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2023-07-17upstream: remove vestigal support for KRL signaturesdjm@openbsd.org
When the KRL format was originally defined, it included support for signing of KRL objects. However, the code to sign KRLs and verify KRL signatues was never completed in OpenSSH. Now, some years later, we have SSHSIG support in ssh-keygen that is more general, well tested and actually works. So this removes the semi-finished KRL signing/verification support from OpenSSH and refactors the remaining code to realise the benefit - primarily, we no longer need to perform multiple parsing passes over KRL objects. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 517437bab3d8180f695c775410c052340e038804
2023-07-17upstream: Support for KRL extensions.djm@openbsd.org
This defines wire formats for optional KRL extensions and implements parsing of the new submessages. No actual extensions are supported at this point. ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ae2fcde9a22a9ba7f765bd4f36b3f5901d8c3fa7
2020-04-03upstream: give ssh-keygen the ability to dump the contents of adjm@openbsd.org
binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b
2019-06-21upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM againstdjm@openbsd.org
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB). Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely. Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or when being saved/serialised. Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer architecture has become less unsafe. been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@ ok dtucker@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
2018-09-12upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygendjm@openbsd.org
to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94
2016-01-07upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
unused prototype Upstream-ID: f3eef4389d53ed6c0d5c77dcdcca3060c745da97
2015-01-14upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
sync changes from libopenssh; prepared by markus@ mostly debug output tweaks, a couple of error return value changes and some other minor stuff
2014-12-05upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
convert KRL code to new buffer API ok markus@
2013-01-18 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01Damien Miller
[auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5] [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl] add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number. KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option. feedback and ok markus@