bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump

Currently a dump of an xlated prog (post verifier stage) doesn't
correlate used helpers as well as maps. The prog info lists
involved map ids, however there's no correlation of where in the
program they are used as of today. Likewise, bpftool does not
correlate helper calls with the target functions.

The latter can be done w/o any kernel changes through kallsyms,
and also has the advantage that this works with inlined helpers
and BPF calls.

Example, via interpreter:

  # tc filter show dev foo ingress
  filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0
  filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0 handle 0x1 foo.o:[ingress] \
                      direct-action not_in_hw id 1 tag c74773051b364165   <-- prog id:1

  * Output before patch (calls/maps remain unclear):

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1             <-- dump prog id:1
   0: (b7) r1 = 2
   1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -4
   4: (18) r1 = 0xffff95c47a8d4800
   6: (85) call unknown#73040
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+18
   8: (bf) r2 = r10
   9: (07) r2 += -4
  10: (bf) r1 = r0
  11: (85) call unknown#73040
  12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23
  [...]

  * Output after patch:

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
   0: (b7) r1 = 2
   1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -4
   4: (18) r1 = map[id:2]                     <-- map id:2
   6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#73424     <-- helper call
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+18
   8: (bf) r2 = r10
   9: (07) r2 += -4
  10: (bf) r1 = r0
  11: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#73424
  12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23
  [...]

  # bpftool map show id 2                     <-- show/dump/etc map id:2
  2: hash_of_maps  flags 0x0
        key 4B  value 4B  max_entries 3  memlock 4096B

Example, JITed, same prog:

  # tc filter show dev foo ingress
  filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0
  filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0 handle 0x1 foo.o:[ingress] \
                  direct-action not_in_hw id 3 tag c74773051b364165 jited

  # bpftool prog show id 3
  3: sched_cls  tag c74773051b364165
        loaded_at Dec 19/13:48  uid 0
        xlated 384B  jited 257B  memlock 4096B  map_ids 2

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 3
   0: (b7) r1 = 2
   1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -4
   4: (18) r1 = map[id:2]                      <-- map id:2
   6: (85) call __htab_map_lookup_elem#77408   <-+ inlined rewrite
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2                |
   8: (07) r0 += 56                              |
   9: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)                <-+
  10: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+24
  11: (bf) r2 = r10
  12: (07) r2 += -4
  [...]

Example, same prog, but kallsyms disabled (in that case we are
also not allowed to pass any relative offsets, etc, so prog
becomes pointer sanitized on dump):

  # sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=2
  kernel.kptr_restrict = 2

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 3
   0: (b7) r1 = 2
   1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -4
   4: (18) r1 = map[id:2]
   6: (85) call bpf_unspec#0
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2
  [...]

Example, BPF calls via interpreter:

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
   0: (85) call pc+2#__bpf_prog_run_args32
   1: (b7) r0 = 1
   2: (95) exit
   3: (b7) r0 = 2
   4: (95) exit

Example, BPF calls via JIT:

  # sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_enable=1
  net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1
  # sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_kallsyms=1
  net.core.bpf_jit_kallsyms = 1

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
   0: (85) call pc+2#bpf_prog_3b185187f1855c4c_F
   1: (b7) r0 = 1
   2: (95) exit
   3: (b7) r0 = 2
   4: (95) exit

And finally, an example for tail calls that is now working
as well wrt correlation:

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 2
  [...]
  10: (b7) r2 = 8
  11: (85) call bpf_trace_printk#-41312
  12: (bf) r1 = r6
  13: (18) r2 = map[id:1]
  15: (b7) r3 = 0
  16: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12
  17: (b7) r1 = 42
  18: (6b) *(u16 *)(r6 +46) = r1
  19: (b7) r0 = 0
  20: (95) exit

  # bpftool map show id 1
  1: prog_array  flags 0x0
        key 4B  value 4B  max_entries 1  memlock 4096B

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

7 files changed, 370 insertions, 35 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index e872b4ebaa57..2b0df2703671 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
 
 #include <net/sch_generic.h>
 
@@ -724,6 +725,14 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func);
 
