diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-05-24 13:38:19 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-05-24 13:38:19 -0700 |
commit | b0ca118dbacbc6c35e15f216e25e95cca7aedf5b (patch) | |
tree | 6c61c91ff0174c8774d4010b892ecf0bed560910 | |
parent | 2bb732cdb48d271ff7a910260ffb851fb4bc8a28 (diff) | |
parent | b7b57551bbda1390959207f79f2038aa7adb72ae (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (43 commits)
TOMOYO: Fix wrong domainname validation.
SELINUX: add /sys/fs/selinux mount point to put selinuxfs
CRED: Fix load_flat_shared_library() to initialise bprm correctly
SELinux: introduce path_has_perm
flex_array: allow 0 length elements
flex_arrays: allow zero length flex arrays
flex_array: flex_array_prealloc takes a number of elements, not an end
SELinux: pass last path component in may_create
SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable
SELinux: generic hashtab entry counter
SELinux: calculate and print hashtab stats with a generic function
SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dir
SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of *con
SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname not a qstr
SMACK: smack_file_lock can use the struct path
LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE
SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe
SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules
SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_t
...
39 files changed, 603 insertions, 284 deletions
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index b64825ddaf32..98c324b07a16 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5592,10 +5592,11 @@ M: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> M: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> L: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (subscribers-only, general discussion) W: http://selinuxproject.org -T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git +T: git git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux.git S: Supported F: include/linux/selinux* F: security/selinux/ +F: scripts/selinux/ APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE M: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c index 397d3057d336..1bffbe0ed778 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c @@ -820,6 +820,8 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int id, struct lib_info *libs) int res; char buf[16]; + memset(&bprm, 0, sizeof(bprm)); + /* Create the file name */ sprintf(buf, "/lib/lib%d.so", id); @@ -835,6 +837,12 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int id, struct lib_info *libs) if (!bprm.cred) goto out; + /* We don't really care about recalculating credentials at this point + * as we're past the point of no return and are dealing with shared + * libraries. + */ + bprm.cred_prepared = 1; + res = prepare_binprm(&bprm); if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(res)) diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 4554db0cde86..c42112350003 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -417,7 +417,6 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) -# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}) # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) @@ -427,11 +426,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ -#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET - # define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0) -# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0) -# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0) #define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) #define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h index 689496bb6654..bafc58c00fc3 100644 --- a/include/linux/init_task.h +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h @@ -83,13 +83,6 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups; #define INIT_IDS #endif -/* - * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem - * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow CAP_SETPCAP to - * be available in the default configuration. - */ -# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET - #ifdef CONFIG_RCU_BOOST #define INIT_TASK_RCU_BOOST() \ .rcu_boost_mutex = NULL, diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index b2bb01719561..ef19b99aff98 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -276,6 +276,19 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key) return key ? key->serial : 0; } +/** + * key_is_instantiated - Determine if a key has been positively instantiated + * @key: The key to check. + * + * Return true if the specified key has been positively instantiated, false + * otherwise. + */ +static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key) +{ + return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) && + !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); +} + #define rcu_dereference_key(KEY) \ (rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcudata, \ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)(KEY))->sem))) diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h index 310231823852..d4a5c84c503d 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmod.h +++ b/include/linux/kmod.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> #define KMOD_PATH_LEN 256 @@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ call_usermodehelper(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, enum umh_wait wait) NULL, NULL, NULL); } +extern struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[]; + extern void usermodehelper_init(void); extern int usermodehelper_disable(void); diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 112a55033352..88e78dedc2e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ /* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */ struct common_audit_data { char type; -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS 1 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH 1 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET 2 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP 3 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC 4 @@ -35,12 +35,13 @@ struct common_audit_data { #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY 6 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE 7 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE 9 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY 10 struct task_struct *tsk; union { - struct { - struct path path; - struct inode *inode; - } fs; + struct path path; + struct dentry *dentry; + struct inode *inode; struct { int netif; struct sock *sk; diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 32a80e08ff4b..283c529f8b1c 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -22,12 +22,8 @@ */ const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET; -const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET; -const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set); int file_caps_enabled = 1; diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 8093c16b84b1..e12c8af793f8 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ struct cred init_cred = { .magic = CRED_MAGIC, #endif .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, - .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, + .cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET, .