diff options
author | James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 2018-09-04 11:35:54 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 2018-09-04 11:35:54 -0700 |
commit | e42f6f9be4f83c537aa81b4c6239ea94ff5b29ce (patch) | |
tree | f956a5ea0e83fc6d0df3e64681e7bbc1f201f3ee /security | |
parent | 4408e300a67ab2ce2505087986a9fe922c800ffd (diff) | |
parent | 57361846b52bc686112da6ca5368d11210796804 (diff) |
Merge tag 'v4.19-rc2' into next-general
Sync to Linux 4.19-rc2 for downstream developers.
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
46 files changed, 427 insertions, 383 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index c4302067a3ad..27d8b2688f75 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" default y - depends on X86_64 && !UML + depends on X86 && !UML help This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped @@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR - select BUG imply STRICT_DEVMEM help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 949dd8a48164..e09fe4d7307c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_ns_revision_fops = { static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *match_str, size_t match_len) { - struct aa_perms tmp; + struct aa_perms tmp = { }; struct aa_dfa *dfa; unsigned int state = 0; @@ -613,7 +613,6 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, dfa = profile->file.dfa; state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->file.start, match_str + 1, match_len - 1); - tmp = nullperms; if (state) { struct path_cond cond = { }; @@ -627,8 +626,6 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, match_str, match_len); if (state) aa_compute_perms(dfa, state, &tmp); - else - tmp = nullperms; } aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp); diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 098d546d8253..08c88de0ffda 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, audit: aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL, - hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, NULL, + hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); if (!hat || (error && error != -ENOENT)) return ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 224b2fef93ca..4285943f7260 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) { char str[10]; - aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, aa_file_perm_chrs, map_mask_to_chr_mask(mask)); + aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, + map_mask_to_chr_mask(mask)); audit_log_string(ab, str); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 38aa6247d00f..b94ec114d1a4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2))) -void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); +void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t str_size, const char *chrs, + u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index a7b3f681b80e..974affe50531 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -198,15 +198,24 @@ const char *aa_file_perm_names[] = { /** * aa_perm_mask_to_str - convert a perm mask to its short string * @str: character buffer to store string in (at least 10 characters) + * @str_size: size of the @str buffer + * @chrs: NUL-terminated character buffer of permission characters * @mask: permission mask to convert */ -void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) +void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t str_size, const char *chrs, u32 mask) { unsigned int i, perm = 1; + size_t num_chrs = strlen(chrs); + + for (i = 0; i < num_chrs; perm <<= 1, i++) { + if (mask & perm) { + /* Ensure that one byte is left for NUL-termination */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(str_size <= 1)) + break; - for (i = 0; i < 32; perm <<= 1, i++) { - if (mask & perm) *str++ = chrs[i]; + str_size--; + } } *str = '\0'; } @@ -236,7 +245,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, audit_log_format(ab, "\""); if ((mask & chrsmask) && chrs) { - aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, chrs, mask & chrsmask); + aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), chrs, mask & chrsmask); mask &= ~chrsmask; audit_log_format(ab, "%s", str); if (mask & namesmask) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 74f17376202b..8b8b70620bbe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); } -static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) { struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); struct aa_label *label; @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) return 0; } - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); if (!unconfined(label)) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index b0f9dc3f765a..1a7cec5d9cac 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ns->level = parent->level + 1; mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(ns, ns_subns_dir(parent), name, dir); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 0e566a01d217..21cb384d712a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -389,32 +389,6 @@ static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name) return res; } -#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff -#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff - -/** - * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa - * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL) - * @flags: flags governing dfa - * - * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error - */ -static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) -{ - int i; - - /* verify accept permissions */ - for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) { - int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i]; - - if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK) - return 0; - - if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} /** * unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa @@ -445,15 +419,9 @@ static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e) if (IS_ERR(dfa)) return dfa; - if (!verify_accept(dfa, flags)) - goto fail; } return dfa; - -fail: - aa_put_dfa(dfa); - return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); } /** diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 6012f0cd8157..18a4fdf6f6eb 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); if (!dentry) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index ab6a029062a1..6dc075144508 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -115,3 +115,26 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } + +/** + * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * @kmod_name: kernel module name + * + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). + * + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies + * also signed with digsig. + */ +int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index d593346d0bba..60221852b26a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config EVM select ENCRYPTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO default n help EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 1257c3c24723..c3f437f5db10 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames; +struct evm_digest { + struct ima_digest_data hdr; + char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; +} __packed; + int evm_init_key(void); int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, @@ -54,10 +59,11 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, size_t req_xattr_value_len); int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); + size_t req_xattr_value_len, struct evm_digest *data); int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest); + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, + struct evm_digest *data); int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, char *hmac_val); int evm_init_secfs(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index b60524310855..8a3905bb02c7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/evm.h> #include <keys/encrypted-type.