+static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(void)
+{
+	/* Reconstruction of call-sites is dependent on kallsyms,
+	 * thus make dump the same restriction.
+	 */
+	return kallsyms_show_value() == 1;
+}
+
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off,
 				       const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len);
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 768e0a02d8c8..70a534549cd3 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -771,7 +771,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 /* Base function for offset calculation. Needs to go into .text section,
  * therefore keeping it non-static as well; will also be used by JITs
- * anyway later on, so do not let the compiler omit it.
+ * anyway later on, so do not let the compiler omit it. This also needs
+ * to go into kallsyms for correlation from e.g. bpftool, so naming
+ * must not change.
  */
 noinline u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
index 883f88fa5bfc..8740406df2cd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
@@ -21,10 +21,39 @@ static const char * const func_id_str[] = {
 };
 #undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN
 
-const char *func_id_name(int id)
+static const char *__func_get_name(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs,
+				   const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+				   char *buff, size_t len)
 {
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID);
 
+	if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL &&
+	    insn->imm >= 0 && insn->imm < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID &&
+	    func_id_str[insn->imm])
+		return func_id_str[insn->imm];
+
+	if (cbs && cbs->cb_call)
+		return cbs->cb_call(cbs->private_data, insn);
+
+	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+		snprintf(buff, len, "%+d", insn->imm);
+
+	return buff;
+}
+
+static const char *__func_imm_name(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs,
+				   const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+				   u64 full_imm, char *buff, size_t len)
+{
+	if (cbs && cbs->cb_imm)
+		return cbs->cb_imm(cbs->private_data, insn, full_imm);
+
+	snprintf(buff, len, "0x%llx", (unsigned long long)full_imm);
+	return buff;
+}
+
+const char *func_id_name(int id)
+{
 	if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id])
 		return func_id_str[id];
 	else
@@ -83,7 +112,7 @@ static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
 	[BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
 };
 
-static void print_bpf_end_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose,
+static void print_bpf_end_insn(bpf_insn_print_t verbose,
 			       struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			       const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
@@ -92,9 +121,12 @@ static void print_bpf_end_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose,
 		insn->imm, insn->dst_reg);
 }
 
-void print_bpf_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-		    const struct bpf_insn *insn, bool allow_ptr_leaks)
+void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs,
+		    struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+		    const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+		    bool allow_ptr_leaks)
 {
+	const bpf_insn_print_t verbose = cbs->cb_print;
 	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
 
 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
@@ -175,12 +207,15 @@ void print_bpf_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			 */
 			u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
 			bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
+			char tmp[64];
 
 			if (map_ptr && !allow_ptr_leaks)
 				imm = 0;
 
-			verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
-				insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
+			verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s\n",
+				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
+				__func_imm_name(cbs, insn, imm,
+						tmp, sizeof(tmp)));
 		} else {
 			verbose(env, "BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
 			return;
@@ -189,12 +224,20 @@ void print_bpf_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 
 		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
-			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
-				verbose(env, "(%02x) call pc%+d\n", insn->code,
-					insn->imm);
-			else
+			char tmp[64];
+
+			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) {
+				verbose(env, "(%02x) call pc%s\n",
+					insn->code,
+					__func_get_name(cbs, insn,
+							tmp, sizeof(tmp)));
+			} else {
+				strcpy(tmp, "unknown");
 				verbose(env, "(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
-					func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
+					__func_get_name(cbs, insn,
+							tmp, sizeof(tmp)),
+					insn->imm);
+			}
 		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
 			verbose(env, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
 				insn->code, insn->off);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.h b/kernel/bpf/disasm.h
index 8de977e420b6..e0857d016f89 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/disasm.h
+++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.h
@@ -17,16 +17,35 @@
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/stringify.h>
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+struct bpf_verifier_env;
 
 extern const char *const bpf_alu_string[16];
 extern const char *const bpf_class_string[8];
 
 const char *func_id_name(int id);
 