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, - .cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, - .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, + .cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET, + .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET, .user = INIT_USER, .user_ns = &init_user_ns, .group_info = &init_groups, diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 5ae0ff38425f..ad6a81c58b44 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/kmod.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/completion.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> @@ -43,6 +44,13 @@ extern int max_threads; static struct workqueue_struct *khelper_wq; +#define CAP_BSET (void *)1 +#define CAP_PI (void *)2 + +static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; +static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_inheritable = CAP_FULL_SET; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(umh_sysctl_lock); + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES /* @@ -132,6 +140,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__request_module); static int ____call_usermodehelper(void *data) { struct subprocess_info *sub_info = data; + struct cred *new; int retval; spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); @@ -153,6 +162,19 @@ static int ____call_usermodehelper(void *data) goto fail; } + retval = -ENOMEM; + new = prepare_kernel_cred(current); + if (!new) + goto fail; + + spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock); + new->cap_bset = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_bset, new->cap_bset); + new->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_inheritable, + new->cap_inheritable); + spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock); + + commit_creds(new); + retval = kernel_execve(sub_info->path, (const char *const *)sub_info->argv, (const char *const *)sub_info->envp); @@ -420,6 +442,84 @@ unlock: } EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_exec); +static int proc_cap_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct ctl_table t; + unsigned long cap_array[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; + kernel_cap_t new_cap; + int err, i; + + if (write && (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP) || + !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))) + return -EPERM; + + /* + * convert from the global kernel_cap_t to the ulong array to print to + * userspace if this is a read. + */ + spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock); + for (i = 0; i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; i++) { + if (table->data == CAP_BSET) + cap_array[i] = usermodehelper_bset.cap[i]; + else if (table->data == CAP_PI) + cap_array[i] = usermodehelper_inheritable.cap[i]; + else + BUG(); + } + spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock); + + t = *table; + t.data = &cap_array; + + /* + * actually read or write and array of ulongs from userspace. Remember + * these are least significant 32 bits first + */ + err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + /* + * convert from the sysctl array of ulongs to the kernel_cap_t + * internal representation + */ + for (i = 0; i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; i++) + new_cap.cap[i] = cap_array[i]; + + /* + * Drop everything not in the new_cap (but don't add things) + */ + spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock); + if (write) { + if (table->data == CAP_BSET) + usermodehelper_bset = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_bset, new_cap); + if (table->data == CAP_PI) + usermodehelper_inheritable = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_inheritable, new_cap); + } + spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock); + + return 0; +} + +struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[] = { + { + .procname = "bset", + .data = CAP_BSET, + .maxlen = _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S * sizeof(unsigned long), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_cap_handler, + }, + { + .procname = "inheritable", + .data = CAP_PI, + .maxlen = _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S * sizeof(unsigned long), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_cap_handler, + }, + { } +}; + void __init usermodehelper_init(void) { khelper_wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("khelper"); diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 3dd0c46fa3bb..4bffd62c2f13 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> #include <linux/oom.h> +#include <linux/kmod.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h> @@ -616,6 +617,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .child = random_table, }, { + .procname = "usermodehelper", + .mode = 0555, + .child = usermodehelper_table, + }, + { .procname = "overflowuid", .data = &overflowuid, .maxlen = sizeof(int), diff --git a/lib/flex_array.c b/lib/flex_array.c index 854b57bd7d9d..cab7621f98aa 100644 --- a/lib/flex_array.c +++ b/lib/flex_array.c @@ -88,8 +88,11 @@ struct flex_array *flex_array_alloc(int element_size, unsigned int total, gfp_t flags) { struct flex_array *ret; - int max_size = FLEX_ARRAY_NR_BASE_PTRS * - FLEX_ARRAY_ELEMENTS_PER_PART(element_size); + int max_size = 0; + + if (element_size) + max_size = FLEX_ARRAY_NR_BASE_PTRS * + FLEX_ARRAY_ELEMENTS_PER_PART(element_size); /* max_size will end up 0 if element_size > PAGE_SIZE */ if (total > max_size) @@ -183,15 +186,18 @@ __fa_get_part(struct flex_array *fa, int part_nr, gfp_t flags) int flex_array_put(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr, void *src, gfp_t flags) { - int part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr); + int part_nr; struct flex_array_part *part; void *dst; if (element_nr >= fa->total_nr_elements) return -ENOSPC; + if (!fa->element_size) + return 0; if (elements_fit_in_base(fa)) part = (struct flex_array_part *)&fa->parts[0]; else { + part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr); part = __fa_get_part(fa, part_nr, flags); if (!part) return -ENOMEM; @@ -211,15 +217,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flex_array_put); */ int flex_array_clear(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr) { - int part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr); + int part_nr; struct flex_array_part *part; void *dst; if (element_nr >= fa->total_nr_elements) return -ENOSPC; + if (!fa->element_size) + return 0; if (elements_fit_in_base(fa)) part = (struct flex_array_part *)&fa->parts[0]; else { + part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr); part = fa->parts[part_nr]; if (!part) return -EINVAL; @@ -264,6 +273,8 @@ int flex_array_prealloc(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int start, if (end >= fa->total_nr_elements) return -ENOSPC; + if (!fa->element_size) + return 0; if (elements_fit_in_base(fa)) return 0; start_part = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, start); @@ -291,14 +302,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flex_array_prealloc); */ void *flex_array_get(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr) { - int part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr); + int part_nr; struct flex_array_part *part; + if (!fa->element_size) + return NULL; if (element_nr >= fa->total_nr_elements) return NULL; if (elements_fit_in_base(fa)) part = (struct flex_array_part *)&fa->parts[0]; else { + part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr); part = fa->parts[part_nr]; if (!part) return NULL; @@ -353,7 +367,7 @@ int flex_array_shrink(struct flex_array *fa) int part_nr; int ret = 0; - if (!fa->total_nr_elements) + if (!fa->total_nr_elements || !fa->element_size) return 0; if (elements_fit_in_base(fa)) return ret; diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index cfa7a5e1c5c9..fa000d26dc60 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -212,10 +212,12 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) int err = key->type_data.x[0]; seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (err) - seq_printf(m, ": %d", err); - else - seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); + if (key_is_instantiated(key)) { + if (err) + seq_printf(m, ": %d", err); + else + seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); + } } /* diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 95accd442d55..e0f08b52e4ab 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX + default 32768 if ARM default 65536 help This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f20e984ccfb4..a93b3b733079 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -529,15 +529,10 @@ skip: new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; - /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial - * task. Thus we skip the usual capability rules - */ - if (!is_global_init(current)) { - if (effective) - new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; - else - cap_clear(new->cap_effective); - } + if (effective) + new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; + else + cap_clear(new->cap_effective); bprm->cap_effective = effective; /* diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 07a025f81902..f375152a2500 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const struct cred *cred, struct key_type *type, const void *description, - key_match_func_t match); + key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check); extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check, const struct cred *cred); extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 427fddcaeb19..eca51918c951 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -206,8 +206,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type, goto error5; } + /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */ + ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1); + if (ret < 0) + goto error6; + ret = key->serial; +error6: key_put(key); error5: key_type_put(ktype); diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index cdd2f3f88c88..a06ffab38568 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -176,13 +176,15 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) else seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); - rcu_read_lock(); - klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); - if (klist) - seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); - else - seq_puts(m, ": empty"); - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { + rcu_read_lock(); + klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); + if (klist) + seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); + else + seq_puts(m, ": empty"); + rcu_read_unlock(); + } } /* @@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, * @type: The type of key to search for. * @description: Parameter for @match. * @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required. + * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad * * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given. * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the @@ -303,7 +306,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const struct cred *cred, struct key_type *type, const void *description, - key_match_func_t match) + key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check) { struct { struct keyring_list *keylist; @@ -345,6 +349,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, kflags = keyring->flags; if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) { key = keyring; + if (no_state_check) + goto found; /* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been * revoked */ @@ -384,11 +390,13 @@ descend: continue; /* skip revoked keys and expired keys */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)) - continue; + if (!no_state_check) { + if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)) + continue; - if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) - continue; + if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) + continue; + } /* keys that don't match */ if (!match(key, description)) @@ -399,6 +407,9 @@ descend: cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) continue; + if (no_state_check) + goto found; + /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { err = key->type_data.reject_error; @@ -478,7 +489,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred, - type, description, type->match); + type, description, type->match, false); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search); diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 525cf8a29cdd..49bbc97943ad 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) { skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key, lookup_user_key_possessed, - cred); + true, cred); if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { key_ref_put(skey_ref); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 930634e45149..6c0480db8885 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check, const struct cred *cred) { key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err; @@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, if (cred->thread_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, make_key_ref(rcu_dereference( cred->tgcred->session_keyring), 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); rcu_read_unlock(); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) @@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, else if (cred->user->session_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -459,7 +460,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, might_sleep(); - key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred); + key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, + false, cred); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; err = key_ref; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index df3c0417ee40..b18a71745901 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -530,8 +530,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, dest_keyring, flags); /* search all the process keyrings for a key */ - key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, - cred); + key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 68164031a74e..f6337c9082eb 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); - seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); + if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); } /* diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index f66baf44f32d..5b366d7af3c4 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/ |