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author | Todd Short <tshort@akamai.com> | 2017-05-11 15:48:10 -0400 |
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committer | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2017-05-11 22:35:21 +0200 |
commit | 7031ddac94d0ae616d1b0670263a9265ce672cd2 (patch) | |
tree | 291ee3feddc4a98ea47522b9ae94069821759d42 /crypto/poly1305 | |
parent | b57f0c598bde43e147a886c9ffb0d6fdb3141d72 (diff) |
Fix infinite loops in secure memory allocation.
Issue 1:
sh.bittable_size is a size_t but i is and int, which can result in
freelist == -1 if sh.bittable_size exceeds an int.
This seems to result in an OPENSSL_assert due to invalid allocation
size, so maybe that is "ok."
Worse, if sh.bittable_size is exactly 1<<31, then this becomes an
infinite loop (because 1<<31 is a negative int, so it can be shifted
right forever and sticks at -1).
Issue 2:
CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() sets secure_mem_initialized=1 even when
sh_init() returns 0.
If sh_init() fails, we end up with secure_mem_initialized=1 but
sh.minsize=0. If you then call secure_malloc(), which then calls,
sh_malloc(), this then enters an infite loop since 0 << anything will
never be larger than size.
Issue 3:
That same sh_malloc loop will loop forever for a size greater
than size_t/2 because i will proceed (assuming sh.minsize=16):
i=16, 32, 64, ..., size_t/8, size_t/4, size_t/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, ....
This sequence will never be larger than "size".
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3449)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/poly1305')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions