diff options
author | Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us> | 2019-03-04 15:05:50 +0800 |
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committer | Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us> | 2019-03-05 13:12:01 +0800 |
commit | 2366e3d6d792c3c54ee7b0440a93c0fe82b9f84d (patch) | |
tree | b4ebb8e237adbba58c3bd1ae2922f86ed2fda4ec /crypt-gpgme.c | |
parent | 67bdfa3110d22c00fe658ce464a6eb515fbfc590 (diff) |
Use gpgme recipient strings for encryption when available.
For gpgme >= 1.11.0, use gpgme_op_encrypt_ext() and
gpgme_op_encrypt_sign_ext() to specify recipients as a string.
This allows '!' to specify forcing a subkey, as is the case in classic
gpg and from the command line.
Remove the '!' "force valid" usage for the newer version.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypt-gpgme.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypt-gpgme.c | 140 |
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/crypt-gpgme.c b/crypt-gpgme.c index 00a52e30..3a1ed8a5 100644 --- a/crypt-gpgme.c +++ b/crypt-gpgme.c @@ -814,6 +814,38 @@ static char *data_object_to_tempfile (gpgme_data_t data, char *tempf, FILE **ret } +#if GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 /* gpgme >= 1.11.0 */ + +static void create_recipient_string (const char *keylist, BUFFER *recpstring, + int use_smime) +{ + const char *s; + unsigned int n = 0; + + s = keylist; + do + { + while (*s == ' ') + s++; + if (*s) + { + if (!n) + { + if (!use_smime) + mutt_buffer_addstr (recpstring, "--\n"); + } + else + mutt_buffer_addch (recpstring, '\n'); + n++; + + while (*s && *s != ' ') + mutt_buffer_addch (recpstring, *s++); + } + } while (*s); +} + +#else + static void free_recipient_set (gpgme_key_t **p_rset) { gpgme_key_t *rset, k; @@ -838,8 +870,7 @@ static void free_recipient_set (gpgme_key_t **p_rset) /* Create a GpgmeRecipientSet from the keys in the string KEYLIST. The keys must be space delimited. */ -static gpgme_key_t *create_recipient_set (const char *keylist, - gpgme_protocol_t protocol) +static gpgme_key_t *create_recipient_set (const char *keylist, int use_smime) { int err; const char *s; @@ -850,7 +881,7 @@ static gpgme_key_t *create_recipient_set (const char *keylist, gpgme_key_t key = NULL; gpgme_ctx_t context = NULL; - context = create_gpgme_context ((protocol == GPGME_PROTOCOL_CMS)); + context = create_gpgme_context (use_smime); s = keylist; do { @@ -899,6 +930,8 @@ static gpgme_key_t *create_recipient_set (const char *keylist, return rset; } +#endif /* GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 */ + /* Make sure that the correct signer is set. Returns 0 on success. */ static int set_signer (gpgme_ctx_t ctx, int for_smime) @@ -975,13 +1008,27 @@ set_pka_sig_notation (gpgme_ctx_t ctx) enciphered text. With USE_SMIME set to true, the smime backend is used. With COMBINED_SIGNED a PGP message is signed and encrypted. Returns NULL in case of error */ -static char *encrypt_gpgme_object (gpgme_data_t plaintext, gpgme_key_t *rset, +static char *encrypt_gpgme_object (gpgme_data_t plaintext, char *keylist, int use_smime, int combined_signed) { gpgme_error_t err; gpgme_ctx_t ctx; gpgme_data_t ciphertext; - char *outfile; + char *outfile = NULL; + +#if GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 /* gpgme >= 1.11.0 */ + BUFFER *recpstring = mutt_buffer_pool_get (); + create_recipient_string (keylist, recpstring, use_smime); + if (mutt_buffer_len (recpstring) == 0) + { + mutt_buffer_pool_release (&recpstring); + return NULL; + } +#else + gpgme_key_t *rset = create_recipient_set (keylist, use_smime); + if (!rset) + return NULL; +#endif /* GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 */ ctx = create_gpgme_context (use_smime); if (!use_smime) @@ -992,41 +1039,52 @@ static char *encrypt_gpgme_object (gpgme_data_t plaintext, gpgme_key_t *rset, if (combined_signed) { if (set_signer (ctx, use_smime)) - { - gpgme_data_release (ciphertext); - gpgme_release (ctx); - return NULL; - } + goto cleanup; if (option (OPTCRYPTUSEPKA)) { err = set_pka_sig_notation (ctx); if (err) - { - gpgme_data_release (ciphertext); - gpgme_release (ctx); - return NULL; - } + goto cleanup; } +#if GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 /* gpgme >= 1.11.0 */ + err = gpgme_op_encrypt_sign_ext (ctx, NULL, mutt_b2s (recpstring), + GPGME_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST, + plaintext, ciphertext); +#else err = gpgme_op_encrypt_sign (ctx, rset, GPGME_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST, plaintext, ciphertext); +#endif } else - err = gpgme_op_encrypt (ctx, rset, GPGME_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST, - plaintext, ciphertext); + { +#if GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 /* gpgme >= 1.11.0 */ + err = gpgme_op_encrypt_ext (ctx, NULL, mutt_b2s (recpstring), + GPGME_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST, + plaintext, ciphertext); +#else + err = gpgme_op_encrypt (ctx, rset, GPGME_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST, + plaintext, ciphertext); +#endif + } + mutt_need_hard_redraw (); if (err) { mutt_error (_("error encrypting data: %s\n"), gpgme_strerror (err)); - gpgme_data_release (ciphertext); - gpgme_release (ctx); - return NULL; + goto cleanup; } - gpgme_release (ctx); - outfile = data_object_to_tempfile (ciphertext, NULL, NULL); + +cleanup: +#if GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 /* gpgme >= 1.11.0 */ + mutt_buffer_pool_release (&recpstring); +#else + free_recipient_set (&rset); +#endif + gpgme_release (ctx); gpgme_data_release (ciphertext); return outfile; } @@ -1230,25 +1288,16 @@ BODY *pgp_gpgme_encrypt_message (BODY *a, char *keylist, int sign) { char *outfile = NULL; BODY *t; - gpgme_key_t *rset = NULL; gpgme_data_t plaintext; - rset = create_recipient_set (keylist, GPGME_PROTOCOL_OpenPGP); - if (!rset) - return NULL; - if (sign) convert_to_7bit (a); plaintext = body_to_data_object (a, 0); if (!plaintext) - { - free_recipient_set (&rset); - return NULL; - } + return NULL; - outfile = encrypt_gpgme_object (plaintext, rset, 0, sign); + outfile = encrypt_gpgme_object (plaintext, keylist, 0, sign); gpgme_data_release (plaintext); - free_recipient_set (&rset); if (!outfile) return NULL; @@ -1291,27 +1340,18 @@ BODY *smime_gpgme_build_smime_entity (BODY *a, char *keylist) { char *outfile = NULL; BODY *t; - gpgme_key_t *rset = NULL; gpgme_data_t plaintext; - rset = create_recipient_set (keylist, GPGME_PROTOCOL_CMS); - if (!rset) - return NULL; - /* OpenSSL converts line endings to crlf when encrypting. Some * clients depend on this for signed+encrypted messages: they do not * convert line endings between decrypting and checking the * signature. See #3904. */ plaintext = body_to_data_object (a, 1); if (!plaintext) - { - free_recipient_set (&rset); - return NULL; - } + return NULL; - outfile = encrypt_gpgme_object (plaintext, rset, 1, 0); + outfile = encrypt_gpgme_object (plaintext, keylist, 1, 0); gpgme_data_release (plaintext); - free_recipient_set (&rset); if (!outfile) return NULL; @@ -4498,7 +4538,19 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_select_key (crypt_key_t *keys, mutt_clear_error (); break; } + + /* A '!' is appended to a key in find_keys() when forced_valid is + * set. Prior to gpgme 1.11.0, encrypt_gpgme_object() called + * create_recipient_set() which interpreted the '!' to mean set + * GPGME_VALIDITY_FULL for the key. + * + * Starting in gpgme 1.11.0, we now use a '\n' delimited recipient + * string, which is passed directly to the gpgme_op_encrypt_ext() + * function. This allows to use the original meaning of '!' to + * force a subkey use. */ +#if GPGME_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x010b00 /* gpgme < 1.11.0 */ *forced_valid = 1; +#endif } k = crypt_copy_key (key_table[menu->current]); |