Update CHANGES and NEWS

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

2 files changed, 49 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index b04cf9c6a9..4493f17f28 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,52 @@
 
  Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow
+
+     TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to
+     a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL
+     crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team)
+     (CVE-2016-7054)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) CMS Null dereference
+
+     Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer
+     dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE
+     type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the
+     structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings.
+     Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are
+     affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure.
+     (CVE-2016-7053)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
+     multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
+     longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
+     and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
+     question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
+     of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
+     transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
+     erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
+     Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
+     presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
+     detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
+     multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
+     share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
+     Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
+
+     This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
+     initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
+     providing reproducible case.
+     (CVE-2016-7055)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
   *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
      or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
      prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 81315becfd..87658ddaf3 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0b and OpenSSL 1.1.0c [under development]
 
-      o
+      o ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054)
+      o CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053)
+      o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0a and OpenSSL 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016]