PACKETise ServerHello processing

Process ServerHello messages using the PACKET API

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

5 files changed, 157 insertions, 115 deletions

diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index 4384edabc6..87dbcc63f3 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -358,33 +358,27 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
     return 0;
 }
 
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-                                       int *al)
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
 {
-    unsigned id;
+    unsigned int id, ct, mki;
     int i;
-    int ct;
 
     STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
     SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
 
-    if (len != 5) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
-               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    n2s(d, ct);
-    if (ct != 2) {
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
+            || ct != 2
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
+            || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
                SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         return 1;
     }
 
-    n2s(d, id);
-    if (*d) {                   /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
+    if (mki != 0) {
+        /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
                SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
         *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index ba35fb9ca5..b27cba218c 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -930,9 +930,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 {
     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
     const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    unsigned char *session_id, *cipherchars;
     int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
-    unsigned int j;
+    unsigned int j, ciphercharlen;
     long n;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
     SSL_COMP *comp;
@@ -971,10 +972,20 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
         goto f_err;
     }
 
-    d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 
     if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
-        int sversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
+        unsigned int sversion;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &sversion)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
 
 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
@@ -1012,8 +1023,16 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
         }
     } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
         /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
-        int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
-        int options = s->options;
+        unsigned int hversion;
+        int options;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &hversion)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        options = s->options;
         if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
             s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
         else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
@@ -1031,30 +1050,43 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
             goto f_err;
         }
         s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
-    } else if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
-        s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
-        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-        goto f_err;
+    } else {
+        unsigned char *vers;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &vers, 2)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
+                || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+            s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
+            al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
     }
-    p += 2;
 
     /* load the server hello data */
     /* load the server random */
-    memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-    p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 
     s->hit = 0;
 
-    /* get the session-id */
-    j = *(p++);
-
-    if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
+    /* get the session-id length */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &j)
+            || (j > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+            || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
         al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
         goto f_err;
     }
 
+    ciphercharlen = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
     /*
      * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
      * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
@@ -1070,22 +1102,42 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
     if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
         s->session->tlsext_tick) {
         SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+        size_t bookm;
+        if (!PACKET_get_bookmark(&pkt, &bookm)
+                || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, j)
+                || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cipherchars, ciphercharlen)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
         s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
         if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
                                      &s->session->master_key_length,
                                      NULL, &pref_cipher,
                                      s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
             s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
-                pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
+                pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
         } else {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
             goto f_err;
         }
+        if (!PACKET_goto_bookmark(&pkt, bookm)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Get the session id */
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &session_id, j)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
     }
 
     if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
-        && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
+        && memcmp(session_id, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
         if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
             || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
             /* actually a client application bug */
@@ -1109,10 +1161,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
             }
         }
         s->session->session_id_length = j;
-        memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
+        memcpy(s->session->session_id, session_id, j); /* j could be 0 */
     }
-    p += j;
-    c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cipherchars, ciphercharlen)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
     if (c == NULL) {
         /* unknown cipher */
         al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
@@ -1133,7 +1190,6 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
         goto f_err;
     }
-    p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
 
     sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
     i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
@@ -1166,8 +1222,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
         goto f_err;
     /* lets get the compression algorithm */
     /* COMPRESSION */
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &j)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-    if (*(p++) != 0) {
+    if (j != 0) {
         al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
                SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
@@ -1182,7 +1243,6 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
         goto f_err;
     }
 #else
-    j = *(p++);
     if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
         al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
@@ -1209,12 +1269,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
     /* TLS extensions */
-    if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+    if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &pkt)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (p != (d + n)) {
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
         /* wrong packet length */
         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 79926ff2b0..2539a4e344 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -2088,8 +2088,7 @@ __owur unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
 __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
 __owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s);
 __owur int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
-__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
-                                 unsigned char *d, int n);
+__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
 __owur int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 __owur int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 
@@ -2126,7 +2125,7 @@ __owur EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md);
 void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
 __owur int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
                                         int maxlen);
-__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
                                           int *al);
 __owur int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
                                         int maxlen);
@@ -2147,8 +2146,7 @@ __owur int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
 __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
 __owur int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
                                      int maxlen);
-__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-                                       int *al);
+__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
 
