diff options
author | Herbert Xu <herbert@lithui.me.apana.org.au> | 2017-12-22 20:00:50 +1100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@lithui.me.apana.org.au> | 2017-12-22 20:00:50 +1100 |
commit | 45fa9a324d0f5be9140ba2e0db9b8fb8a0b9b7e8 (patch) | |
tree | a5e7c8428030ec0462b58133d6548ddff3802018 /lib | |
parent | fc8517bf627c9b834f80274a1bc9ecd39b27231b (diff) | |
parent | 2973633e9f09311e849f975d969737af81a521ff (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Merge the crypto tree to pick up inside-secure fixes.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ashldi3.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ashrdi3.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/asn1_decoder.c | 49 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/cmpdi2.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/lshrdi3.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/mpi/longlong.h | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/muldi3.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/nlattr.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/oid_registry.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/test_printf.c | 108 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ucmpdi2.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/vsprintf.c | 194 |
12 files changed, 293 insertions, 126 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ashldi3.c b/lib/ashldi3.c index 1b6087db95a5..3ffc46e3bb6c 100644 --- a/lib/ashldi3.c +++ b/lib/ashldi3.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> -#include <lib/libgcc.h> +#include <linux/libgcc.h> long long notrace __ashldi3(long long u, word_type b) { diff --git a/lib/ashrdi3.c b/lib/ashrdi3.c index 2e67c97ac65a..ea054550f0e8 100644 --- a/lib/ashrdi3.c +++ b/lib/ashrdi3.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> -#include <lib/libgcc.h> +#include <linux/libgcc.h> long long notrace __ashrdi3(long long u, word_type b) { diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c index 1ef0cec38d78..dc14beae2c9a 100644 --- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c +++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c @@ -313,42 +313,47 @@ next_op: /* Decide how to handle the operation */ switch (op) { - case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT: - case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP: - case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT: - case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP: - ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - goto skip_data; - - case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT: - case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP: - case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP: - ret = actions[machine[pc + 2]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - goto skip_data; - case ASN1_OP_MATCH: case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP: + case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT: + case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP: case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY: case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP: + case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT: + case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP: case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP: + case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP: case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY: case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP: - skip_data: + case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT: + case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP: + if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) { if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) { + size_t tmp = dp; + ret = asn1_find_indefinite_length( - data, datalen, &dp, &len, &errmsg); + data, datalen, &tmp, &len, &errmsg); if (ret < 0) goto error; - } else { - dp += len; } pr_debug("- LEAF: %zu\n", len); } + + if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ACT) { + unsigned char act; + + if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY) + act = machine[pc + 1]; + else + act = machine[pc + 2]; + ret = actions[act](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + + if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) + dp += len; pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; goto next_op; @@ -434,6 +439,8 @@ next_op: else act = machine[pc + 1]; ret = actions[act](context, hdr, 0, data + tdp, len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; } pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; goto next_op; diff --git a/lib/cmpdi2.c b/lib/cmpdi2.c index 6d7ebf6c2b86..2250da7e503e 100644 --- a/lib/cmpdi2.c +++ b/lib/cmpdi2.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> -#include <lib/libgcc.h> +#include <linux/libgcc.h> word_type notrace __cmpdi2(long long a, long long b) { diff --git a/lib/lshrdi3.c b/lib/lshrdi3.c index 8e845f4bb65f..99cfa5721f2d 100644 --- a/lib/lshrdi3.c +++ b/lib/lshrdi3.