diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-01-10 11:18:59 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-01-10 11:18:59 -0800 |
commit | e0e736fc0d33861335e2a132e4f688f7fd380c61 (patch) | |
tree | d9febe9ca1ef1e24efc5e6e1e34e412316d246bd | |
parent | a08948812b30653eb2c536ae613b635a989feb6f (diff) | |
parent | aeda4ac3efc29e4d55989abd0a73530453aa69ba (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits)
MAINTAINERS: Add tomoyo-dev-en ML.
SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messages
encrypted-keys: style and other cleanup
encrypted-keys: verify datablob size before converting to binary
trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup
trusted-keys: additional TSS return code and other error handling
syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict
Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories
selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid results
SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystems
This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running.
SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_others
selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array
selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array
flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C
SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfs
selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.c
...
37 files changed, 3914 insertions, 1074 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8fb79bc1ac4b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ + Trusted and Encrypted Keys + +Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel +key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys, +and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees, +stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability +of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while Encrypted +Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded +in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified. + +Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys. Keys are sealed +under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally sealed to specified PCR +(integrity measurement) values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob +integrity verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new +(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as +when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many saved +blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported. + +By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default +authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership time with the +trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z". + +Usage: + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring + keyctl update key "update [options]" + keyctl print keyid + + options: + keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK) + keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob + migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, + default 1 (resealing allowed) + +"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard +TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit +within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding. + +Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for +encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel generated random +numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified 'master' key. The +'master' key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main +disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, +they are only as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key +should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in +boot. + +Usage: + keyctl add encrypted name "new key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring + keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" + +where 'key-type' is either 'trusted' or 'user'. + +Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage: + +Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u + 440502848 + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses + 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500 + 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk + + $ keyctl print 440502848 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + + $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob + +Load a trusted key from the saved blob: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u + 268728824 + + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + +Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values: + + $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805 + 77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73 + d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e + df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4 + 9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6 + e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610 + 94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9 + 7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef + df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8 + +Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk": + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u + 159771175 + + $ keyctl print 159771175 + trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55 + be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64 + 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob + +Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u + 831684262 + + $ keyctl print 831684262 + trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55 + be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64 + 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + +The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high +quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a +trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been +compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to specific boot PCR +values, protects against boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and +encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated. diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt index 209e1584c3dc..574067194f38 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ dmesg_restrict: This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log buffer. When dmesg_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions. When -dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use +dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYSLOG to use dmesg(8). The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT sets the default diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 03c516a1edfa..9e4d4ca690e2 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5930,7 +5930,8 @@ F: drivers/net/tlan.* TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE M: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> M: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> -L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English) +L: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in English) +L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in English) L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese) L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese) W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c index 0b3af3fe6766..1f46f1cd9225 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) if (chip == NULL) return -ENODEV; rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf); - module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner); + tpm_chip_put(chip); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read); @@ -775,11 +775,27 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, "attempting extend a PCR value"); - module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner); + tpm_chip_put(chip); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend); +int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd"); + + tpm_chip_put(chip); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send); + ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 792868d24f2a..72ddb031b69a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ struct tpm_chip { #define to_tpm_chip(n) container_of(n, struct tpm_chip, vendor) +static inline void tpm_chip_put(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner); +} + static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index) { outb(index, base); diff --git a/include/keys/encrypted-type.h b/include/keys/encrypted-type.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..95855017a32b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/encrypted-type.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + */ + +#ifndef _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H +#define _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H + +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> + +struct encrypted_key_payload { + struct rcu_head rcu; + char *master_desc; /* datablob: master key name */ + char *datalen; /* datablob: decrypted key length */ + u8 *iv; /* datablob: iv */ + u8 *encrypted_data; /* datablob: encrypted data */ + unsigned short datablob_len; /* length of datablob */ + unsigned short decrypted_datalen; /* decrypted data length */ + u8 decrypted_data[0]; /* decrypted data + datablob + hmac */ +}; + +extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted; + +#endif /* _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..56f82e5c9975 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Author: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + */ + +#ifndef _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H +#define _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H + +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> + +#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 +#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320 + +struct trusted_key_payload { + struct rcu_head rcu; + unsigned int key_len; + unsigned int blob_len; + unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; + unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; +}; + +extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; + +#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 