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authorMark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org>2005-10-19 11:00:39 +0000
committerMark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org>2005-10-19 11:00:39 +0000
commit04fac373113e6fb751a2ea9db252dd0279e21d40 (patch)
treed26e7e1314e91cdd24d22ea93ea6bdc62ccf1f3c /CHANGES
parentbcb43bb358ca48486f24d18b4f30c957b8697083 (diff)
one time CAN->CVE update
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
-rw-r--r--CHANGES32
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index bca36c97ae..89fdaabc75 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
- idea. (CAN-2005-2969)
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
- idea. (CAN-2005-2969)
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
@@ -1078,11 +1078,11 @@
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
- (CAN-2004-0112)
+ (CVE-2004-0112)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
@@ -1125,9 +1125,9 @@
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
- Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
+ Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
- (CAN-2002-0657)
+ (CVE-2002-0657)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
@@ -3113,7 +3113,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
- certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851)
+ certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
@@ -3129,7 +3129,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
@@ -3181,7 +3181,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
@@ -3314,7 +3314,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
- supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
+ supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
@@ -3322,15 +3322,15 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
- too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
+ too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]