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ */ #include <linux/module.h> -#include <lib/libgcc.h> +#include <linux/libgcc.h> long long notrace __lshrdi3(long long u, word_type b) { diff --git a/lib/mpi/longlong.h b/lib/mpi/longlong.h index 57fd45ab7af1..08c60d10747f 100644 --- a/lib/mpi/longlong.h +++ b/lib/mpi/longlong.h @@ -671,7 +671,23 @@ do { \ ************** MIPS/64 ************** ***************************************/ #if (defined(__mips) && __mips >= 3) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 64 -#if (__GNUC__ >= 5) || (__GNUC__ >= 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 4) +#if defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev >= 6 +/* + * GCC ends up emitting a __multi3 intrinsic call for MIPS64r6 with the plain C + * code below, so we special case MIPS64r6 until the compiler can do better. + */ +#define umul_ppmm(w1, w0, u, v) \ +do { \ + __asm__ ("dmulu %0,%1,%2" \ + : "=d" ((UDItype)(w0)) \ + : "d" ((UDItype)(u)), \ + "d" ((UDItype)(v))); \ + __asm__ ("dmuhu %0,%1,%2" \ + : "=d" ((UDItype)(w1)) \ + : "d" ((UDItype)(u)), \ + "d" ((UDItype)(v))); \ +} while (0) +#elif (__GNUC__ >= 5) || (__GNUC__ >= 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 4) #define umul_ppmm(w1, w0, u, v) \ do { \ typedef unsigned int __ll_UTItype __attribute__((mode(TI))); \ diff --git a/lib/muldi3.c b/lib/muldi3.c index 88938543e10a..54c8b3123376 100644 --- a/lib/muldi3.c +++ b/lib/muldi3.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ */ #include <linux/export.h> -#include <lib/libgcc.h> +#include <linux/libgcc.h> #define W_TYPE_SIZE 32 diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c index 8bf78b4b78f0..dfa55c873c13 100644 --- a/lib/nlattr.c +++ b/lib/nlattr.c @@ -15,7 +15,11 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <net/netlink.h> -/* for these data types attribute length must be exactly given size */ +/* For these data types, attribute length should be exactly the given + * size. However, to maintain compatibility with broken commands, if the + * attribute length does not match the expected size a warning is emitted + * to the user that the command is sending invalid data and needs to be fixed. + */ static const u8 nla_attr_len[NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = { [NLA_U8] = sizeof(u8), [NLA_U16] = sizeof(u16), @@ -28,8 +32,16 @@ static const u8 nla_attr_len[NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = { }; static const u8 nla_attr_minlen[NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = { + [NLA_U8] = sizeof(u8), + [NLA_U16] = sizeof(u16), + [NLA_U32] = sizeof(u32), + [NLA_U64] = sizeof(u64), [NLA_MSECS] = sizeof(u64), [NLA_NESTED] = NLA_HDRLEN, + [NLA_S8] = sizeof(s8), + [NLA_S16] = sizeof(s16), + [NLA_S32] = sizeof(s32), + [NLA_S64] = sizeof(s64), }; static int validate_nla_bitfield32(const struct nlattr *nla, @@ -69,11 +81,9 @@ static int validate_nla(const struct nlattr *nla, int maxtype, BUG_ON(pt->type > NLA_TYPE_MAX); - /* for data types NLA_U* and NLA_S* require exact length */ - if (nla_attr_len[pt->type]) { - if (attrlen != nla_attr_len[pt->type]) - return -ERANGE; - return 0; + if (nla_attr_len[pt->type] && attrlen != nla_attr_len[pt->type]) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("netlink: '%s': attribute type %d has an invalid length.\n", + current->comm, type); } switch (pt->type) { diff --git a/lib/oid_registry.c b/lib/oid_registry.c index 41b9e50711a7..0bcac6ccb1b2 100644 --- a/lib/oid_registry.c +++ b/lib/oid_registry.c @@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ int sprint_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize, char *buffer, size_t bufsize) int count; if (v >= end) - return -EBADMSG; + goto bad; n = *v++; ret = count = snprintf(buffer, bufsize, "%u.%u", n / 40, n % 40); + if (count >= bufsize) + return -ENOBUFS; buffer += count; bufsize -= count; - if (bufsize == 0) - return -ENOBUFS; while (v < end) { num = 0; @@ -134,20 +134,24 @@ int sprint_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize, char *buffer, size_t bufsize) num = n & 0x7f; do { if (v >= end) - return -EBADMSG; + goto bad; n = *v++; num <<= 7; num |= n & 0x7f; } while (n & 0x80); } ret += count = snprintf(buffer, bufsize, ".%lu", num); - buffer += count; - if (bufsize <= count) + if (count >= bufsize) return -ENOBUFS; + buffer += count; bufsize -= count; } return ret; + +bad: + snprintf(buffer, bufsize, "(bad)"); + return -EBADMSG; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sprint_oid); diff --git a/lib/test_printf.c b/lib/test_printf.c index 563f10e6876a..71ebfa43ad05 100644 --- a/lib/test_printf.c +++ b/lib/test_printf.c @@ -24,24 +24,6 @@ #define PAD_SIZE 16 #define FILL_CHAR '$' -#define PTR1 ((void*)0x01234567) -#define PTR2 ((void*)(long)(int)0xfedcba98) - -#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 -#define PTR1_ZEROES "000000000" -#define PTR1_SPACES " " -#define PTR1_STR "1234567" -#define PTR2_STR "fffffffffedcba98" -#define PTR_WIDTH 16 -#else -#define PTR1_ZEROES "0" -#define PTR1_SPACES " " -#define PTR1_STR "1234567" -#define PTR2_STR "fedcba98" -#define PTR_WIDTH 8 -#endif -#define PTR_WIDTH_STR stringify(PTR_WIDTH) - static unsigned total_tests __initdata; static unsigned failed_tests __initdata; static char *test_buffer __initdata; @@ -217,30 +199,79 @@ test_string(void) test("a | | ", "%-3.s|%-3.0s|%-3.