90012b9ddbf3..fb16a3699b99 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { /* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */ /* Allow administration of the random device */ /* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */ -/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */ /* Allow setting the domainname */ /* Allow setting the hostname */ /* Allow calling bdflush() */ @@ -352,7 +351,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { #define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN +/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */ + +#define CAP_SYSLOG 34 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYSLOG #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) diff --git a/include/linux/flex_array.h b/include/linux/flex_array.h index 631b77f2ac70..70e4efabe0fb 100644 --- a/include/linux/flex_array.h +++ b/include/linux/flex_array.h @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ void *flex_array_get(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr); int flex_array_shrink(struct flex_array *fa); #define flex_array_put_ptr(fa, nr, src, gfp) \ - flex_array_put(fa, nr, &(void *)(src), gfp) + flex_array_put(fa, nr, (void *)&(src), gfp) void *flex_array_get_ptr(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr); diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index b6de9a6f7018..d0fbc043de60 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ #define FIELD_SIZEOF(t, f) (sizeof(((t*)0)->f)) #define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d)) + +/* The `const' in roundup() prevents gcc-3.3 from calling __divdi3 */ #define roundup(x, y) ( \ { \ const typeof(y) __y = y; \ @@ -263,6 +265,7 @@ static inline char *pack_hex_byte(char *buf, u8 byte) } extern int hex_to_bin(char ch); +extern void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count); /* * General tracing related utility functions - trace_printk(), diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1ac42475ea08..c642bb8b8f5a 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1058,8 +1058,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to * evaluate the security data on the key. * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key. - * Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the - * normal permissions model should be effected. + * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. * @key_getsecurity: * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index ac5d1c1285d9..fdc718abf83b 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); +extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen); #else static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) { return -ENODEV; @@ -38,5 +39,8 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) { static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) { return -ENODEV; } +static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) { + return -ENODEV; +} #endif #endif diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..727512e249b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__ +#define __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__ + +/* + * TPM Command constants from specifications at + * http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org + */ + +/* Command TAGS */ +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193 +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194 +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195 +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196 +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197 +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198 + +/* Command Ordinals */ +#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70 +#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11 +#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10 +#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23 +#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24 + +/* Other constants */ +#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000 +#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20 + +#endif diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index f1e5bde4b35a..e6131ef98d8f 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h @@ -40,9 +40,13 @@ #define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" +#define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC" +#define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE" #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c index 4642a5c439eb..f64b8997fc76 100644 --- a/kernel/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk.c @@ -273,12 +273,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) * at open time. */ if (type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN || !from_file) { - if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; + if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) + goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */ if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; + !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) + goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */ } error = security_syslog(type); @@ -422,6 +422,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) } out: return error; +warn: + /* remove after 2.6.39 */ + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN " + "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated and denied).\n"); + return -EPERM; } SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len) diff --git a/lib/hexdump.c b/lib/hexdump.c index 5d7a4802c562..b66b2bd67952 100644 --- a/lib/hexdump.c +++ b/lib/hexdump.c @@ -34,6 +34,22 @@ int hex_to_bin(char ch) EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin); /** + * hex2bin - convert an ascii hexadecimal string to its binary representation + * @dst: binary result + * @src: ascii hexadecimal string + * @count: result length + */ +void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count) +{ + while (count--) { + *dst = hex_to_bin(*src++) << 4; + *dst += hex_to_bin(*src++); + dst++; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex2bin); + +/** * hex_dump_to_buffer - convert a blob of data to "hex ASCII" in memory * @buf: data blob to dump * @len: number of bytes in the @buf diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e80da955e687..95accd442d55 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -21,6 +21,37 @@ config KEYS If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +config TRUSTED_KEYS + tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" + depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + help + This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing + keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, + generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, + if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever + see encrypted blobs. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + +config ENCRYPTED_KEYS + tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS" + depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CBC + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_RNG + help + This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys + in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers, + which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The + 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type. + Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 74d5447d7df7..6c941050f573 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ obj-y := \ request_key_auth.o \ user_defined.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted_defined.o obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..32d27c858388 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c @@ -0,0 +1,903 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt + */ + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <keys/encrypted-type.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <crypto/aes.h> + +#include "encrypted_defined.h" + +static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:"; +static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:"; +static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256"; +static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)"; +static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)"; +static unsigned int ivsize; +static int blksize; + +#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) +#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE +#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096 +#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20 + +struct sdesc { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; +static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; + +enum { + Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +static int aes_get_sizes(void) +{ + struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n", + PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm); + blksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm); + crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm); + return 0; +} + +/* + * valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key + * + * key-type:= "trusted:" | "encrypted:" + * desc:= master-key description + * + * Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update, + * only the master key description is permitted to change, not the key-type. + * The key-type remains constant. + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) +{ + if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { + if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) + goto out; + if (orig_desc) + if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + goto out; + } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { + if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) + goto out; + if (orig_desc) + if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + goto out; + } else + goto out; + return 0; +out: + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data + * + * datablob format: + * new <master-key name> <decrypted data length> + * load <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data> + * update <new-master-key name> + * + * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token, + * which is null terminated. + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc, + char **decrypted_datalen, |