 __owur int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen);
 
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index f0042886c6..95b4fb694d 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2344,28 +2344,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
  * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
  * fill the length of the block.
  */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    unsigned int off = 0;
+    unsigned int len;
 
-    while (off < len) {
-        if (d[off] == 0)
+    while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
+                || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
             return 0;
-        off += d[off];
-        off++;
     }
 
-    return off == len;
+    return 1;
 }
 #endif
 
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-                                       unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
 {
-    unsigned short length;
-    unsigned short type;
-    unsigned short size;
-    unsigned char *data = *p;
+    unsigned int length, type, size;
     int tlsext_servername = 0;
     int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
@@ -2385,27 +2380,27 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
     s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
 #endif
 
-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
         goto ri_check;
 
-    n2s(data, length);
-    if (data + length != d + n) {
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         return 0;
     }
 
-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
-        n2s(data, type);
-        n2s(data, size);
+    while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
+        unsigned char *data;
+        PACKET spkt;
 
-        if (data + size > (d + n))
+        if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
+                ||  !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
             goto ri_check;
 
         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
             s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
 
         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
-            if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+            if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
                 return 0;
             renegotiate_seen = 1;
         } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
@@ -2418,10 +2413,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
         else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
-            unsigned char *sdata = data;
-            int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
-            if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
+            unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
+                    || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
                 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 return 0;
             }
@@ -2435,8 +2429,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                 }
                 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
                     ecpointformatlist_length;
-                memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
-                       ecpointformatlist_length);
+                if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
+                                       s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                                       ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+                    *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
             }
         }
 #endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
@@ -2472,14 +2471,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                  s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
             unsigned char *selected;
             unsigned char selected_len;
-
             /* We must have requested it. */
             if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
                 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                 return 0;
             }
             /* The data must be valid */
-            if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
+            if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
                 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 return 0;
             }
@@ -2504,31 +2502,21 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 
         else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
             unsigned len;
-
             /* We must have requested it. */
             if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
                 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                 return 0;
             }
-            if (size < 4) {
-                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
             /*-
              * The extension data consists of:
              *   uint16 list_length
              *   uint8 proto_length;
              *   uint8 proto[proto_length];
              */
-            len = data[0];
-            len <<= 8;
-            len |= data[1];
-            if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
-                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-            len = data[2];
-            if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
+            if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
+                    || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
+                    || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
+                    || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
                 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 return 0;
             }
@@ -2538,12 +2526,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                 return 0;
             }
-            memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+            if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
+                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
             s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
         else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
-            switch (data[0]) {
+            unsigned int hbtype;
+            if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            switch (hbtype) {
             case 0x01:         /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
                 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
                 break;
@@ -2559,7 +2555,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
-            if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
+            if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
                 return 0;
         }
 #endif
@@ -2581,11 +2577,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
          */
         else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
             return 0;
-
-        data += size;
     }
 
-    if (data != d + n) {
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         return 0;
     }
@@ -2605,8 +2599,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
         }
     }
 
-    *p = data;
-
  ri_check:
 
     /*
@@ -2887,13 +2879,12 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
     }
 }
 
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
-                                 int n)
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
     int al = -1;
     if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
         return 1;
-    if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
+    if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
         return 0;
     }
diff --git a/ssl/t1_reneg.c b/ssl/t1_reneg.c
index 22a71fed49..3fb6a96a4d 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_reneg.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_reneg.c
@@ -220,29 +220,27 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
 /*
  * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
  */
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-                                          int *al)
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
 {
-    int expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+    unsigned int expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
         + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
-    int ilen;
+    unsigned int ilen;
+    unsigned char *data;
 
     /* Check for logic errors */
     OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
     OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
 
     /* Parse the length byte */
-    if (len < 1) {
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
                SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
         *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
         return 0;
     }
-    ilen = *d;
-    d++;
 
     /* Consistency check */
-    if (ilen + 1 != len) {
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
                SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
         *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
@@ -257,17 +255,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
-               s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+            || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+               s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
                SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
         *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         return 0;
     }
-    d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
 
-    if (memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
-               s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)) {
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
+            || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+               s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,
                SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
         *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;