diff options
| author | djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> | 2020-08-27 01:07:09 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2020-08-27 11:28:36 +1000 |
| commit | 801c9f095e6d8b7b91aefd98f5001c652ea13488 (patch) | |
| tree | 6c6416d6d926939b208eb1f1181f196a554e0734 /monitor.c | |
| parent | 9b8ad93824c682ce841f53f3b5762cef4e7cc4dc (diff) | |
upstream: support for requiring user verified FIDO keys in sshd
This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
through and adding ways to require it.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6
Diffstat (limited to 'monitor.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | monitor.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.213 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.214 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> @@ -1387,7 +1387,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) const u_char *signature, *data, *blob; char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL; size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; - int r, ret, req_presence = 0, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret; + int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0; + int encoded_ret; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || @@ -1452,6 +1453,18 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } + req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options & + PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify; + if (req_verify && + (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) { + error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s " + "port %d rejected: user verification requirement " + "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp, + authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", + authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + } } auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key); |