-struct bpf_verifier_env;
-typedef void (*bpf_insn_print_cb)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-				  const char *, ...);
-void print_bpf_insn(bpf_insn_print_cb verbose, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-		    const struct bpf_insn *insn, bool allow_ptr_leaks);
+typedef void (*bpf_insn_print_t)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				 const char *, ...);
+typedef const char *(*bpf_insn_revmap_call_t)(void *private_data,
+					      const struct bpf_insn *insn);
+typedef const char *(*bpf_insn_print_imm_t)(void *private_data,
+					    const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+					    __u64 full_imm);
+
+struct bpf_insn_cbs {
+	bpf_insn_print_t	cb_print;
+	bpf_insn_revmap_call_t	cb_call;
+	bpf_insn_print_imm_t	cb_imm;
+	void			*private_data;
+};
 
+void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs,
+		    struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+		    const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+		    bool allow_ptr_leaks);
 #endif
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 30e728dcd35d..007802c5ca7d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1558,6 +1558,67 @@ static int bpf_map_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
 	return fd;
 }
 
+static const struct bpf_map *bpf_map_from_imm(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					      unsigned long addr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->used_map_cnt; i++)
+		if (prog->aux->used_maps[i] == (void *)addr)
+			return prog->aux->used_maps[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct bpf_insn *bpf_insn_prepare_dump(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	const struct bpf_map *map;
+	struct bpf_insn *insns;
+	u64 imm;
+	int i;
+
+	insns = kmemdup(prog->insnsi, bpf_prog_insn_size(prog),
+			GFP_USER);
+	if (!insns)
+		return insns;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+		if (insns[i].code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL)) {
+			insns[i].code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL;
+			insns[i].imm = BPF_FUNC_tail_call;
+			/* fall-through */
+		}
+		if (insns[i].code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
+		    insns[i].code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS)) {
+			if (insns[i].code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS))
+				insns[i].code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL;
+			if (!bpf_dump_raw_ok())
+				insns[i].imm = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (insns[i].code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
+			continue;
+
+		imm = ((u64)insns[i + 1].imm << 32) | (u32)insns[i].imm;
+		map = bpf_map_from_imm(prog, imm);
+		if (map) {
+			insns[i].src_reg = BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
+			insns[i].imm = map->id;
+			insns[i + 1].imm = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!bpf_dump_raw_ok() &&
+		    imm == (unsigned long)prog->aux) {
+			insns[i].imm = 0;
+			insns[i + 1].imm = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return insns;
+}
+
 static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
 				   const union bpf_attr *attr,
 				   union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
@@ -1608,18 +1669,34 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
 	ulen = info.jited_prog_len;
 	info.jited_prog_len = prog->jited_len;
 	if (info.jited_prog_len && ulen) {
-		uinsns = u64_to_user_ptr(info.jited_prog_insns);
-		ulen = min_t(u32, info.jited_prog_len, ulen);
-		if (copy_to_user(uinsns, prog->bpf_func, ulen))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) {
+			uinsns = u64_to_user_ptr(info.jited_prog_insns);
+			ulen = min_t(u32, info.jited_prog_len, ulen);
+			if (copy_to_user(uinsns, prog->bpf_func, ulen))
+				return -EFAULT;
+		} else {
+			info.jited_prog_insns = 0;
+		}
 	}
 
 	ulen = info.xlated_prog_len;
 	info.xlated_prog_len = bpf_prog_insn_size(prog);
 	if (info.xlated_prog_len && ulen) {
+		struct bpf_insn *insns_sanitized;
+		bool fault;
+
+		if (prog->blinded && !bpf_dump_raw_ok()) {
+			info.xlated_prog_insns = 0;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		insns_sanitized = bpf_insn_prepare_dump(prog);
+		if (!insns_sanitized)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 		uinsns = u64_to_user_ptr(info.xlated_prog_insns);
 		ulen = min_t(u32, info.xlated_prog_len, ulen);
-		if (copy_to_user(uinsns, prog->insnsi, ulen))
+		fault = copy_to_user(uinsns, insns_sanitized, ulen);
+		kfree(insns_sanitized);
+		if (fault)
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3c3eec58b3e8..4ae46b2cba88 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4427,9 +4427,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		}
 
