (mdsize < 0) + return 0; for (i = 1; i < iter; i++) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, EVP_MD_size(md)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, mdsize); EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL); } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c index 70fd48aed0..334379f310 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c +++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, HMAC_CTX hctx; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest); + if (mdlen < 0) + return 0; HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); p = out; @@ -273,8 +275,9 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data; saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length; iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter); - PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd, - keylen, key); + if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd, + keylen, key)) + goto err; EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c b/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c index aff7013b76..985921ca1a 100644 --- a/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c @@ -157,7 +157,11 @@ static int hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, { unsigned int hlen; HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data; - *siglen = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx); + int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx); + + if (l < 0) + return 0; + *siglen = l; if (!sig) return 1; diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index be9bf5b0f0..415d67e61c 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, } mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); + if (mdlen < 0) + return -1; if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) || (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen)) return 0; diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c index 9e57eee4a4..b72cf1638b 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int ret; unsigned char *unipass; int uniplen; + if(!pass) { unipass = NULL; uniplen = 0; @@ -90,6 +91,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, } ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen, id, iter, n, out, md_type); + if (ret <= 0) + return 0; if(unipass) { OPENSSL_cleanse(unipass, uniplen); /* Clear password from memory */ OPENSSL_free(unipass); @@ -129,6 +132,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, #endif v = EVP_MD_block_size (md_type); u = EVP_MD_size (md_type); + if (u < 0) + return 0; D = OPENSSL_malloc (v); Ai = OPENSSL_malloc (u); B = OPENSSL_malloc (v + 1); diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index 70bfef6e5d..9ab740d51f 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, HMAC_CTX hmac; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt; int saltlen, iter; + int md_size; if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) { @@ -87,13 +88,16 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); return 0; } + md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type); + if (md_size < 0) + return 0; if(!PKCS12_key_gen (pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter, - EVP_MD_size(md_type), key, md_type)) { + md_size, key, md_type)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR); return 0; } HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, EVP_MD_size(md_type), md_type, NULL); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL); HMAC_Update(&hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data, p12->authsafes->d.data->length); HMAC_Final(&hmac, mac, maclen); diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h index 91cd4198c7..cf74343657 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h @@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void); /* Reason codes. */ #define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 100 -#define RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT 149 #define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE 101 #define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT 102 #define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT 103 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c index a53c5f6bff..cf9f1106b0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c @@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]= static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]= { {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH) ,"algorithm mismatch"}, -{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT) ,"bad argument"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE) ,"bad e value"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT),"bad fixed header decrypt"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT) ,"bad pad byte count"}, diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c index 3652677a99..70bacf850e 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/sha.h> -int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, +static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, @@ -76,11 +76,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 20); #endif - MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0) + return 0; for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; - MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0) + return 0; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; @@ -133,11 +135,13 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; - MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen); + if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen)) + return -1; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) seed[i] ^= padded_from[i]; - MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + return -1; for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; @@ -188,6 +192,8 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); + if (mdlen < 0) + return -1; for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); @@ -213,7 +219,8 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, return 0; } -int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen) +static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, + long seedlen) { return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1()); } diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c index 2e44194bdc..775c36114f 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c @@ -81,13 +81,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, EVP_MD_CTX ctx; unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - if (Hash == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT); - goto err; - } - hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash); + if (hLen < 0) + goto err; /* * Negative sLen has special meanings: * -1 sLen == hLen @@ -132,7 +128,8 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash); + if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash) < 0) + goto err; for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++) DB[i] ^= EM[i]; if (MSBits) @@ -183,6 +180,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, EVP_MD_CTX ctx; hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash); + if (hLen < 0) + goto err; /* * Negative sLen has special meanings: * -1 sLen == hLen @@ -238,7 +237,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */ - PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash); + if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash)) + goto err; p = EM; diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c index 6acacac6c1..e1f3b534af 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c +++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c @@ -604,7 +604,10 @@ static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info, } /* Compute message digest. */ - *imprint_len = EVP_MD_size(md); + length = EVP_MD_size(md); + if (length < 0) + goto err; + *imprint_len = length; if (!(*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len))) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |