diff options
author | Mark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org> | 2006-09-28 13:18:43 +0000 |
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committer | Mark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org> | 2006-09-28 13:18:43 +0000 |
commit | 3ff55e9680cc99f330f25e48cd1422e3459c02de (patch) | |
tree | 1d0ec06ac2e93bcd761869294c1e21b682dce4a6 /CHANGES | |
parent | cbb92dfaf0ec4e4bc91e729c69847f56d40d8302 (diff) |
Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
(CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
[Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 21 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. + (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] + + *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a + malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) + [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] + *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing @@ -408,6 +415,20 @@ Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to + cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) + [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result + in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. + (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] + + *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a + malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) + [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] + *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got |