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//! Asymmetrically encrypted session keys.
use libc::size_t;
extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use self::openpgp::packet::PKESK;
use super::super::keyid::KeyID;
use super::super::packet::key::Key;
use crate::error::Status;
use crate::MoveIntoRaw;
use crate::RefRaw;
/// Returns the PKESK's recipient.
///
/// The return value is a reference to a `KeyID`. The caller must not
/// modify or free it.
#[::sequoia_ffi_macros::extern_fn] #[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn pgp_pkesk_recipient(pkesk: *const PKESK)
-> *const KeyID {
let pkesk = ffi_param_ref!(pkesk);
pkesk.recipient().move_into_raw()
}
/// Returns the session key.
///
/// `key` of size `key_len` must be a buffer large enough to hold the
/// session key. If `key` is NULL, or not large enough, then the key
/// is not written to it. Either way, `key_len` is set to the size of
/// the session key.
#[::sequoia_ffi_macros::extern_fn] #[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn pgp_pkesk_decrypt(errp: Option<&mut *mut crate::error::Error>,
pkesk: *const PKESK,
secret_key: *const Key,
algo: *mut u8, // XXX
key: *mut u8,
key_len: *mut size_t)
-> Status {
ffi_make_fry_from_errp!(errp);
let pkesk = ffi_param_ref!(pkesk);
let secret_key = secret_key.ref_raw();
let algo = ffi_param_ref_mut!(algo);
let key_len = ffi_param_ref_mut!(key_len);
match ffi_try_or_status!(secret_key.clone().mark_parts_secret())
.into_keypair()
{
Ok(mut keypair) => {
match pkesk.decrypt(&mut keypair, None /* XXX */) {
Ok((a, k)) => {
*algo = a.into();
if !key.is_null() && *key_len >= k.len() {
unsafe {
::std::ptr::copy(k.as_ptr(),
key,
k.len());
}
}
*key_len = k.len();
Status::Success
},
Err(e) => ffi_try_status!(Err::<(), anyhow::Error>(e)),
}
},
Err(e) => {
// XXX: Better message, don't panic.
panic!("Secret parts not unencrypted in {:?}: {}", secret_key, e);
},
}
}
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