 		if (env->log.level) {
+			const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
+				.cb_print	= verbose,
+			};
+
 			verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx);
-			print_bpf_insn(verbose, env, insn,
-				       env->allow_ptr_leaks);
+			print_bpf_insn(&cbs, env, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
 		}
 
 		err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
@@ -5017,14 +5020,14 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
 	int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
-	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
+	struct bpf_insn *insn;
 	void *old_bpf_func;
 	int err = -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (env->subprog_cnt == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
+	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
 		if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
 		    insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
 			continue;
@@ -5116,6 +5119,25 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
 		bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
 	}
+
+	/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
+	 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
+	 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
+		unsigned long addr;
+
+		if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
+		    insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+			continue;
+		insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
+		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
+		addr  = (unsigned long)func[subprog + 1]->bpf_func;
+		addr &= PAGE_MASK;
+		insn->imm = (u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64))
+			    addr - __bpf_call_base;
+	}
+
 	prog->jited = 1;
 	prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
 	prog->aux->func = func;
diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c
index 037484ceaeaf..42ee8892549c 100644
--- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c
+++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c
@@ -401,6 +401,88 @@ static int do_show(int argc, char **argv)
 	return err;
 }
 
+#define SYM_MAX_NAME	256
+
+struct kernel_sym {
+	unsigned long address;
+	char name[SYM_MAX_NAME];
+};
+
+struct dump_data {
+	unsigned long address_call_base;
+	struct kernel_sym *sym_mapping;
+	__u32 sym_count;
+	char scratch_buff[SYM_MAX_NAME];
+};
+
+static int kernel_syms_cmp(const void *sym_a, const void *sym_b)
+{
+	return ((struct kernel_sym *)sym_a)->address -
+	       ((struct kernel_sym *)sym_b)->address;
+}
+
+static void kernel_syms_load(struct dump_data *dd)
+{
+	struct kernel_sym *sym;
+	char buff[256];
+	void *tmp, *address;
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	fp = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
+	if (!fp)
+		return;
+
+	while (!feof(fp)) {
+		if (!fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), fp))
+			break;
+		tmp = realloc(dd->sym_mapping,
+			      (dd->sym_count + 1) *
+			      sizeof(*dd->sym_mapping));
+		if (!tmp) {
+out:
+			free(dd->sym_mapping);
+			dd->sym_mapping = NULL;
+			fclose(fp);
+			return;
+		}
+		dd->sym_mapping = tmp;
+		sym = &dd->sym_mapping[dd->sym_count];
+		if (sscanf(buff, "%p %*c %s", &address, sym->name) != 2)
+			continue;
+		sym->address = (unsigned long)address;
+		if (!strcmp(sym->name, "__bpf_call_base")) {
+			dd->address_call_base = sym->address;
+			/* sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict was set */
+			if (!sym->address)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (sym->address)
+			dd->sym_count++;
+	}
+
+	fclose(fp);
+
+	qsort(dd->sym_mapping, dd->sym_count,
+	      sizeof(*dd->sym_mapping), kernel_syms_cmp);
+}
+
+static void kernel_syms_destroy(struct dump_data *dd)
+{
+	free(dd->sym_mapping);
+}
+
+static struct kernel_sym *kernel_syms_search(struct dump_data *dd,
+					     unsigned long key)
+{
+	struct kernel_sym sym = {
+		.address = key,
+	};
+
+	return dd->sym_mapping ?
+	       bsearch(&sym, dd->sym_mapping, dd->sym_count,
+		       sizeof(*dd->sym_mapping), kernel_syms_cmp) : NULL;
+}
+
 static void print_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	va_list args;
@@ -410,8 +492,71 @@ static void print_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *fmt, ...)
 	va_end(args);
 }
 
