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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2016-03-03 23:36:23 +0000
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2016-05-03 08:57:06 +0100
commit3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26 (patch)
tree864a0107fcc29981600c83c92effceb44e0fe66b /crypto/x509
parent05aef4bbdbc18e7b9490512cdee41e8a608bcc0e (diff)
Fix encrypt overflow
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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