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authorMark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org>2006-09-28 11:29:03 +0000
committerMark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org>2006-09-28 11:29:03 +0000
commit951dfbb13a79bff82cef8096d2c93bc2d65a7525 (patch)
treeabc7f989e18378c7c06a5eecf6f23257fb42f53a /crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
parent81780a3b6290836f3ef64eafe7143e892e7fa5cc (diff)
Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c12
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 3fd8a35613..e6aad85825 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -304,6 +304,18 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
return -1;
}
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
+ {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
BN_init(&u1);
BN_init(&u2);
BN_init(&t1);