Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "New notable features:
   - The seccomp work from Will Drewry
   - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
   - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
   - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
  apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
  apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
  ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
  KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
  Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
  gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
  Smack: recursive tramsmute
  Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
  TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
  KEYS: Add invalidation support
  KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
  KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
  KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
  KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
  KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
  KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
  KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
  Yama: remove an unused variable
  samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
  Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
  ...

1 files changed, 9 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
index a9511f179069..e369de2d48cd 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still
 work), or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID"
 still work as root).
 
-For software that has defined application-specific relationships
+In mode 1, software that has defined application-specific relationships
 between a debugging process and its inferior (crash handlers, etc),
 prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, pid, ...) can be used. An inferior can declare which
 other process (and its descendents) are allowed to call PTRACE_ATTACH
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ restrictions, it can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...)
 so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces)
 may attach.
 
+These restrictions do not change how ptrace via PTRACE_TRACEME operates.
+
 The sysctl settings are:
 
 0 - classic ptrace permissions: a process can PTRACE_ATTACH to any other
@@ -60,6 +62,12 @@ The sysctl settings are:
     inferior can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...) to declare
     an allowed debugger PID to call PTRACE_ATTACH on the inferior.
 
+2 - admin-only attach: only processes with CAP_SYS_PTRACE may use ptrace
+    with PTRACE_ATTACH.
+
+3 - no attach: no processes may use ptrace with PTRACE_ATTACH. Once set,
+    this sysctl cannot be changed to a lower value.
+
 The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity.
 
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