Merge tag 'v3.16' into next

Linux 3.16

27 files changed, 490 insertions, 175 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index ad0d4de69944..e76373de3129 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
 }
 
 static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-			      key_perm_t perm)
+			      unsigned perm)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 9134dbf70d3e..d9d69e6930ed 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static inline bool is_devcg_online(const struct dev_cgroup *devcg)
 static int devcgroup_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
 {
 	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css);
-	struct dev_cgroup *parent_dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css_parent(css));
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent_dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css->parent);
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ static bool verify_new_ex(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
 static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
 				  struct dev_exception_item *ex)
 {
-	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(css_parent(&childcg->css));
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(childcg->css.parent);
 
 	if (!parent)
 		return 1;
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
 static bool parent_allows_removal(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
 				  struct dev_exception_item *ex)
 {
-	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(css_parent(&childcg->css));
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(childcg->css.parent);
 
 	if (!parent)
 		return true;
@@ -587,13 +587,6 @@ static int propagate_exception(struct dev_cgroup *devcg_root,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static inline bool has_children(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup)
-{
-	struct cgroup *cgrp = devcgroup->css.cgroup;
-
-	return !list_empty(&cgrp->children);
-}
-
 /*
  * Modify the exception list using allow/deny rules.
  * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this.  It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD
@@ -614,7 +607,7 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
 	char temp[12];		/* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */
 	int count, rc = 0;
 	struct dev_exception_item ex;
-	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(css_parent(&devcgroup->css));
+	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(devcgroup->css.parent);
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -626,7 +619,7 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
 	case 'a':
 		switch (filetype) {
 		case DEVCG_ALLOW:
-			if (has_children(devcgroup))
+			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
 				return -EINVAL;
 
 			if (!may_allow_all(parent))
@@ -642,7 +635,7 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
 				return rc;
 			break;
 		case DEVCG_DENY:
-			if (has_children(devcgroup))
+			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
 				return -EINVAL;
 
 			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
@@ -767,27 +760,27 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int devcgroup_access_write(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
-				  struct cftype *cft, char *buffer)
+static ssize_t devcgroup_access_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+				      char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
 {
 	int retval;
 
 	mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
-	retval = devcgroup_update_access(css_to_devcgroup(css),
-					 cft->private, buffer);
+	retval = devcgroup_update_access(css_to_devcgroup(of_css(of)),
+					 of_cft(of)->private, strstrip(buf));
 	mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
-	return retval;
+	return retval ?: nbytes;
 }
 
 static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "allow",
-		.write_string  = devcgroup_access_write,
+		.write = devcgroup_access_write,
 		.private = DEVCG_ALLOW,
 	},
 	{
 		.name = "deny",
-		.write_string = devcgroup_access_write,
+		.write = devcgroup_access_write,
 		.private = DEVCG_DENY,
 	},
 	{
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index d35b4915b00d..d606f3d12d6b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -12,15 +12,41 @@ config EVM
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config EVM_HMAC_VERSION
-	int "EVM HMAC version"
+if EVM
+
+menu "EVM options"
+
+config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	bool "FSUUID (version 2)"
+	default y
 	depends on EVM
-	default 2
 	help
-	  This options adds EVM HMAC version support.
-	  1 - original version
-	  2 - add per filesystem unique identifier (UUID) (default)
+	  Include filesystem UUID for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  Default value is 'selected', which is former version 2.
+	  if 'not selected', it is former version 1
 
-	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding 
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
 	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
-	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.  
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
+	bool "Additional SMACK xattrs"
+	depends on EVM && SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux,
+	  security.SMACK64, security.capability, and security.ima) included
+	  in the HMAC calculation, enabling this option includes newly defined
+	  Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and
+	  security.SMACK64MMAP.
+
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+endmenu
+
+endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 37c88ddb3cfe..88bfe77efa1c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
 extern int evm_initialized;
 extern char *evm_hmac;
 extern char *evm_hash;
-extern int evm_hmac_version;
+
+#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
+
+extern int evm_hmac_attrs;
 
 extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
 extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 6b540f1822e0..5e9687f02e1b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
 	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
 	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
 	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
-	if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
+	if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)
 		crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
 				    sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
 	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 6e0bd933b6a9..3bcb80df4d01 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
 };
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
 char *evm_hash = "sha1";
-int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
+int evm_hmac_attrs;
 
 char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 	XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
+	XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
+	XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+	XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
+#endif
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 	XATTR_NAME_IMA,
@@ -57,6 +62,14 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 }
 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
 
+static void __init evm_init_config(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
+#endif
+	pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
+}
+
 static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -287,12 +300,20 @@ out:
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
  *
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+	if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
+	    && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC))
+		return -EPERM;
 	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				 xattr_value_len);
 }
@@ -432,6 +453,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
+	evm_init_config();
+
 	error = evm_init_secfs();
 	if (error < 0) {
 		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index ba9e4d792dd5..d9cd5ce14d2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
 			    int *xattr_len)
 {
+	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
@@ -213,6 +214,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+			result = -EACCES;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		/* use default hash algorithm */
 		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
 
