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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Much x86 work was pushed out to 5.12, but ARM more than made up for it.
ARM:
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
s390:
- memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
- selftest for diag318
- new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync
x86:
- Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
- Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
- Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
- SEV-ES host support
- Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
- New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
- New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features
Generic:
- Selftest improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
KVM: SVM: fix 32-bit compilation
KVM: SVM: Add AP_JUMP_TABLE support in prep for AP booting
KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests
KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading
KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading
KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests
KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area
KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing
KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
kvm/arm64 fixes for 5.10, take #5
- Don't leak page tables on PTE update
- Correctly invalidate TLBs on table to block transition
- Only update permissions if the fault level matches the
expected mapping size
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kvmarm-master/next
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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kvmarm-master/queue
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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With protected nVHE hyp code interception host's PSCI SMCs, the host
starts seeing new CPUs boot in EL1 instead of EL2. The kernel logic
that keeps track of the boot mode needs to be adjusted.
Add a static key enabled if KVM protected mode initialization is
successful.
When the key is enabled, is_hyp_mode_available continues to report
`true` because its users either treat it as a check whether KVM will be
/ was initialized, or whether stub HVCs can be made (eg. hibernate).
is_hyp_mode_mismatched is changed to report `false` when the key is
enabled. That's because all cores' modes matched at the point of KVM
init and KVM will not allow cores not present at init to boot. That
said, the function is never used after KVM is initialized.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-27-dbrazdil@google.com
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While protected KVM is installed, start trapping all host SMCs.
For now these are simply forwarded to EL3, except PSCI
CPU_ON/CPU_SUSPEND/SYSTEM_SUSPEND which are intercepted and the
hypervisor installed on newly booted cores.
Create new constant HCR_HOST_NVHE_PROTECTED_FLAGS with the new set of HCR
flags to use while the nVHE vector is installed when the kernel was
booted with the protected flag enabled. Switch back to the default HCR
flags when switching back to the stub vector.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-26-dbrazdil@google.com
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KVM by default keeps the stub vector installed and installs the nVHE
vector only briefly for init and later on demand. Change this policy
to install the vector at init and then never uninstall it if the kernel
was given the protected KVM command line parameter.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-25-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add a handler of SYSTEM_SUSPEND host PSCI SMCs. The semantics are
equivalent to CPU_SUSPEND, typically called on the last online CPU.
Reuse the same entry point and boot args struct as CPU_SUSPEND.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-24-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add a handler of CPU_SUSPEND host PSCI SMCs. The SMC can either enter
a sleep state indistinguishable from a WFI or a deeper sleep state that
behaves like a CPU_OFF+CPU_ON except that the core is still considered
online while asleep.
The handler saves r0,pc of the host and makes the same call to EL3 with
the hyp CPU entry point. It either returns back to the handler and then
back to the host, or wakes up into the entry point and initializes EL2
state before dropping back to EL1. No EL2 state needs to be
saved/restored for this purpose.
CPU_ON and CPU_SUSPEND are both implemented using struct psci_boot_args
to store the state upon powerup, with each CPU having separate structs
for CPU_ON and CPU_SUSPEND so that CPU_SUSPEND can operate locklessly
and so that a CPU_ON call targeting a CPU cannot interfere with
a concurrent CPU_SUSPEND call on that CPU.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-23-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add a handler of the CPU_ON PSCI call from host. When invoked, it looks
up the logical CPU ID corresponding to the provided MPIDR and populates
the state struct of the target CPU with the provided x0, pc. It then
calls CPU_ON itself, with an entry point in hyp that initializes EL2
state before returning ERET to the provided PC in EL1.
