Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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- Implement IntoIter and Deref to &'a [MessageLayer<'a>], drop the
custom iteration structs.
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- Introduce `KeyAmalgamation` and `ValidKeyAmalgamation` to the C
FFI.
- Change pgp_cert_key_iter_next and pgp_cert_valid_key_iter_next to
return them instead of keys.
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- Fixes linking tests and examples with ld --as-needed.
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- Split VerificationResult into Result<GoodChecksum,
VerificationError>.
- Fixes #416.
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- Change all functions that need to evaluate the validity of a
signature (either directly or indirectly to take a policy object.
- Use the policy object to allow the user to place additional
constraints on a signature's validity.
- This addresses the first half of #274 (it introduces the policy
object, but does not yet implement any policy).
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- This is better expressed as an error.
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- KeyIter::revoked and KeyIter::key_flags (and its variants) didn't
take a time stamp so they could only be used for filtering keys
based on their current state, not their state at some time in the
past. Adding a time stamp to each of the filters would have fixed
the problem, but it would have made the interface ugly: callers
always want the same time stamp for all filters.
- Split KeyIter into two structures: a KeyIter and a ValidKeyIter.
- Add KeyIter::policy. It takes a time stamp, which is then used
for filters like `alive` and `revoked`, and it returns a
ValidKeyIter, which exposes filters that require a time stamp.
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- Cert::keys_valid() is just a short-cut for
Cert::keys_all().alive().revoked(false).
- Remove Cert::keys_valid() and rename Cert::keys_all() to
Cert::keys().
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- Fixes #359.
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- Fixes #387.
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- Instead of giving a set of TPKs to the encryptor, hand in a set of
recipients, which are (keyid, key)-tuples, conveniently created
from key queries over TPKs. This simplifies the encryptor, and
makes the key selection explicit.
- Drop the EncryptionMode type.
- As a nice side effect, we can now generate encrypted messages with
wildcard recipient addresses.
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- Automatically using AEAD if all recipients claim support is a
policy decision, which we'd rather avoid in the openpgp crate.
- Fixes #293.
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- DecryptionHelper has a default NULL implementation of the inspect
callback. Allow C code to override it by exposing it in the
pgp_decryptor_new API.
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- sequoia/openpgp.h doesn't require <unistd.h> so don't include it
there.
- Several examples do need <unistd.h> for STDIN_FILENO. So, include
it locally.
- Note: <unistd.h> is not available on Windows. This change makes
<sequoia/openpgp.h> work there. (Although the examples now fail.)
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- Fixes #100.
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- One would think that TPKBuilder::default would return something
filled with useful defaults, but it just returns a nearly empty
builder. Rename it to TPKBuilder::new, which is less misleading.
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- With a1e226f8f1418de43e577fdaa1d087b68bbb09ae in place, we have a
more general way to add components to a TPK. Retire the current
`TSK` type and replace it with a thin shim that only allows
serialization of secret keys.
- Fixes #107.
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- See #156.
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- In the streaming verifier and decryptor, check that
signatures (and binding signatures) are valid at the given time.
- Fixes #247.
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- Simplify the protocol by removing the iteration. Instead, the
callee gets a proxy for PacketParser::decrypt() that she can use
to decrypt the message. If successful, the session key can be
cached without involving the DecryptionHelper trait. This also
allows us to dump session keys.
- Fixes #219.
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- To make the tests and examples more portable, provide our own
roughly compatible replacement for glibc's error(3).
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- See #154.
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- Fixes #208.
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- Turn it into a pointer type aligning it with the other type
definitions.
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- Addresses #172.
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- When we transfer ownership from C to Rust, we move the wrapped
object out of the wrapper, and poison the wrapper.
- This prevents reuse of the wrapper object. When a stale reference
is given to us, we check the tag encoding the type information.
- If the tag field is poisoned, we can produce a more helpful error
message. This is not exact, of course. As soon as the memory is
reused, our tag is overwritten.
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- This change adds a tag to the derived wrapper types that identify
the type of the wrapped value.
- At runtime, we can verify that references to wrapper objects
indeed carry the right tag.
- Fixes #166.
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- This function was used early on to demonstrate the FFI layer. It
can now be expressed using pgp_tpk_debug().
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- This change is the result of the following command, which can also
be used to automatically convert existing users of Sequoia's C
API:
git grep -il sq_ | while read F ; do sed -E -i -e 's/sq_(arbitrary_writer_new|armor_reader_from_bytes|armor_reader_from_file|armor_reader_headers|armor_reader_kind|armor_reader_new|armor_writer_new|decrypt|encryptor_new|error_free|error_status|error_string|fingerprint_as_bytes|fingerprint_clone|fingerprint_equal|fingerprint_free|fingerprint_from_bytes|fingerprint_from_hex|fingerprint_hash|fingerprint_to_hex|fingerprint_to_keyid|fingerprint_to_string|keyid_clone|keyid_equal|keyid_free|keyid_from_bytes|keyid_from_hex|keyid_hash|keyid_to_hex|keyid_to_string|key_pair_as_signer|key_pair_free|key_pair_new|literal_writer_new|packet_free|packet_kind|packet_parser_buffer_unread_content|packet_parser_decrypt|packet_parser_eof_free|packet_parser_eof_is_message|packet_parser_finish|packet_parser_free|packet_parser_from_bytes|packet_parser_from_file|packet_parser_from_reader|packet_parser_next|packet_parser_packet|packet_parser_recurse|packet_parser_recursion_depth|packet_parser_result_eof|packet_parser_result_free|packet_parser_result_packet_parser|packet_parser_result_tag|packet_pile_clone|packet_pile_free|packet_pile_from_bytes|packet_pile_from_file|packet_pile_from_reader|packet_pile_serialize|packet_tag|pkesk_decrypt|pkesk_recipient|p_key_alive|p_key_alive_at|p_key_clone|p_key_creation_time|p_key_expired|p_key_expired_at|p_key_fingerprint|p_key_into_key_pair|p_key_keyid|p_key_public_key_algo|p_key_public_key_bits|reader_free|reader_from_bytes|reader_from_fd|reader_from_file|reader_read|revocation_status_free|revocation_status_variant|secret_cached|signature_alive|signature_alive_at|signature_can_authenticate|signature_can_certify|signature_can_encrypt_at_rest|signature_can_encrypt_for_transport|signature_can_sign|signature_expired|signature_expired_at|signature_free|signature_is_group_key|signature_is_split_key|signature_issuer|signature_issuer_fingerprint|signature_to_packet|signer_free|signer_new|signer_new_detached|skesk_decrypt|tag_to_string|tpk_alive|tpk_alive_at|tpk_builder_add_certification_subkey|tpk_builder_add_encryption_subkey|tpk_builder_add_signing_subkey|tpk_builder_add_userid|tpk_builder_autocrypt|tpk_builder_default|tpk_builder_free|tpk_builder_generate|tpk_builder_set_cipher_suite|tpk_clone|tpk_dump|tpk_equal|tpk_expired|tpk_expired_at|tpk_fingerprint|tpk_free|tpk_from_bytes|tpk_from_file|tpk_from_packet_parser|tpk_from_packet_pile|tpk_from_reader|tpk_into_tsk|tpk_is_tsk|tpk_key_iter|tpk_key_iter_free|tpk_key_iter_next|tpk_merge|tpk_merge_packets|tpk_primary|tpk_primary_user_id|tpk_revocation_status|tpk_revoke|tpk_revoke_in_place|tpk_serialize|tpk_set_expiry|tpk_user_id_binding_iter|tsk_free|tsk_into_tpk|tsk_new|tsk_serialize|tsk_tpk|user_attribute_value|user_id_binding_iter_free|user_id_binding_iter_next|user_id_binding_selfsig|user_id_binding_user_id|user_id_value|verification_result_code|verification_result_level|verification_results_at_level|verification_result_signature|verify|writer_alloc|writer_free|writer_from_bytes|writer_from_fd|writer_from_file|writer_stack_finalize|writer_stack_finalize_one|writer_stack_message|writer_stack_write|writer_stack_write_all|writer_write|reader|writer|packet_parser|packet_parser_result|packet_parser_eof|keyid|fingerprint|revocation_status|revocation_status_variant|armor_kind|armor_header|tag|unknown|signature|one_pass_sig|p_key|user_id|user_attribute|literal|compressed_data|pkesk|skesk|seip|mdc|packet|packet_pile|reason_for_revocation|user_id_binding|user_id_binding_iter|tpk_key_iter|tpk|tsk|tpk_builder|tpk_cipher_suite|public_key_algorithm|writer_stack|encryption_mode|secret|verification_results|verification_result|verification_result_code|sequoia_decrypt_get_public_keys_cb_t|sequoia_decrypt_get_secret_keys_cb_t|sequoia_decrypt_check_signatures_cb_t|mpi|signer|key_pair|p_key|status|error)/pgp_\1/g' -e 's/SQ_(ARMOR_KIND_ANY|ARMOR_KIND_FILE|ARMOR_KIND_FORCE_WIDTH|ARMOR_KIND_MESSAGE|ARMOR_KIND_PUBLICKEY|ARMOR_KIND_SECRETKEY|ARMOR_KIND_SIGNATURE|ENCRYPTION_MODE_AT_REST|ENCRYPTION_MODE_FOR_TRANSPORT|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_DSA|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_ECDH|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_ECDSA|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_EDDSA|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_ENCRYPT|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_ENCRYPT_SIGN|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_FORCE_WIDTH|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_ENCRYPT|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_ENCRYPT_SIGN|PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_SIGN|REASON_FOR_REVOCATION_FORCE_WIDTH|REASON_FOR_REVOCATION_KEY_COMPROMISED|REASON_FOR_REVOCATION_KEY_RETIRED|REASON_FOR_REVOCATION_KEY_SUPERSEDED|REASON_FOR_REVOCATION_UID_RETIRED|REASON_FOR_REVOCATION_UNSPECIFIED|REVOCATION_STATUS_COULD_BE|REVOCATION_STATUS_FORCE_WIDTH|REVOCATION_STATUS_NOT_AS_FAR_AS_WE_KNOW|REVOCATION_STATUS_REVOKED|STATUS_BAD_SIGNATURE|STATUS_FORCE_WIDTH|STATUS_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE|STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT|STATUS_INVALID_OPERATION|STATUS_INVALID_PASSWORD|STATUS_INVALID_SESSION_KEY|STATUS_IO_ERROR|STATUS_MALFORMED_MESSAGE|STATUS_MALFORMED_PACKET|STATUS_MALFORMED_TPK|STATUS_MANIPULATED_MESSAGE|STATUS_MISSING_SESSION_KEY|STATUS_NETWORK_POLICY_VIOLATION|STATUS_SUCCESS|STATUS_UNKNOWN_ERROR|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_AEAD_ALGORITHM|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLICKEY_ALGORITHM|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHM|STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_TPK|TAG_COMPRESSED_DATA|TAG_LITERAL|TAG_MARKER|TAG_MDC|TAG_ONE_PASS_SIG|TAG_PKESK|TAG_PRIVATE|TAG_PUBLIC_KEY|TAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY|TAG_RESERVED|TAG_SECRET_KEY|TAG_SECRET_SUBKEY|TAG_SED|TAG_SEIP|TAG_SIGNATURE|TAG_SKESK|TAG_TRUST|TAG_UNASSIGNED|TAG_USER_ATTRIBUTE|TAG_USER_ID|TPK_CIPHER_SUITE_CV|TPK_CIPHER_SUITE_FORCE_WIDTH|TPK_CIPHER_SUITE_RSA|VERIFICATION_RESULT_CODE_BAD_CHECKSUM|VERIFICATION_RESULT_CODE_FORCE_WIDTH|VERIFICATION_RESULT_CODE_GOOD_CHECKSUM|VERIFICATION_RESULT_CODE_MISSING_KEY)/PGP_\1/g' $F ; done
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- This creates a new crate, 'sequoia-openpgp-ffi', and moves a
handful of functions from 'sequoia-ffi' to it.
- The 'sequoia-ffi' crate is a superset of the 'sequoia-openpgp-ffi'
crate. This is accomplished by some include! magic.
- My first attempt involved having 'sequoia-ffi' depend on
'sequoia-openpgp-ffi', so that the former just re-exports the
symbols. However, that turned out to be unreliable, and might be
not what we want, because it could also duplicate parts of Rust's
standard library.
- Fixes #144.
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