-static void dump_xlated_plain(void *buf, unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
+static const char *print_call_pcrel(struct dump_data *dd,
+				    struct kernel_sym *sym,
+				    unsigned long address,
+				    const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
+	if (sym)
+		snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff),
+			 "%+d#%s", insn->off, sym->name);
+	else
+		snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff),
+			 "%+d#0x%lx", insn->off, address);
+	return dd->scratch_buff;
+}
+
+static const char *print_call_helper(struct dump_data *dd,
+				     struct kernel_sym *sym,
+				     unsigned long address)
+{
+	if (sym)
+		snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff),
+			 "%s", sym->name);
+	else
+		snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff),
+			 "0x%lx", address);
+	return dd->scratch_buff;
+}
+
+static const char *print_call(void *private_data,
+			      const struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+	struct dump_data *dd = private_data;
+	unsigned long address = dd->address_call_base + insn->imm;
+	struct kernel_sym *sym;
+
+	sym = kernel_syms_search(dd, address);
+	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+		return print_call_pcrel(dd, sym, address, insn);
+	else
+		return print_call_helper(dd, sym, address);
+}
+
+static const char *print_imm(void *private_data,
+			     const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+			     __u64 full_imm)
+{
+	struct dump_data *dd = private_data;
+
+	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD)
+		snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff),
+			 "map[id:%u]", insn->imm);
+	else
+		snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff),
+			 "0x%llx", (unsigned long long)full_imm);
+	return dd->scratch_buff;
+}
+
+static void dump_xlated_plain(struct dump_data *dd, void *buf,
+			      unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
+{
+	const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
+		.cb_print	= print_insn,
+		.cb_call	= print_call,
+		.cb_imm		= print_imm,
+		.private_data	= dd,
+	};
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = buf;
 	bool double_insn = false;
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -425,7 +570,7 @@ static void dump_xlated_plain(void *buf, unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
 		double_insn = insn[i].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW);
 
 		printf("% 4d: ", i);
-		print_bpf_insn(print_insn, NULL, insn + i, true);
+		print_bpf_insn(&cbs, NULL, insn + i, true);
 
 		if (opcodes) {
 			printf("       ");
@@ -454,8 +599,15 @@ static void print_insn_json(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *fmt, ...)
 	va_end(args);
 }
 
-static void dump_xlated_json(void *buf, unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
+static void dump_xlated_json(struct dump_data *dd, void *buf,
+			     unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
 {
+	const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
+		.cb_print	= print_insn_json,
+		.cb_call	= print_call,
+		.cb_imm		= print_imm,
+		.private_data	= dd,
+	};
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = buf;
 	bool double_insn = false;
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -470,7 +622,7 @@ static void dump_xlated_json(void *buf, unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
 
 		jsonw_start_object(json_wtr);
 		jsonw_name(json_wtr, "disasm");
-		print_bpf_insn(print_insn_json, NULL, insn + i, true);
+		print_bpf_insn(&cbs, NULL, insn + i, true);
 
 		if (opcodes) {
 			jsonw_name(json_wtr, "opcodes");
@@ -505,6 +657,7 @@ static void dump_xlated_json(void *buf, unsigned int len, bool opcodes)
 static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog_info info = {};
+	struct dump_data dd = {};
 	__u32 len = sizeof(info);
 	unsigned int buf_size;
 	char *filepath = NULL;
@@ -592,6 +745,14 @@ static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv)
 		goto err_free;
 	}
 
+	if ((member_len == &info.jited_prog_len &&
+	     info.jited_prog_insns == 0) ||
+	    (member_len == &info.xlated_prog_len &&
+	     info.xlated_prog_insns == 0)) {
+		p_err("error retrieving insn dump: kernel.kptr_restrict set?");
+		goto err_free;
+	}
+
 	if (filepath) {
 		fd = open(filepath, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
 		if (fd < 0) {
@@ -608,17 +769,19 @@ static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto err_free;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (member_len == &info.jited_prog_len)
+		if (member_len == &info.jited_prog_len) {
 			disasm_print_insn(buf, *member_len, opcodes);
-		else
+		} else {
+			kernel_syms_load(&dd);
 			if (json_output)
-				dump_xlated_json(buf, *member_len, opcodes);
+				dump_xlated_json(&dd, buf, *member_len, opcodes);
 			else
-				dump_xlated_plain(buf, *member_len, opcodes);
+				dump_xlated_plain(&dd, buf, *member_len, opcodes);
+			kernel_syms_destroy(&dd);
+		}
 	}
 
 	free(buf);
-
 	return 0;
 
 err_free: