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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2017-12-06 13:54:37 +0000
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2017-12-07 11:31:48 +0000
commitf3b6b413b05f8031c001fd252e0f3b5157261fcb (patch)
tree6ee7ba2c4efda2343cf63184f5ddb74a2f5040ef
parentdf7797f0e8825fbc179d3b3294c563039f88b671 (diff)
Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-rw-r--r--CHANGES43
-rw-r--r--NEWS3
2 files changed, 44 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 7a2e91b931..904b174907 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -9,7 +9,48 @@
Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [xx XXX xxxx]
- *)
+ *) Read/write after SSL object in error state
+
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
+ mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
+ then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
+ you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
+ explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
+ SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
+ SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
+ handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
+ call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
+ for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
+ being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
+
+ In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present
+ that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having
+ already received a fatal error.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google).
+ (CVE-2017-3737)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
+
+ There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
+ used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
+ Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
+ defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
+ Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
+ work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
+ offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
+ significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
+ would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
+ no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
+
+ This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
+ like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
+ was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ (CVE-2017-3738)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017]
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 4cb7db2a3e..f7da7a9e2e 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2m and OpenSSL 1.0.2n [under development]
- o
+ o Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737)
+ o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2l and OpenSSL 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017]