There is a simple atomic lock around the boot args struct. If it is
already locked, CPU_ON will return PENDING_ON error code.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-22-dbrazdil@google.com
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All nVHE hyp code is currently executed as handlers of host's HVCs. This
will change as nVHE starts intercepting host's PSCI CPU_ON SMCs. The
newly booted CPU will need to initialize EL2 state and then enter the
host. Add __host_enter function that branches into the existing
host state-restoring code after the trap handler would have returned.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-21-dbrazdil@google.com
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In preparation for adding a CPU entry point in nVHE hyp code, extract
most of __do_hyp_init hypervisor initialization code into a common
helper function. This will be invoked by the entry point to install KVM
on the newly booted CPU.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-20-dbrazdil@google.com
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Forward the following PSCI SMCs issued by host to EL3 as they do not
require the hypervisor's intervention. This assumes that EL3 correctly
implements the PSCI specification.
Only function IDs implemented in Linux are included.
Where both 32-bit and 64-bit variants exist, it is assumed that the host
will always use the 64-bit variant.
* SMCs that only return information about the system
* PSCI_VERSION - PSCI version implemented by EL3
* PSCI_FEATURES - optional features supported by EL3
* AFFINITY_INFO - power state of core/cluster
* MIGRATE_INFO_TYPE - whether Trusted OS can be migrated
* MIGRATE_INFO_UP_CPU - resident core of Trusted OS
* operations which do not affect the hypervisor
* MIGRATE - migrate Trusted OS to a different core
* SET_SUSPEND_MODE - toggle OS-initiated mode
* system shutdown/reset
* SYSTEM_OFF
* SYSTEM_RESET
* SYSTEM_RESET2
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-19-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add a host-initialized constant to KVM nVHE hyp code for converting
between EL2 linear map virtual addresses and physical addresses.
Also add `__hyp_pa` macro that performs the conversion.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-18-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add a handler of PSCI SMCs in nVHE hyp code. The handler is initialized
with the version used by the host's PSCI driver and the function IDs it
was configured with. If the SMC function ID matches one of the
configured PSCI calls (for v0.1) or falls into the PSCI function ID
range (for v0.2+), the SMC is handled by the PSCI handler. For now, all
SMCs return PSCI_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-17-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add handler of host SMCs in KVM nVHE trap handler. Forward all SMCs to
EL3 and propagate the result back to EL1. This is done in preparation
for validating host SMCs in KVM protected mode.
The implementation assumes that firmware uses SMCCC v1.2 or older. That
means x0-x17 can be used both for arguments and results, other GPRs are
preserved.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-16-dbrazdil@google.com
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When KVM starts validating host's PSCI requests, it will need to map
MPIDR back to the CPU ID. To this end, copy cpu_logical_map into nVHE
hyp memory when KVM is initialized.
Only copy the information for CPUs that are online at the point of KVM
initialization so that KVM rejects CPUs whose features were not checked
against the finalized capabilities.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-15-dbrazdil@google.com
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When compiling with __KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__, redefine per_cpu_offset()
to __hyp_per_cpu_offset() which looks up the base of the nVHE per-CPU
region of the given cpu and computes its offset from the
.hyp.data..percpu section.
This enables use of per_cpu_ptr() helpers in nVHE hyp code. Until now
only this_cpu_ptr() was supported by setting TPIDR_EL2.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-14-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add rules for renaming the .data..ro_after_init ELF section in KVM nVHE
object files to .hyp.data..ro_after_init, linking it into the kernel
and mapping it in hyp at runtime.
The section is RW to the host, then mapped RO in hyp. The expectation is
that the host populates the variables in the section and they are never
changed by hyp afterwards.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-13-dbrazdil@google.com
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MAIR_EL2 and TCR_EL2 are currently initialized from their _EL1 values.
This will not work once KVM starts intercepting PSCI ON/SUSPEND SMCs
and initializing EL2 state before EL1 state.
Obtain the EL1 values during KVM init and store them in the init params
struct. The struct will stay in memory and can be used when booting new
cores.
Take the opportunity to move copying the T0SZ value from idmap_t0sz in
KVM init rather than in .hyp.idmap.text. This avoids the need for the
idmap_t0sz symbol alias.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-12-dbrazdil@google.com
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Once we start initializing KVM on newly booted cores before the rest of
the kernel, parameters to __do_hyp_init will need to be provided by EL2
rather than EL1. At that point it will not be possible to pass its three
arguments directly because PSCI_CPU_ON only supports one context
argument.