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include "evm.h" #define EVMKEY "evm-key" @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE; struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; -struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; +static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST]; static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); @@ -38,7 +39,6 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; static char * const evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; -static char * const evm_hash = "sha1"; /** * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel @@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ busy: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key); -static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) +static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) { long rc; - char *algo; + const char *algo; struct crypto_shash **tfm; struct shash_desc *desc; @@ -89,15 +89,16 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) tfm = &hmac_tfm; algo = evm_hmac; } else { - tfm = &hash_tfm; - algo = evm_hash; + tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; + algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } if (*tfm == NULL) { mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out; - *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); @@ -186,10 +187,10 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory. */ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char type, char *digest) + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, + uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; @@ -204,10 +205,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - desc = init_desc(type); + desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo); if (IS_ERR(desc)) return PTR_ERR(desc); + data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm); + error = -ENODATA; list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { bool is_ima = false; @@ -239,7 +242,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, if (is_ima) ima_present = true; } - hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest); /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present) @@ -252,18 +255,18 @@ out: int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char *digest) + struct evm_digest *data) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data); } int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char type, char *digest) + char type, struct evm_digest *data) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, type, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, type, data); } static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) @@ -303,7 +306,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; + struct evm_digest data; int rc = 0; /* @@ -316,13 +319,14 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (rc) return -EPERM; + data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); + xattr_value_len, &data); if (rc == 0) { - xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, - &xattr_data, - sizeof(xattr_data), 0); + &data.hdr.xattr.data[1], + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0); } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); } @@ -334,7 +338,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, { struct shash_desc *desc; - desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC); + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); if (IS_ERR(desc)) { pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index f9eff5041e4c..7f3f54d89a6e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/magic.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <crypto/algapi.h> #include "evm.h" @@ -134,8 +135,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; - struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc; + struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + struct evm_digest digest; struct inode *inode; int rc, xattr_len; @@ -171,25 +173,28 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } + + digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, calc.digest); + xattr_value_len, &digest); if (rc) break; - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, - sizeof(calc.digest)); + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: + hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data; + digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo; rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, - calc.digest); + xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest); if (rc) break; rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, - calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); + digest.digest, digest.hdr.length); if (!rc) { inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 637eb999e340..77de71b7794c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return -E2BIG; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR); - if (IS_ERR(ab)) - return PTR_ERR(ab); + if (!ab) + return -ENOMEM; xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!xattr) { diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 149faa81f6f0..5a6810041e5c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -219,10 +219,13 @@ static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) { integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL); if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) { - pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %ld\n", - PTR_ERR(integrity_dir)); + int ret = PTR_ERR(integrity_dir); + + if (ret != -ENODEV) + pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %d\n", + ret); integrity_dir = NULL; - return PTR_ERR(integrity_dir); + return ret; } return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 004919d9bf09..13b446328dda 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config IMA select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES + select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT help The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 78c15264b17b..67db9d9454ca 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; extern int ima_policy_flag; /* set during initialization */ -extern int ima_used_chip; extern int ima_hash_algo; extern int ima_appraise; +extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; /* IMA event related data */ struct ima_event_data { @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened); + int xattr_len); int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..deec1804a00a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ? "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash"; status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; - if (opened & FILE_CREATED) + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) || diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 4e085a17124f..7e7e7e7c250a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len, static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) { - if (!ima_used_chip) + if (!ima_tpm_chip) return; - if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0) + if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 29b72cd2502e..faac9ecaa0ae 100644 --- a/security/in |