diff options
author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2012-08-03 13:51:43 +0000 |
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committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2012-08-03 13:51:43 +0000 |
commit | 3ad344a5171c55511adddb96c805e037f2c061be (patch) | |
tree | b5799e38c260f3f7851369a3d8666b953658c0c2 /crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | |
parent | 6dbb6219e7a6a5f94c9e7b0a25f0ce7c733f5060 (diff) |
add suite B chain validation flags and associated verify errors
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 124 |
1 files changed, 124 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c index 352aa37434..74e076c7ba 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -341,3 +341,127 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) return 1; return 0; } + +/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and + * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is + * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification + * flags. + */ + +static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) + { + const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; + int curve_nid; + if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) + grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); + if (!grp) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; + curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); + /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ + if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */ + { + /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with + * curve. + */ + if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; + /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ + *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; + } + else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */ + { + if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; + } + else + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; + + return X509_V_OK; + } + +int X509_check_suiteb_chain(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, + unsigned long flags) + { + int rv, i, sign_nid; + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + unsigned long tflags; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) + return X509_V_OK; + tflags = flags; + /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ + if (x == NULL) + { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); + i = 1; + } + else + i = 0; + + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) + { + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; + /* Correct error depth */ + i = 0; + goto end; + } + + pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + /* Check EE key only */ + rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + { + /* Correct error depth */ + i = 0; + goto end; + } + for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) + { + sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) + { + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; + goto end; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + goto end; + } + + /* Final check: root CA signature */ + rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); + end: + if (pk) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + { + /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ + if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM + || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) + i--; + /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing + * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. + */ + if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; + if (perror_depth) + *perror_depth = i; + } + return rv; + } + +int X509_check_suiteb_crl(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) + { + int sign_nid; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) + return X509_V_OK; + sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); + return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); + } + |