@@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 				result = -ENOMEM;
 		}
 	}
+out:
 	if (result)
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-				    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+				    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
 				    result, 0);
 	return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 291bf0f3a46d..d3113d4aaa3c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 
@@ -353,18 +353,22 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode)
 		return;
 
 	iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+	if (digsig)
+		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 	return;
 }
 
 int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
 	int result;
 
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len);
 	if (result == 1) {
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode,
+			 (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;
@@ -376,7 +380,7 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 	if (result == 1) {
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode, 0);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 1bde8e627766..ccd0ac8fa9a0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -27,6 +27,36 @@
 
 static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
 
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_read - read file content
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			   char *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+	mm_segment_t old_fs;
+	char __user *buf = addr;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
+		return -EBADF;
+	if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	old_fs = get_fs();
+	set_fs(get_ds());
+	if (file->f_op->read)
+		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	else
+		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	set_fs(old_fs);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
@@ -104,7 +134,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
 
-		rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+		rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
 		if (rbuf_len < 0) {
 			rc = rbuf_len;
 			break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 52ac6cf41f88..09baa335ebc7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-	int must_measure;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname;
@@ -92,18 +91,19 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);	/* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
 
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
-		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
-			send_tomtou = true;
-		goto out;
+		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
+			struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+			iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
+			if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
+				send_tomtou = true;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) &&
+		    ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK))
+			send_writers = true;
 	}
 
-	must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
-	if (!must_measure)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
-		send_writers = true;
-out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
@@ -214,8 +214,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
-	if (rc != 0)
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
 		goto out_digsig;
+	}
 
 	pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 93873a450ff7..40a7488f6721 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
 	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
-	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
+	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -622,6 +623,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
+		case Opt_permit_directio:
+			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
 			result = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53e927f..33c0a70f6b15 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x04000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 80b2aac4f50c..5f20da01fd8d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -176,20 +176,11 @@ extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
 /*
  * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
  */
-static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
 {
 	return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
 }
 
-/* required permissions */
-#define	KEY_VIEW	0x01	/* require permission to view attributes */
-#define	KEY_READ	0x02	/* require permission to read content */
-#define	KEY_WRITE	0x04	/* require permission to update / modify */
-#define	KEY_SEARCH	0x08	/* require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
-#define	KEY_LINK	0x10	/* require permission to link */
-#define	KEY_SETATTR	0x20	/* require permission to change attributes */
-#define	KEY_ALL		0x3f	/* all the above permissions */
-
 /*
  * Authorisation record for request_key().
  */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6e21c11e48bc..2048a110e7f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	int ret;
 
 	/* need write permission on the key to update it */
-	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
 	 * to modify the keyring */
-	ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+	ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 		goto error_link_end;
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
 	key_check(key);
 
 	/* the key must be writable */
-	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index cee72ce64222..cd5bd0cef25d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error3;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
 		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
-					   KEY_WRITE);
+					   KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 	long ret;
 
 	lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -365,12 +365,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		if (ret != -EACCES)
 			goto error;
-		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 		if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 			goto error;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 
 	kenter("%d", id);
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 
@@ -470,13 +470,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *tmpbuf;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
 		 * authorisation token handy */
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	}
 
 	/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
 		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
-					   KEY_WRITE);
+					   KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
 	if (dest_ref) {
-		ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
+		ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error6;
 
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
 	/* see if we can read it directly */
-	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
 	if (ret == 0)
 		goto can_read_key;
 	if (ret != -EACCES)
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 		goto error;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-				  KEY_SETATTR);
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
 		goto error;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-				  KEY_SETATTR);
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
 	if (ringid > 0) {
-		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dkref))
 			return PTR_ERR(dkref);
 		*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	long ret;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-				  KEY_SETATTR);
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
 		 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *context;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 	struct cred *cred;
 	int ret;
 
-	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
 		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 2fb2576dc644..9cf2575f0d97 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
 	/* key must have search permissions */
 	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
 	    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-				ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
+				ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
 		ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 		kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
 		goto skipped;
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ ascend_to_node:
 		/* Search a nested keyring */
 		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
 		    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+					ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
 			continue;
 
 		/* stack the current position */
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
 
 	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
-		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return ERR_PTR(err);
 	}
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
 
 			if (!skip_perm_check &&
 			    key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
-					   KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+					   KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
 				continue;
 
 			/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index efcc0c855a0d..732cc0beffdf 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * permissions bits or the LSM check.
  */
 int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-			key_perm_t perm)
+			unsigned perm)
 {
 	struct key *key;
 	key_perm_t kperm;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ use_these_perms: