diff options
author | Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> | 2011-07-07 18:59:34 -0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi> | 2011-07-08 17:07:43 -0300 |
commit | 7034b911af1aa571995b56db3ed71a25daf00373 (patch) | |
tree | 89325f75fef679c8d6657ee6d971aa36823cc962 /net | |
parent | fadd192e81b0a8d8086531b8c11bd88b311b68c2 (diff) |
Bluetooth: Add support for SMP phase 3 (key distribution)
This adds support for generating and distributing all the keys
specified in the third phase of SMP.
This will make possible to re-establish secure connections, resolve
private addresses and sign commands.
For now, the values generated are random.
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 114 |
2 files changed, 113 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 2c5d335bde87..ab2e244a76c4 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -4103,6 +4103,7 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) chan->sec_level = hcon->sec_level; del_timer(&conn->security_timer); l2cap_chan_ready(sk); + smp_distribute_keys(conn, 0); } bh_unlock_sock(sk); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index ba55bd4b5dda..82443b95f24e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, cmd->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; cmd->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; - cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00; - cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00; + cmd->init_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; + cmd->resp_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; cmd->auth_req = authreq; } @@ -474,6 +474,26 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) return 0; } +static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + /* FIXME: store the ltk */ + return 0; +} + +static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *paircmd = (void *) &conn->prsp[1]; + u8 keydist = paircmd->init_key_dist; + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", keydist); + /* FIXME: store ediv and rand */ + + smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1); + + return 0; +} + int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { __u8 code = skb->data[0]; @@ -521,10 +541,20 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) break; case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: + reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: + reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: + /* Just ignored */ + reason = 0; + break; + default: BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); @@ -541,3 +571,83 @@ done: kfree_skb(skb); return err; } + +int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; + __u8 *keydist; + + BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force); + + if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm); + + rsp = (void *) &conn->prsp[1]; + + /* The responder sends its keys first */ + if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07)) + return 0; + + req = (void *) &conn->preq[1]; + + if (conn->hcon->out) { + keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; + } else { + keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; + } + + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; + struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; + __le16 ediv; + + get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); + get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); + get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); + + ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; + struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; + + /* Send a dummy key */ + get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); + + /* Just public address */ + memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo)); + bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), + &addrinfo); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { + struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; + + /* Send a dummy key */ + get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; + } + + return 0; +} |