*s", "a", "b", 0, "c"); } +#define PLAIN_BUF_SIZE 64 /* leave some space so we don't oops */ + +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 + +#define PTR_WIDTH 16 +#define PTR ((void *)0xffff0123456789ab) +#define PTR_STR "ffff0123456789ab" +#define ZEROS "00000000" /* hex 32 zero bits */ + +static int __init +plain_format(void) +{ + char buf[PLAIN_BUF_SIZE]; + int nchars; + + nchars = snprintf(buf, PLAIN_BUF_SIZE, "%p", PTR); + + if (nchars != PTR_WIDTH || strncmp(buf, ZEROS, strlen(ZEROS)) != 0) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +#else + +#define PTR_WIDTH 8 +#define PTR ((void *)0x456789ab) +#define PTR_STR "456789ab" + +static int __init +plain_format(void) +{ + /* Format is implicitly tested for 32 bit machines by plain_hash() */ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* BITS_PER_LONG == 64 */ + +static int __init +plain_hash(void) +{ + char buf[PLAIN_BUF_SIZE]; + int nchars; + + nchars = snprintf(buf, PLAIN_BUF_SIZE, "%p", PTR); + + if (nchars != PTR_WIDTH || strncmp(buf, PTR_STR, PTR_WIDTH) == 0) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * We can't use test() to test %p because we don't know what output to expect + * after an address is hashed. + */ static void __init plain(void) { - test(PTR1_ZEROES PTR1_STR " " PTR2_STR, "%p %p", PTR1, PTR2); - /* - * The field width is overloaded for some %p extensions to - * pass another piece of information. For plain pointers, the - * behaviour is slightly odd: One cannot pass either the 0 - * flag nor a precision to %p without gcc complaining, and if - * one explicitly gives a field width, the number is no longer - * zero-padded. - */ - test("|" PTR1_STR PTR1_SPACES " | " PTR1_SPACES PTR1_STR "|", - "|%-*p|%*p|", PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR1, PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR1); - test("|" PTR2_STR " | " PTR2_STR "|", - "|%-*p|%*p|", PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR2, PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR2); + int err; - /* - * Unrecognized %p extensions are treated as plain %p, but the - * alphanumeric suffix is ignored (that is, does not occur in - * the output.) - */ - test("|"PTR1_ZEROES PTR1_STR"|", "|%p0y|", PTR1); - test("|"PTR2_STR"|", "|%p0y|", PTR2); + err = plain_hash(); + if (err) { + pr_warn("plain 'p' does not appear to be hashed\n"); + failed_tests++; + return; + } + + err = plain_format(); + if (err) { + pr_warn("hashing plain 'p' has unexpected format\n"); + failed_tests++; + } } static void __init @@ -251,6 +282,7 @@ symbol_ptr(void) static void __init kernel_ptr(void) { + /* We can't test this without access to kptr_restrict. */ } static void __init diff --git a/lib/ucmpdi2.c b/lib/ucmpdi2.c index 49a53505c8e3..25ca2d4c1e19 100644 --- a/lib/ucmpdi2.c +++ b/lib/ucmpdi2.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ */ #include <linux/module.h> -#include <lib/libgcc.h> +#include <linux/libgcc.h> word_type __ucmpdi2(unsigned long long a, unsigned long long b) { diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 1746bae94d41..01c3957b2de6 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ #include <linux/uuid.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <net/addrconf.h> +#include <linux/siphash.h> +#include <linux/compiler.h> #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK #include <linux/blkdev.h> #endif @@ -1343,6 +1345,59 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr, return string(buf, end, uuid, spec); } +int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; + +static noinline_for_stack +char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, + struct printf_spec spec) +{ + spec.base = 16; + spec.flags |= SMALL; + if (spec.field_width == -1) { + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); + spec.flags |= ZEROPAD; + } + + switch (kptr_restrict) { + case 0: + /* Always print %pK values */ + break; + case 1: { + const struct cred *cred; + + /* + * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context + * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. + */ + if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) + return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); + + /* + * Only print the real pointer value if the current + * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the + * same credentials it started with. This is because + * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK + * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to + * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using + * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. + */ + cred = current_cred(); + if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) || + !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || + !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)) + ptr = NULL; + break; + } + case 2: + default: + /* Always print 0's for %pK */ + ptr = NULL; + break; + } + + return number(buf, end, (unsigned long)ptr, spec); +} + static noinline_for_stack char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt) { @@ -1591,7 +1646,86 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } -int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; +static noinline_for_stack +char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, + struct printf_spec spec) +{ + spec.base = 16; + spec.flags |= SMALL; + if (spec.field_width == -1) { + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); + spec.flags |= ZEROPAD; + } + + return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec); +} + +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly; +static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly; + +static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused) +{ + get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key)); + /* + * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes(). + * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true + * after get_random_bytes() returns. + */ + smp_mb(); + WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true); +} + +static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { + .func = fill_random_ptr_key +}; + +static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void) +{ + int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); + + if (!ret) { + return 0; + } else if (ret == -EALREADY) { + fill_random_ptr_key(&random_ready); + return 0; + } + + return ret; +} +early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random); + +/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */ +static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) +{ + unsigned long hashval; + const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); + + if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) { + spec.field_width = default_width; + /* string length must be less than default_width */ + return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec); + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key); + /* + * Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have + * modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID). + */ + hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff; +#else + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key); +#endif + + spec.flags |= SMALL; + if (spec.field_width == -1) { + spec.field_width = default_width; + spec.flags |= ZEROPAD; + } + spec.base = 16; + + return number(buf, end, hashval, spec); +} /* * Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed @@ -1698,11 +1832,16 @@ int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; * c major compatible string * C full compatible string * + * - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx". + * * ** Please update also Documentation/printk-formats.txt when making changes ** * * Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64 * function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a * pointer to the real address. + * + * Note: The default behaviour (unadorned %p) is to hash the address, + * rendering it useful as a unique identifier. */ static noinline_for_stack char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, @@ -1792,47 +1931,9 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, return buf; } case 'K': - switch (kptr_restrict) { - case 0: - /* Always print %pK values */ - break; - case 1: { - const struct cred *cred; - - /* - * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context - * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. - */ - if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) { - if (spec.field_width == -1) - spec.field_width = default_width; - return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); - } - - /* - * Only print the real pointer value if the current - * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the - * same credentials it started with. This is because - * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK - * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to - * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using - * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. - */ - cred = current_cred(); - if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) || - !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || - !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)) - ptr = NULL; - break; - } - case 2: - default: - /* Always print 0's for %pK */ - ptr = NULL; + if (!kptr_restrict) break; - } - break; - + return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec); case 'N': return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt); case 'a': @@ -1857,15 +1958,12 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, case 'F': return device_node_string(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt + 1); } + case 'x': + return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec); } - spec.flags |= SMALL; - if (spec.field_width == -1) { - spec.field_width = default_width; - spec.flags |= ZEROPAD; - } - spec.base = 16; - return number(buf, end, (unsigned long) ptr, spec); + /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */ + return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec); } /* |