diff options
author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2009-12-01 17:32:16 +0000 |
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committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2009-12-01 17:32:16 +0000 |
commit | b172352b52f224de091651bc80e67791664fb961 (patch) | |
tree | df4891c467f10c3ec3c1ba5a99c0629520a3fe1c /crypto/ecdsa | |
parent | 95b14fd8039ba63f9bb547e19f53132d22dc0549 (diff) |
PR: 1432
Submitted by: "Andrzej Chmielowiec" <achmielowiec@enigma.com.pl>, steve@openssl.org
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Truncate hash if it is too large: as required by FIPS 186-3.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ecdsa')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 54 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index 3ead1af94e..551cf5068f 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ err: static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey) { - int ok = 0; + int ok = 0, i; BIGNUM *kinv=NULL, *s, *m=NULL,*tmp=NULL,*order=NULL; const BIGNUM *ckinv; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; @@ -251,22 +251,19 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - if (8 * dgst_len > BN_num_bits(order)) + i = BN_num_bits(order); + /* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole + * bytes. + */ + if (8 * dgst_len > i) + dgst_len = (i + 7)/8; + if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { - /* XXX - * - * Should provide for optional hash truncation: - * Keep the BN_num_bits(order) leftmost bits of dgst - * (see March 2006 FIPS 186-3 draft, which has a few - * confusing errors in this part though) - */ - - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, - ECDSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); + ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } - - if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) + /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ + if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; @@ -346,7 +343,7 @@ err: static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) { - int ret = -1; + int ret = -1, i; BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X; EC_POINT *point = NULL; @@ -384,21 +381,6 @@ static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - if (8 * dgst_len > BN_num_bits(order)) - { - /* XXX - * - * Should provide for optional hash truncation: - * Keep the BN_num_bits(order) leftmost bits of dgst - * (see March 2006 FIPS 186-3 draft, which has a few - * confusing errors in this part though) - */ - - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, - ECDSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); - ret = 0; - goto err; - } if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || @@ -415,11 +397,23 @@ static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, goto err; } /* digest -> m */ + i = BN_num_bits(order); + /* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole + * bytes. + */ + if (8 * dgst_len > i) + dgst_len = (i + 7)/8; if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } + /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ + if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) + { + ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) { |