Refactor __do_hyp_init to accept its parameters in a struct. This
prepares the code for KVM booting cores as well as removes any limits on
the number of __do_hyp_init arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-11-dbrazdil@google.com
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KVM precomputes the hyp VA of __kvm_hyp_host_vector, essentially a
constant (minus ASLR), before passing it to __kvm_hyp_init.
Now that we have alternatives for converting kimg VA to hyp VA, replace
this with computing the constant inside __kvm_hyp_init, thus removing
the need for an argument.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-10-dbrazdil@google.com
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Expose the boolean value whether the system is running with KVM in
protected mode (nVHE + kernel param). CPU capability was selected over
a global variable to allow use in alternatives.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-3-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add an early parameter that allows users to select the mode of operation
for KVM/arm64.
For now, the only supported value is "protected". By passing this flag
users opt into the hypervisor placing additional restrictions on the
host kernel. These allow the hypervisor to spawn guests whose state is
kept private from the host. Restrictions will include stage-2 address
translation to prevent host from accessing guest memory, filtering its
SMC calls, etc.
Without this parameter, the default behaviour remains selecting VHE/nVHE
based on hardware support and CONFIG_ARM64_VHE.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-2-dbrazdil@google.com
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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There is a lock version kvm_write_guest. Use it to simplify code.
Signed-off-by: Keqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817110728.12196-3-zhukeqian1@huawei.com
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If we get a FSC_PERM fault, just using (logging_active && writable) to
determine calling kvm_pgtable_stage2_map(). There will be two more cases
we should consider.
(1) After logging_active is configged back to false from true. When we
get a FSC_PERM fault with write_fault and adjustment of hugepage is needed,
we should merge tables back to a block entry. This case is ignored by still
calling kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms(), which will lead to an endless
loop and guest panic due to soft lockup.
(2) We use (FSC_PERM && logging_active && writable) to determine
collapsing a block entry into a table by calling kvm_pgtable_stage2_map().
But sometimes we may only need to relax permissions when trying to write
to a page other than a block.
In this condition,using kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms() will be fine.
The ISS filed bit[1:0] in ESR_EL2 regesiter indicates the stage2 lookup
level at which a D-abort or I-abort occurred. By comparing granule of
the fault lookup level with vma_pagesize, we can strictly distinguish
conditions of calling kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms() or
kvm_pgtable_stage2_map(), and the above two cases will be well considered.
Suggested-by: Keqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201201201034.116760-4-wangyanan55@huawei.com
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When dirty logging is enabled, we collapse block entries into tables
as necessary. If dirty logging gets canceled, we can end-up merging
tables back into block entries.
When this happens, we must not only free the non-huge page-table
pages but also invalidate all the TLB entries that can potentially
cover the block. Otherwise, we end-up with multiple possible translations
for the same physical page, which can legitimately result in a TLB
conflict.
To address this, replease the bogus invalidation by IPA with a full
VM invalidation. Although this is pretty heavy handed, it happens
very infrequently and saves a bunch of invalidations by IPA.
Signed-off-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
[maz: fixup commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201201201034.116760-3-wangyanan55@huawei.com
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When installing a new leaf PTE onto an invalid ptep, we need to
get_page(ptep) to account for the new mapping.
However, simply updating a valid PTE shouldn't result in any
additional refcounting, as there is new mapping. This otherwise
results in a page being forever wasted.
Address this by fixing-up the refcount in stage2_map_walker_try_leaf()
if the PTE was already valid, balancing out the later get_page()
in stage2_map_walk_leaf().
Signed-off-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
[maz: update commit message, add comment in the code]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201201201034.116760-2-wangyanan55@huawei.com
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Cores that predate the introduction of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 to
the ARMv8 architecture have this field set to 0, even of some of
them are not affected by the vulnerability.
