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authorDr. David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>2022-09-15 11:51:30 +0200
committerDr. David von Oheimb <dev@ddvo.net>2023-02-24 12:39:58 +0100
commit26521faae48c14597877e330911171105ab6c30f (patch)
treed8ddec77d378f29daf2705dbc444ff97c8d98ca5
parent9fae775acf56d64854d76f0399a80919f9b115e7 (diff)
CMS_decrypt*(): fix misconceptions and mem leak
Also document CMS_decrypt_set1_password() and fix CMS_EnvelopedData_create.pod. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20209)
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_env.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_smime.c21
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod72
4 files changed, 64 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
index 51a1d7df84..584fe1a547 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd)
return 1;
}
-CMS_EncryptedContentInfo* ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
{
switch (cms_get_enveloped_type(cms)) {
case CMS_ENVELOPED_STANDARD:
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
index d17df31dd4..0e37321a0b 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -705,10 +705,16 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
int i, r, cms_pkey_ri_type;
int debug = 0, match_ri = 0;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
+
+ /* Prevent mem leak on earlier CMS_decrypt_set1_{pkey_and_peer,password} */
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ ec->key = NULL;
+ ec->keylen = 0;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
if (ris != NULL)
- debug = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms)->debug;
+ debug = ec->debug;
cms_pkey_ri_type = ossl_cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk);
if (cms_pkey_ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE) {
@@ -843,7 +849,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
{
int r;
BIO *cont;
-
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms));
if (nid != NID_pkcs7_enveloped
@@ -853,14 +859,9 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
}
if (dcont == NULL && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
- if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
- ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms)->debug = 1;
- else
- ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms)->debug = 0;
- if (cert == NULL)
- ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms)->havenocert = 1;
- else
- ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms)->havenocert = 0;
+ ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
+ ec->debug = (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) != 0;
+ ec->havenocert = cert == NULL;
if (pk == NULL && cert == NULL && dcont == NULL && out == NULL)
return 1;
if (pk != NULL && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
diff --git a/doc/man3/CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt.pod
index 17850a98af..7a19f92b26 100644
--- a/doc/man3/CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt.pod
@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ to and I<flags> is an optional set of flags.
I<dcont> is used in the rare case where the encrypted content is detached. It
will normally be set to NULL.
-The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+The following flags can be passed in the I<flags> parameter.
-If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
-from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type C<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type C<text/plain> then an error is
returned.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
index 4f8d32fbbb..c656133c5d 100644
--- a/doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
=head1 NAME
-CMS_decrypt, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey - decrypt
-content from a CMS envelopedData structure
+CMS_decrypt, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer,
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey, CMS_decrypt_set1_password
+- decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -14,23 +15,41 @@ content from a CMS envelopedData structure
int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert, X509 *peer);
int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert);
+ int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData
-or AuthEnvelopedData structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient,
-B<cert> is the recipient's certificate, B<out> is a BIO to write the content to
-and B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
-
-The B<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
+CMS_decrypt() extracts the decrypted content from a CMS EnvelopedData
+or AuthEnvelopedData structure.
+It uses CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey() to decrypt the content
+with the recipient private key I<pkey> if I<pkey> is not NULL.
+In this case, it is recommended to provide the associated certificate
+in I<cert> - see the NOTES below.
+I<out> is a BIO to write the content to and
+I<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+If I<pkey> is NULL the function assumes that decryption was already done
+(e.g., using CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey() or CMS_decrypt_set1_password()) and just
+provides the content unless I<cert>, I<dcont>, and I<out> are NULL as well.
+The I<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
-CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer() associates the private key B<pkey>, the
-corresponding certificate B<cert> and the originator certificate B<peer> with
-the CMS_ContentInfo structure B<cms>.
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer() decrypts the CMS_ContentInfo structure I<cms>
+using the private key I<pkey>, the corresponding certificate I<cert>, which is
+recommended to be supplied but may be NULL,
+and the (optional) originator certificate I<peer>.
+On success, it also records in I<cms> the decryption key I<pkey>, and this
+should be followed by C<CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, dcont, out, flags)>.
+This call deallocates any decryption key stored in I<cms>.
+
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey() is the same as
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer() with I<peer> being NULL.
-CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey() associates the private key B<pkey>, corresponding
-certificate B<cert> with the CMS_ContentInfo structure B<cms>.
+CMS_decrypt_set1_password() decrypts the CMS_ContentInfo structure I<cms>
+using the secret I<pass> of length I<passlen>.
+On success, it also records in I<cms> the decryption key used, and this
+should be followed by C<CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, dcont, out, flags)>.
+This call deallocates any decryption key stored in I<cms>.
=head1 NOTES
@@ -38,7 +57,7 @@ Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
structure.
-If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
+If I<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
@@ -54,26 +73,32 @@ open to attack.
It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
-in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this
-case both B<cert> and B<pkey> should be set to NULL.
+in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(),
+or use CMS_decrypt_set1_password() if the recipient has a symmetric key.
+In these cases both I<cert> and I<pkey> should be set to NULL.
To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()
and CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and
-B<cert> and B<pkey> set to NULL.
+I<cert> and I<pkey> set to NULL.
-The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+The following flags can be passed in the I<flags> parameter.
-If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
-from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type C<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type C<text/plain> then an error is
returned.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-CMS_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
-The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
+CMS_decrypt(), CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(),
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(), and CMS_decrypt_set1_password()
+return either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
=head1 BUGS
+The B<set1_> part of these function names is misleading
+and should better read: B<with_>.
+
The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt().
@@ -83,7 +108,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-B<CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer> was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer() and CMS_decrypt_set1_password()
+were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT