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- Previously, we transformed data and detached signatures into
signed messages on the fly, then used the streaming Verifier to
verify the message. However, this introduces a nontrivial
overhead, even if unnecessary copies are carefully avoided.
- Instead, specialize the streaming Decryptor to handle detached
signatures. use crypto::hash_buffered_reader to compute the
hashes over the data, then attach the computed signatures to the
signature packets, and use Decryptor's verification machinery.
- While this is arguably less elegant, it is much simpler, and a lot
faster. Notably, if we operate on files and can mmap them into
memory, we can compute the hash in one call to the compression
function. Verification of detached signatures is an important use
case, so this speedup outweighs the loss of elegance.
- Fixes #457.
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- Add two new traits: `Marshal` and `MarshalInto`.
- Implement them instead of `Serialize` and `SerializeInto`.
- Only implement `Serialize` and `SerializeInto` for data structures
that are normally exported.
- This should prevent users from accidentally serializing a bare
signature (`Signature`) when they meant to serialize a signature
packet (`Packet`), for instance.
- Fixes #368.
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- Fixes #446.
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- Add `openpgp/src/cert/prelude.rs` to import most types and traits
related to certificates.
- Use it instead of using the types and traits individually.
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- Split VerificationResult into Result<GoodChecksum,
VerificationError>.
- Fixes #416.
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- Fixes #427.
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- Change all functions that need to evaluate the validity of a
signature (either directly or indirectly to take a policy object.
- Use the policy object to allow the user to place additional
constraints on a signature's validity.
- This addresses the first half of #274 (it introduces the policy
object, but does not yet implement any policy).
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- Use the frozen time as policy. Simplify writer stack
finalization.
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- Add Signer::creation_time so that a user of a Signer object can
determine the signature's creation time.
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- Instead of passing MessageStructure to VerificationHelper::check
by reference, pass it by value.
- After calling VerificationHelper::check, it is dropped. Passing
it by value allows the caller to avoid some cloning.
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- Use the convenient functions
KeyAmalgamation::for_storage_encryption,
KeyAmalgamation::for_transport_encryption, etc., instead of
building up a KeyFlags and then calling
KeyAmalgamation::key_flags.
- This pattern requires less boilerplate.
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- KeyIter::revoked and KeyIter::key_flags (and its variants) didn't
take a time stamp so they could only be used for filtering keys
based on their current state, not their state at some time in the
past. Adding a time stamp to each of the filters would have fixed
the problem, but it would have made the interface ugly: callers
always want the same time stamp for all filters.
- Split KeyIter into two structures: a KeyIter and a ValidKeyIter.
- Add KeyIter::policy. It takes a time stamp, which is then used
for filters like `alive` and `revoked`, and it returns a
ValidKeyIter, which exposes filters that require a time stamp.
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- Cert::keys_valid() is just a short-cut for
Cert::keys_all().alive().revoked(false).
- Remove Cert::keys_valid() and rename Cert::keys_all() to
Cert::keys().
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- A tuple is just an unnamed, inflexible struct. Use a struct
instead.
- Fixes #400.
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See https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/65819. Warned against by
default since Rust 1.41.
Right now `into_iter` returns references to objects inside an array
rather than moving the values (as one would expect) so it makes sense to
use `iter()` or for-in-borrowed (which calls the same thing) to retain
the behaviour but make it less confusing.
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- These are low-level cryptographic traits that are not concerned
with the role of a key.
- Fixes #382.
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- Fixes #359.
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- See #359.
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- The hash context knows the algorithm.
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- And drop Literal::set_filename_from_bytes.
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- Now that we store timestamps in OpenPGP's native encoding, the
canonicalization happens when converting to it.
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- Fixes #387.
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- To that end, make VerificationHelper::get_public_keys take
KeyHandles for all the issuers.
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- Fixes #381.
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- Fixes #380.
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- In sq and sqv, use chrono to interface with the user.
- Fixes #341.
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- Fixes #375.
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- See #375.
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- See #375.
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- See #375.
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- Instead of pushing an element at a time, use Vec::resize to grow
the vector to the desired size.
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- The AEAD implementation did not correctly handle messages where
the last chunk was a bit smaller than the chunk size.
Specifically, assume that the chunk size is 32 bytes and the
digest size is 16 bytes, and consider a message with 17 bytes of
data. That message will be encrypted as follows:
[ chunk1 ][ tag1 ][ tagF ]
17B 16B 16B
If we read a chunk and a digest, we'll successfully read 48
bytes of data. Unfortunately, we'll have over read: the
last 15 bytes are from the final tag.
To correctly handle this case, we have to make sure that
there are at least a tag worth of bytes left over when we
read a chunk and a tag.
- Test encrypting and decrypting more message sizes using AEAD.
- Also, check that the AEAD implementation correctly handles
corruption (specifically, a corrupted final tag).
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Newer Rust compilers requre `dyn` marking trait objects.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Silverstone <dsilvers@digital-scurf.org>
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