The kernel maintains a list of unaffected cores (A53, A55 and a few
others) so that it doesn't impose an expensive mitigation uncessarily.
As we do for CSV2, let's expose the CSV3 property to guests that run
on HW that is effectively not vulnerable. This can be reset to zero
by writing to the ID register from userspace, ensuring that VMs can
be migrated despite the new property being set.
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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In order to reduce the impact of the VPT parsing happening on the GIC,
we can split the vcpu reseidency in two phases:
- programming GICR_VPENDBASER: this still happens in vcpu_load()
- checking for the VPT parsing to be complete: this can happen
on vcpu entry (in kvm_vgic_flush_hwstate())
This allows the GIC and the CPU to work in parallel, rewmoving some
of the entry overhead.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shenming Lu <lushenming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128141857.983-3-lushenming@huawei.com
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Not counting TnD, which KVM doesn't currently consider, CSSELR_EL1
can have a maximum value of 0b1101 (13), which corresponds to an
instruction cache at level 7. With CSSELR_MAX set to 12 we can
only select up to cache level 6. Change it to 14.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126134641.35231-2-drjones@redhat.com
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kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension() is only called from
kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(), so we can inline it and remove the extra
function.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118194402.2892-3-will@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master
KVM/arm64 fixes for v5.10, take #4
- Fix alignment of the new HYP sections
- Fix GICR_TYPER access from userspace
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The PMU ready state has no user left. Goodbye.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We currently gate the update of the PMU state on the PMU being "ready".
The "ready" state is only set to true when the first vcpu run is
successful, and if it isn't, we never reach the update code.
So the "ready" state is never the right thing to check for, and it
should instead be the presence of the PMU feature, which makes
a bit more sense.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The handling of traps in access_pmu_evcntr() has a couple of
omminous "else return false;" statements that don't make any sense:
the decoding tree coverse all the registers that trap to this handler,
and returning false implies that we change PC, which we don't.
Get rid of what is evidently dead code.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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There is no RAZ/WI handling allowed for the PMU registers in the
ARMv8 architecture. Nobody can remember how we cam to the conclusion
that we could do this, but the ARMv8 ARM is pretty clear that we cannot.
Remove the RAZ/WI handling of the PMU system registers when it is
not configured.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The ARMv8 architecture says that in the absence of FEAT_PMUv3,
all the PMU-related register generate an UNDEF. Let's make
sure that all our PMU handers catch this case by hooking into
check_pmu_access_disabled(), and add checks in a couple of
other places.
Note that we still cannot deliver an exception into the guest
as the offending cases are already caught by the RAZ/WI handling.
But this puts us one step away to architectural compliance.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We accept to configure a PMU when a vcpu is created, even if the
HW (or the host) doesn't support it. This results in failures
when attributes get set, which is a bit odd as we should have
failed the vcpu creation the first place.
Move the check to the point where we check the vcpu feature set,
and fail early if we cannot support a PMU. This further simplifies
the attribute handling.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We always expose the HW view of PMU in ID_AA64FDR0_EL1.PMUver,
even when the PMU feature is disabled, while the architecture
says that FEAT_PMUv3 not being implemented should result in this
field being zero.
Let's follow the architecture's guidance.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When enabling the PMU in kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable(), KVM returns early if the
PMU flag created is false and skips any other checks. Because PMU emulation
is gated only on the VCPU feature being set, this makes it possible for
userspace to get away with setting the VCPU feature but not doing any
initialization for the PMU. Fix it by returning an error when trying to run
the VCPU if the PMU hasn't been initialized correctly.
The PMU is marked as created only if the interrupt ID has been set when
using an in-kernel irqchip. This means the same check in
kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable() is redundant, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126144916.164075-1-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
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There are a number of places where we check for the KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3
feature. Wrap this check into a new kvm_vcpu_has_pmu(), and use
it at the existing locations.
No functional change.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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