diff options
author | Antoine Cœur <coeur@gmx.fr> | 2019-07-02 16:04:04 +0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> | 2019-07-02 14:22:29 +0200 |
commit | c2969ff6e70b10f71fbd97c1d0b0cffc92bd69df (patch) | |
tree | 31e1c94c18598574c6074468cffbf16602f98a15 /crypto/ec | |
parent | f663ddc7b00a2d75c1e7d868b73b24adc3f62095 (diff) |
Fix Typos
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9288)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ec')
-rwxr-xr-x | crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl | 2 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c | 2 |
5 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl index e1e23ca90a..7fbc3eb4ac 100755 --- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl +++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_montx: ################################# reduction mulx 8*0+128(%r14), $t0, $t1 - adcx $t0, $acc3 # guranteed to be zero + adcx $t0, $acc3 # guaranteed to be zero adox $t1, $acc4 mulx 8*1+128(%r14), $t0, $t1 diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl index 2f8d82c2b0..5f6bff1850 100755 --- a/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl +++ b/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes: and $t0,$t0,$t1 sldi $a3,$a3,1 add $t0,$t0,$t1 # compare to modulus in the same go - srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared + srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared addc $a0,$a0,$t0 addze $a1,$a1 @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes: sradi $t0,$a3,63 # most significant bit -> mask sldi $a3,$a3,1 andc $t0,$t1,$t0 - srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared + srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared subi $rp,$rp,1 subfc $a0,$t0,$a0 diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h index c54789ba6a..0b1697ec3a 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ struct ec_method_st { int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /*- - * 'field_inv' computes the multipicative inverse of a in the field, + * 'field_inv' computes the multiplicative inverse of a in the field, * storing the result in r. * * If 'a' is zero (or equivalent), you'll get an EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error. diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c index fe6f3b3bbd..06f1a6380f 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, * ffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb * 71e913863f7, in that case the penultimate intermediate is -9G and * the final digit is also -9G. Since this only happens for a single - * scalar, the timing leak is irrelevent. (Any attacker who wanted to + * scalar, the timing leak is irrelevant. (Any attacker who wanted to * check whether a secret scalar was that exact value, can already do * so.) */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c index 7d133a3c96..1958aa2610 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static int ecd_item_sign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); if (alg2) X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); - /* Algorithm idetifiers set: carry on as normal */ + /* Algorithm identifiers set: carry on as normal */ return 3; } |